Credit Horizons*

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, John Moore, and Shengxing Zhang
Princeton, Edinburgh, and LSE

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Abstract

Entrepreneurs appear to raise funds largely against their near-term revenues, even when their investment has a longer horizon. To explain why, we develop a model of credit horizons in which the inalienable human capital of an entrepreneur-cum-engineer is essential for constructing and then maintaining a production plant. The further distant into the future, the larger the fraction of the revenue flow that can be attributed to the engineer’s cumulative maintenance. Looking ahead from the time of investment, we see that because the engineer cannot precommit to work for less than her marginal contribution to (future) production, as time passes more of the surplus goes (has effectively already gone) to her – and concomitantly less goes to financial claimants. Hence the investing engineer’s fundraising capacity is largely governed by revenues in the near horizon.

We use our framework to examine how credit horizons interact with plant dynamics and the evolution of productivity. We also show that a permanent fall in the interest rate in small open economy can lead to a temporary boom followed by slower growth in the long run.

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1 Introduction

To finance investment, entrepreneurs usually raise external funding against their future cash flows as well as put up their fixed assets as collateral.\(^1\) But the funds raised are typically only a few years’ worth of revenue.\(^2\) It can thus be said that borrowing is largely near-term even when investment projects are long-term.

In this paper, we develop a model of credit horizons in which the human capital of an entrepreneur-cum-engineer is essential for the construction and then maintenance of a production facility. To get a flavour of our model, think of an engineer, Emma, investing in goods and a building in which to construct plant. There is no obstacle to Emma raising funds against the plant: it can be freely sold at the time of investment. What cannot be sold is Emma’s engineering expertise, her human capital, which we assume is acquired through learning-by-doing associated with her gross investment. This inalienability constrains Emma’s fund-raising ability, so the scale of her investment is limited by her net worth.\(^3\)

A saver, Sam, who buys the plant will subsequently need an engineer’s expertise to maintain its productivity. Without adequate maintenance, productivity would deteriorate. We adopt a form of ‘roundabout’ technology, inspired by Böhm-Bawerk (1889): we suppose that tomorrow’s plant productivity is a function of both today’s productivity and today’s engineering input. Hence, although on any given date the plant’s current productivity is historically given, its long-run future productivity will mostly depend upon the forthcoming cumulative maintenance effort.

Crucially, because her human capital is inalienable, Emma cannot commit at the time of investment, ex ante, subsequently to supply her maintenance services to Sam. The division of ex post surplus could be determined through competition or bargaining. In the body of the paper, we assume there is no

\(^1\) Lian and Ma (2021) examine firm-level data of US non-financial corporations to document that approximately 80% of corporate borrowing is backed by future cash flow and only 20% by collateral assets – though this 4:1 ratio tends to be lower for smaller US firms and lower in other countries like Japan. Drechsel (2020) also documents that much of US corporate borrowing is constrained by firms’ current earnings.

\(^2\) Lian and Ma (2021) further examine debt covenants to find that, at the 25 percentile, the cash-flow-based debt is restricted by 3 years’ worth of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) and, at the 75 percentile, by 4.5 years’ worth.

\(^3\) Hart and Moore (1994).
specificity of match between plant and engineers – Sam can hire any engineer to maintain his plant and Emma can work for any plant owner – so Emma’s ex post remuneration is determined competitively. Here, our sole departure from the Arrow-Debreu model is the assumption that Emma is unable to commit to work for less than the ex post competitive wage; this form of constraint is sometimes called a non-exclusivity constraint.\footnote{See, for example, Allen (1985), Townsend (1989), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and Attar, Mariotti and Salanie (2011).} Aside from avoiding the need to make some auxiliary assumption about a bargaining protocol, the great merit of the competitive model for us is that it facilitates analysis of a number of important questions, such as how does an economy with heterogeneous plant behave dynamically – questions that we couldn’t readily investigate within a bargaining framework. Nonetheless, it should be admitted that our competitive model has novel features that require a little digestion. So, for the moment, let us look at a simple bargaining model that should feel familiar from the corporate finance literature, and use it to discuss the basic economics of our theory of credit horizons.

Let us suppose – here in the Introduction only – that Emma’s specific expertise is needed to maintain the plant she sells to Sam. Then the ex post division of surplus will be determined through a sequence of bargains between them. Consider the following example. To construct a unit of plant, Emma has to outlay $x$ goods, as well as acquire a building at cost $q = f/(R - 1)$ where $f$ is the building’s alternative (generic) daily use value and $R > 1$ is the daily gross interest rate (ignore depreciation). To raise funds, she sells the plant to Sam for some amount $b$ – to be determined below – which, in our case of interest, is strictly less than $x + q$. Think of $b$ as Emma’s borrowing capacity per unit of investment. The gap, $x + q - b$, is the required downpayment per unit of investment that she must find from her own resources.

Each unit thereafter delivers its owner, Sam, a gross daily return of $a$, provided the plant has been maintained by Emma (in this bargaining example, she is the only person capable of looking after it). Assume that if she misses a day, although the plant generates the return $a$ on that day, it thereafter becomes permanently worthless – an extreme form of roundaboutness. Every day Sam has to bargain with Emma about the level of her pay to maintain it, bearing in mind that the stakes are high (failure to agree would be fatal to the future of the project) and that on every subsequent day Emma
will be back for more (she cannot commit her future labour).

Assume a simple bargaining protocol: on each day following the initial investment, Emma extracts – in the form of a payment $w$ – some fraction $(1 - \theta)$ of Sam’s end-of-day discounted future surplus, $V$. That is, $V$ and $w$ solve

$$V = \frac{1}{R} (a - w + V)$$

$$w = (1 - \theta)V.$$

Before moving on, we should make two points about interpretation. First, although we think in terms of credit horizons, the initial contract between Emma and Sam is really a sales contract whereby Sam, as the new owner, buys all control rights over the plant, including not only the right to decide its future maintenance schedule but also the right to liquidate it (to return the building to its alternative use). Hence external finance is similar to equity finance – though since for the most part we assume no uncertainty at plant level, the distinction between debt and equity is moot. Second, for brevity we will often refer to $w$ as Emma’s wage. But $w$ is not a wage in the usual sense: it should be seen as the return to a key member of personnel, say the chief engineer/scientist/chef/founder. In this context, $w$ is more akin to inside equity.

Now Emma’s borrowing capacity, $b$, equals the amount Sam is willing pay per unit of new plant, namely $V$. It helps to write this out as

$$b = V = \frac{a}{R - \theta} = \frac{1}{R} a + \frac{1}{R^2} \theta a + \frac{1}{R^3} \theta^2 a + \frac{1}{R^4} \theta^3 a + ...$$

Notice how, because of the geometric decay $1, \theta, \theta^2, \theta^3, ...$, Sam’s ex post net returns are in effect front-loaded. As a result, at the time of investment Emma is less able to borrow against the more distant future by selling the plant ownership to Sam. Her credit horizon is foreshortened.

A straightforward intuition can be offered for this front loading: the later the return comes in, the more opportunities Emma has to bite chunks out of it. On the face of it, though, this intuition seems at odds with the fact that $V$ is simply the discounted sum of the daily revenue $a$ net of the wage $w$:

$$b = V = \frac{1}{R} (a - w) + \frac{1}{R^2} (a - w) + \frac{1}{R^3} (a - w) + \frac{1}{R^4} (a - w) + ...$$
And since $a$ and $w$ are both stationary, where is the front-loading? The answer is that $w$ is itself forward-looking:

$$w = (1 - \theta)V = \frac{1 - \theta}{R}a + \frac{1 - \theta}{R^2}\theta a + \frac{1 - \theta}{R^3}\theta^2a + \frac{1 - \theta}{R^4}\theta^3a + ...$$

Substituting this formula for $w$ back into the discounted sum of net revenues, $(a - w)$, and collecting like terms, we obtain yet another way of writing $b$ and $V$:

$$b = V = \frac{1}{R}a + \frac{1}{R^2}[a - (1 - \theta)a]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{R^3}[a - (1 - \theta)\theta a - (1 - \theta)a]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{R^4}[a - (1 - \theta)\theta^2a - (1 - \theta)\theta a - (1 - \theta)a]$$
$$+ ...$$

This expression reveals more of the economics. Following the initial investment, the first day’s revenue $a$ belongs entirely to Sam, insofar as the impact of Emma’s maintenance contribution on that day only kicks in from the next day. A portion, $(1 - \theta)a$, of the second day’s revenue $a$ has effectively already been paid to Emma, on the first day. On the third day, two portions, $(1 - \theta)\theta a$ and $(1 - \theta)a$, of the revenue $a$ have effectively already been paid to Emma – respectively, $(1 - \theta)\theta a$ on the first day and $(1 - \theta)a$ on the second. And so on. Overall, Sam’s share of revenue is dropping through time.

There may appear to be an error in our economic logic, which we should address: Sam’s valuation of plant net of the opportunity cost of the building, $V - q$, can be written

$$V - q = \frac{1}{R}[a - f] + \frac{1}{R^2}[a - (1 - \theta)a - f]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{R^3}[a - (1 - \theta)\theta a - (1 - \theta)a - f]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{R^4}[a - (1 - \theta)\theta^2a - (1 - \theta)\theta a - (1 - \theta)a - f]$$
$$+ ...$$
Notice that in this summation, all the longer-horizon terms—beyond a certain date in the future—become negative. But then, from that date, why would Sam continue with a project whose net payoff appears to have turned negative? Wouldn’t he be better off shutting the project down at that point and selling the building for \( q \) (thereby either returning it to generic use or handing it on to someone starting a new project)? No. Because the negative components \( (1-\theta)a, (1-\theta)\theta a, (1-\theta)\theta^2 a, \ldots \) reflect wages that have already been paid to Emma and are therefore sunk costs. And looking forward from any given day, Sam’s net flow of receipts, \( a - w - f \), stays constant and positive.

These insights from the bargaining example carry over to our competitive model where engineers’ expertise is not specific to the plant. The further distant we are into the future, the larger the fraction of the revenue flow that can be attributed to engineers’ cumulative maintenance. Looking ahead from the time of investment, we see that because engineers cannot precommit to work for less than their marginal contribution to future production, as time passes more of the surplus goes (has effectively already gone) to engineers—and concomitantly less goes to the initial plant owner. Hence the price of new plant—an investing engineer’s fundraising capacity—is largely governed by revenues in the near horizon.

Parenthetically, we note that an often made criticism of a capitalist economy is that the horizons of shareholders and managers are too short-term. This idea finds an echo in our model. Plant owners—who are akin to shareholders and managers—derive value mainly from the plant’s near-term revenues, insofar as they are obliged to pay engineers—their key workers—a forward-looking reward to maintain the plant.\(^5\)

Our model displays a rich interaction between credit horizons and firm/plant dynamics. As the owner of new plant, Sam has to decide on a plan for its future maintenance. He has a distinct choice. Either he curbs maintenance costs and allows productivity to deteriorate slowly, to some point when he decides to exit and liquidate plant as a generic building—call this his stopping strategy. Or he pays the costs needed to maintain, or even improve, productivity with a view to staying in production over the long haul—call this his continuing strategy.

This dichotomous decision—either planning to stop within a finite hori-

\(^5\)De la O and Myers (2021) find that expectations of cash flow growth in the near future explain most movements in the S&P 500 price-dividend and price-earnings ratios.
zon, or planning to continue for the long haul – reveals an intriguing feature of equilibrium. For an open set of parameters, even though all plant starts off identical in productivity, their qualities diverge over time: some plant improves in productivity and other plant deteriorates and eventually shuts down. (Allowing for initial heterogeneity would purify this mixed-strategy equilibrium so that plant owners would, more realistically, follow pure strategies. Incidentally, this is where the competitive framework comes into its own; we doubt that these complex dynamics would be tractable in a bargaining model.) In the complementary part of the parameter space, all owners of new plant choose the continuing strategy and their qualities do not diverge. We think all this may be a fruitful new vein for research into firm/plant dynamics, which should inform the study of how aggregate productivity evolves.

A question of particular concern to us is whether persistently low real interest rates can stifle aggregate investment and growth. The question is motivated by Japan, where the economy struggles to regain robust growth despite interest rates having been close to zero for over two decades. Recently, this has become a concern for other developed economies too. With this in mind, we model a small open economy where the world interest rate, $R$, is taken to be exogenous. What happens if the real interest rate $R$ falls permanently?

Let us go back to our bargaining example. Because Emma’s pledgeable return is predominantly near horizon, when $R$ is lower, Sam’s willingness to pay for new plant, $b$, does not increase much: $b = a/(R - \theta)$ is not very sensitive to $R$ (unless $\theta$ is close to 1). On the other hand, Emma’s investment cost, $x + q$, includes the building cost, $q$, which has a longer duration: $q = f/(R-1)$ is much more sensitive to $R$. Now consider the impact of a permanent fall in $R$. Because the building has a longer duration than Sam’s valuation of plant, $q$ can rise more than $b$ with a fall in $R$. In which case, Emma’s required downpayment per unit of investment, $x + q - b$, will rise – contrary to the usual notion that lower interest rates help borrowers.

The scale of Emma’s investment, $I$, will be given by a critical ratio, now common in macroeconomic models of investment under financing constraints: her net worth (net of her consumption), $N$, divided by the required downpayment per unit of plant,

$$I = \frac{N}{x + q - b},$$

6 Aumann et al. (1983).
We show that, as might be expected, when $R$ falls, the numerator of this critical ratio, net worth $N$, rises. ($N$ is largely determined by the wage $w$, which rises as $R$ falls.) However, because the pledgeable returns have a shorter duration than investment cost, the denominator can also rise – the more so, the more major an element of cost is the building.

There may be a parallel here with the housing market. When interest rates fall persistently, we often observe housing prices rising more than borrowing capacities. As a result, first-time buyers have a hard time getting onto the housing ladder. On the other hand, people who already own their houses enjoy a large increase in net worth and can afford to move into larger properties.\footnote{Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).} In the long run, the housing market may stagnate if not many new buyers enter into the market.

Along a time path following an unexpected fall in $R$, the rise in net worth initially dominates the rise in the required downpayment, leading to a temporary boom – especially if the liability to foreign creditors is not indexed. But the rise in the required downpayment can eventually overwhelm the rise in net worth. Overall, we demonstrate that domestic investment can fall with a fall in world interest rates, as can the growth rate in the long run. Further, we show that the welfare of all domestic agents – their discounted utilities calculated at the time of the fall in $R$ so as to include any beneficial effects of the temporary boom – can fall too.

We believe the dynamic path we uncover here – especially the disjunction between the initial rise in the value of total investment (including real estate) versus the subsequent fall in underlying productive investment in plant and human capital – may provide a sobering account of a number of property-fuelled booms sparked by lower interest rates. In particular, it may give a less rosy picture of, say, the Japanese property boom in the late 1980s, or the property boom in southern Europe following the introduction of the euro in the early 2000s, than more popular narratives based on asset price bubbles.

Lastly, in terms of policy intervention, we show there can be scope for an investment subsidy, financed by a plant-level payroll tax on engineers’ maintenance services. This policy can improve welfare by implementing a form of additional group borrowing by the engineers, although the success of any such policy depends on exactly what the government is able to monitor.

The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we lay out the model. Section 3 describes equilibrium in the part of the parameter space
where no plant owner chooses the stopping strategy – what we call the Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping. Section 4 considers the complementary part of the parameter space, where some plant owners choose to stop and others choose to continue – what we call the Mixed Equilibrium. Section 5 looks at the effects of a fall in the interest rate. Section 6 extends the model to allow for idiosyncratic uncertainty across plant. Finally, Section 7 considers policy intervention.

2 Model

We consider a small open economy with an exogenous world real interest rate $R$. There is no aggregate uncertainty and, for the moment, we focus on steady state equilibrium (later, we will examine the effects of an unanticipated persistent drop in $R$). There is a homogeneous perishable consumption/investment good at each date $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ We use this good as numeraire as we consider a non-monetary economy.

There is a continuum of domestic agents, each maximizing utility of consumption $c_t$ from the present to the infinite future:

$$E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln c_t \right], \quad (1)$$

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the utility discount factor and $\ln c$ is the natural logarithm of $c$. We assume that the exogenous world interest rate is nonnegative in net terms and lower than the subjective interest rate:

$$1 \leq R < \frac{1}{\beta}. \quad (2)$$

Each agent sometimes has an investment opportunity (being an entrepreneur or simply “engineer”), and sometimes not (“saver”). The transition probabilities of being an engineer conditional on being an engineer or a saver in the previous period are given by

$$\text{Prob (engineer at } t \mid \text{engineer at } t-1) = \pi^E,$$
$$\text{Prob (engineer at } t \mid \text{saver at } t-1) = \pi^S.$$ 

We assume the arrival of an investment opportunity is persistent to a limited degree so that $0 \leq \pi^S \leq \pi^E < 1$. 


At each date \( t \), an engineer \( E \) can jointly produce plant and tools from goods and building: within the period, per unit of plant,

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ x \text{ goods } & \} \\
1 \text{ building } & \rightarrow \{ \text{ plant of productivity } 1 \} \\
& \quad \text{ 1 E-tool} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The investment technology is constant returns to scale and scalable by any positive number \( i \). Plant and tools are ready for use from date \( t + 1 \). Here we can think of tools as the engineer’s human capital acquired through her learning by doing. As in Arrow (1962), the learning by doing is associated with gross investment instead of regular production.

Each tool (or human capital) is specific to the engineer (“E-tool”) in that only she knows how to use it – unless she sells it to another engineer and teaches him. Because the engineer cannot usefully sell her tools to savers and her human capital is inalienable, she raises funds by selling all that she can, the plant.

The plant owner has a constant returns to scale production technology. Match between plant and engineer is not specific. At each date, the owner of one unit of plant of productivity \( z \) can hire any number \( h \geq 0 \) of tools (hiring each tool along with the engineer who knows how to use it) at a competitive rental price \( w \) (“wage”) to produce goods and maintain plant productivity: within the period, per unit of plant,

\[
\begin{align*}
\{ \text{ plant of productivity } z \} & \rightarrow \{ y = az \text{ goods } & \} \\
& \quad \{ \lambda \text{ plant of productivity } z' = z^\theta h^\eta \} \\
& \quad \{ \lambda h \text{ tools} & \}
\end{align*}
\]

\( a > 0 \) is the common productivity of all plant and \( z' \) is plant productivity after maintenance. \( \lambda < 1 \) reflects depreciation, by which a fraction \( 1 - \lambda \) of plant and tools are destroyed after use. The parameter \( \theta \) is the share of present plant productivity and \( \eta \) is the share of engineers’ tools (human capital) in maintaining plant productivity. We assume that \( \theta, \eta > 0 \), and \( \theta + \eta \leq 1 \). We can think of physical plant as tangible capital, productivity of plant as intangible capital, and both contributing to production at present and future.

A brief word about interpretation is in order here. Although we call \( w \) the engineer’s “wage”, it is important to distinguish it from the simple wage of, say, an unskilled worker. The engineer’s remuneration is like payment to
a skilled core employee who influences the firm’s future productivity. Notice that, unlike in a more fleshed-out macroeconomic framework, we assume a simple reduced-form production of output: proportional to the productivity of the plant. In Appendix A we show that this formulation is justified when output is a general decreasing returns to scale function of plant productivity and unskilled labor, where unskilled labor is hired by plant owners in a competitive market.

New buildings are supplied by foreigners. We assume foreign builders have an alternative use of building to produces a fixed amount of goods \( f \) per unit every period and the a building depreciate at the same rate as plant as

\[
1 \text{ building} \rightarrow \begin{cases} \ f \text{ goods} \\ \lambda \text{ building} \end{cases}.
\]

Because foreigners are indifferent between supplying building to home engineers and using building themselves, the price building \( q \) is

\[
q = \frac{f}{R} + \frac{\lambda f}{R^2} + \frac{\lambda^2 f}{R^3} + \cdots = \frac{f}{R - \lambda}.
\]

Competitive foreign builders have enough capacity to satisfy the building demand of the domestic economy at their marginal cost \( q \). We introduce foreign builders to ease the exposition. Alternatively we can think engineers and plant owners rent building and pay the rent \( f \) per unit every period. Whether building is owned or rented by plant owners does not matter much the economic implication.

The plant owner always has the option to stop and convert the plant into generic building. The value of a unit of plant of productivity \( z \) at the end of

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8 Whether the remuneration is a spot payment or a claim to future revenue of the plant does not matter, because, to finance downpayment, an investing engineer can equally use a spot payment or the sale of a claim.

9 Any difference between the building purchase price and the construction cost is the profit of foreign builders. If builders were domestic agents, we would need to take into account the impact of their income and wealth on the domestic economy – although we do not expect this would qualitatively change our findings.

10 More generally, we can think plant owner needs to pay fixed cost \( f \) per period to operate the plant. If \( f \) is fixed cost for production, total fixed cost should be subtracted from GDP. Otherwise, it does not matter much whether \( f \) is opportunity cost of using building (as in text), rental price, or fixed cost of production.
the period is given by
\[ V(z; w, R) = \max \left\{ q, \frac{1}{R} \max_{h} \left[ az - wh + \lambda V(z^{h}; w, R) \right] \right\}. \] (5)

The value \( q \) inside the braces is the value of stopping, while the second term is the value of continuing – the sum of net cash flow (gross revenue minus wage) and the capital value of the remaining \( \lambda \) units of plant with productivity \( z' = z^{h} \).

Knowing that the return from maintaining plant productivity depends upon his future production and maintenance choices, the plant owner must devise a long-term plan: Either stop after a finite number of periods \( T \), or continue forever \((T = \infty)\)? For each \( T = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \), define recursively the owner’s value of a unit of plant of current productivity \( z \) stopping in \( T \) periods:

\[
S^{0}(z; w, R) = q, \quad S^{1}(z; w, R) = \frac{1}{R} (az + \lambda q), \quad S^{2}(z; w, R) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{h} \left[ az - wh + \frac{\lambda}{R} (az^{h} + \lambda q) \right], \]

\[
\vdots \quad S^{T}(z; w, R) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{h} \left[ az - wh + \lambda S^{T-1}(z^{h}; w, R) \right]. \] (6)

If the plant is shut down tonight, the value \( S^{0}(z; w, R) \) is \( q \). If the plant owner shuts down tomorrow night, he will not hire tools tomorrow and the value \( S^{1}(z; w, R) \) equals the present value of tomorrow’s revenue plus building value after depreciation. If the plant owner shuts down in two nights’ time, he hires tomorrow’s tools to balance the cost and benefit of maintaining plant productivity for production two days later. Generally, the owner’s value of a unit of plant of current productivity \( z \) stopping in \( T \) periods, \( S^{T}(z; w, R) \), equals the present value of the sum of tomorrow’s net cash flow and the value of \( \lambda \) units of plant of productivity \( z^{h} \) stopping in \( T - 1 \) periods.

Now, for all value of \( z \), the plant owner chooses the optimal stopping time so that
\[ V(z; w, R) = \sup_{T \geq 0} S^{T}(z; w, R). \] (7)

Because new plant that she sells to a saver at the time of investment has productivity 1, the engineer raises, per unit of plant,
\[ b = V(1; w, R). \] (8)
The value $b$ can be thought of as the engineer’s fund-raising capacity per unit of investment.

The required own-funds (downpayment) per unit of investment equals the gap between the investment cost and the fund-raising capacity:

$$x + q - b.$$ We assume that a new saver – an engineer yesterday who switched to being a saver today – can sell her tools (after use today) to an engineer, and teach him how to use them, at a competitive price $x + q - b$.

The budget constraint of an agent at date $t$ who has $h_t$ tools and $d_t$ financial assets is

$$c_t + (x + q - b)i_t + \frac{d_{t+1}}{R} = wh_t + d_t,$$

where $h_t$ is positive only if the agent was an engineer yesterday. Here, financial assets consist of the value of plant ownership as well as maturing one-period discount bonds. The discount bond is traded internationally at the interest rate $R$. Only if the agent is an engineer today, investment $i_t$ can be positive and her tools tomorrow will be

$$h_{t+1} = \lambda h_t + i_t.$$ The budget constraint can be rewritten as

$$c_t + (x + q - b)h_{t+1} + \frac{d_{t+1}}{R} = [w + \lambda(x + q - b)]h_t + d_t = n_t,$$

where $n_t$ is net worth – the sum of flow return (wage) and capital value (replacement cost or resale value) of tools, plus financial assets.

The rate of return for an engineer investing with maximal fund-raising is given by

$$R^E = \frac{w + \lambda(x + q - b)}{x + q - b},$$

the ratio of total returns of one tool to the downpayment of investment. (Remember she sells plant to a saver at the time of investment and so does not receive the return on plant.) If the return on investment $R^E$ exceeds the interest rate $R$, then, thanks to the logarithmic utility function, the engineer’s consumption and investment are

$$c_t = (1 - \beta)n_t,$$

$$(x + q - b)h_{t+1} = \beta n_t.$$
And a saver’s consumption and asset holdings are

$$c_t = (1 - \beta)n_t, \quad (11a)$$
$$\frac{d_{t+1}}{R} = \beta n_t. \quad (11b)$$

Notice that individual consumption depends only on present net worth and not on whether the agent has an investment opportunity today. Because marginal utility is independent of whether or not there is an investment opportunity, there are no gains from insurance (such as the agent receives a bonus if she has an investment opportunity while pays a premium if not).

A steady state equilibrium of our small open economy is characterized by the wage $w$ and the new plant price $b$, together with the quantity choices of savers/plant owners ($c, d, h, z, y$), engineers ($c, h, i$), and foreigners (who have net asset holdings $D^*$), such that the markets for goods, tools, plant, and bonds all clear.

## 3 Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping

We use a guess and verify method to characterize equilibrium. Suppose that in the steady state, no plant owner shuts down his plant until it depreciates exogenously. Then the value function (5) is the present value of net cash flow into the indefinite future:

$$V(z; w, R) = \frac{1}{R}(y_t - wh_t) + \frac{\lambda}{R^2}(y_{t+1} - wh_{t+1}) + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3}(y_{t+2} - wh_{t+2}) + ...$$

An optimal sequence $\{h_t, z_{t+1}, h_{t+1}, z_{t+2}, h_{t+2}, ...\}$ equates the discounted sum of marginal product to the wage (see Appendix B for the derivation):

$$w = \frac{\lambda}{R} \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} + \left(\frac{\lambda}{R}\right)^2 \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} + \left(\frac{\lambda}{R}\right)^3 \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} \theta \frac{z_{t+3}}{z_{t+2}} + ... \quad (12)$$

The first term on the right hand side is the marginal impact of a date-t tool on output $y_{t+1}$ through its impact on plant productivity $z_{t+1}$. The second term is the marginal impact of the date-t tool on $y_{t+2}$ through its impact on $z_{t+1}$ which impacts $z_{t+2}$. The third term is the marginal impact of the date-t tool on $y_{t+3}$ through its impact on $z_{t+1}$ which impacts $z_{t+2}$ which in turn impacts $z_{t+3}$. 

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Multiplying through by \( h_t \) and simplifying, we get

\[
wh_t = \frac{\lambda}{R} \eta y_{t+1} + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^2} \eta \theta y_{t+2} + \frac{\lambda^3}{R^3} \eta \theta^2 y_{t+3} + \ldots \tag{13}
\]

The present wage bill for engineers equals the present discounted value of a fraction \( \eta \) of tomorrow’s output, plus a fraction \( \eta \theta \) of output two periods later, plus a fraction \( \eta \theta^2 \) of output three periods later, etc.

An engineer raises funds by selling new plant at price

\[
b = V(1; w, R) = \frac{1}{R} a + \frac{\lambda}{R^2} y_{t+1} (1 - \eta) + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3} y_{t+2} (1 - \eta - \eta \theta) + \ldots \tag{14}
\]

All plant starts with productivity \( z = 1 \). Moreover, investment generates an equal number of plant and tools, which have the same technological depreciation rate \( 1 - \lambda \). If no plant is stopped, the ratio of tools to plant stays one-to-one. Then because

\[
z' = z^\theta h^\eta = 1 \text{ when } z = h = 1,
\]

all plant is maintained at initial productivity \( z = 1 \) until the exogenous death of plant through depreciation. Output per unit of plant is unchanged from the initial level:

\[
y_{t+1} = y_{t+2} = y_{t+3} = \ldots = a.
\]

The engineer’s fund-raising capacity \( b \) becomes

\[
b = \frac{1}{R} a + \frac{\lambda}{R^2} a (1 - \eta) + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3} a (1 - \eta - \eta \theta) + \ldots \tag{15}
\]

Notice how the plant owner’s share declines in more distant future output: 1, 1 - \( \eta \), 1 - \( \eta - \eta \theta \), . . .

In Figure 1, the horizontal axis is time horizon: \( t \) measures how far distant future is from present. The vertical axis is output, and the shares of future output for the plant owner and engineers as functions of time horizon. The parameters and equilibrium wage rate \( w \) shown in the figure. In pure equilibrium with no stopping, output is \( y_t = a \). The downward sloping curve is the share of future output the plant owner obtains. Think of this as his rightful reward for his "contribution" to those revenues, stemming from the initial productivity \( z = 1 \) of the plant that he paid to own.
By calculating the present value of the engineers’ payoff from new plant

\[
\frac{1}{R}w + \frac{\lambda}{R^2}w + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3}w + \ldots \\
= 0 + \frac{\lambda}{R^2}a\eta + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3}a(\eta + \eta\theta) + \frac{\lambda^3}{R^4}a(\eta + \eta\theta + \eta\theta^2) + \ldots
\]

we see that, correspondingly, the engineers’ share rises in more distant future output: 0, \(\eta\), \(\eta + \eta\theta\), \(\eta + \eta\theta + \eta\theta^2\), \ldots. The gap between output and the owner’s share in Figure 1 is the engineers’ share of future output. Intuitively, as the cumulative contribution of engineers’ human capital to plant productivity rises with horizon, the effects of the plant’s initial productivity – essentially what a saver gets when he buys a new plant – tails off. Figure 1 illustrates why the plant owner’s share (investing engineer’s pledgeable return) is largely near-term, and she raise funds against near future revenue.¹¹

¹¹Notice that Figure 1 shows which shares of future output belongs to the plant owner vs. engineers as a function of time horizon – how distant is the future from now. Because wage reflects contribution to future output and past wage payment is sunk cost, the realized division of output does not change with the age of plant in Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping: \(a - w\) to the plant owner and \(w\) to engineers.
Take a special case of constant returns to scale maintenance technology $\eta + \theta = 1$ and no depreciation $\lambda = 1$. The value function of plant with no stopping is

$$V(z) = \frac{1}{R} \max_h \left[ az - wh + V(z h^{1-\theta}) \right].$$

The first order condition for $h$ implies

$$w = (1 - \theta) V'(z') \frac{z'}{h} = (1 - \theta) V'(z') \left( \frac{z}{R} \right)^{\theta}.$$  \hfill (17)

We guess the value function to be proportional to $z$ as

$$V(z) = vz = \frac{1}{R} [az + \theta vz']$$

$$= \frac{1}{R} [az + \theta V(z')].$$ \hfill (18)

Because $h$ and $z'$ are proportional to $z$ from (17) and $V'(z) = v$, we verify the guess.

This expression (18) is identical to the bilateral bargaining between Emma (engineer) and Sam (plant owner) if the bargaining powers of Sam and Emma are $\theta$ and $1 - \theta$. In bilateral bargaining, because Sam needs Emma every period, he only obtains $\theta < 1$ fraction of the continuation value of the plant at the end of next period. In our baseline model, because the wage bill of engineers equals a fraction $1 - \theta$ of the next period value $V'(z') z' = V(z')$ under constant returns to scale maintenance technology from (17), the plant owner captures only $\theta$ fraction of the continuation value as in (18).

In particular, in Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping, we have $z = h = 1 = z'$ and

$$b = V(1) = v = \frac{a}{R - \theta}.$$  \hfill (17)

In both bilateral bargaining and competitive market cases, the saver (Sam) is willing to provide fund to the investing engineer (Emma) at the time of investment only against near-term revenue. An advantage of using a competitive framework with non-exclusivity constraint is that we can analyze dynamics of economy without specifying details of bilateral bargaining when each agent may or may not have an investment opportunities at each future date.

Returning to the general baseline model, we can aggregate across engineers and savers to obtain aggregate tool holdings $H_{t+1}$, financial asset
holdings $D_{t+1}/R$, consumption $C_t$, and net worth of engineers and savers ($N_t^E$ and $N_t^S$):

\[
(x + q - b)H_{t+1} = \beta N_t^E, \quad \frac{D_{t+1}}{R} = \beta N_t^S, \quad C_t = (1 - \beta) (N_t^E + N_t^S), \quad N_t^E = \pi^E [w + \lambda(x + q - b)] H_t + \pi^S D_t, \quad N_t^S = (1 - \pi^E) [w + \lambda(x + q - b)] H_t + (1 - \pi^S) D_t.
\]

Equation (19a) says the aggregate capital value of tools equals the aggregate net worth of engineers after subtracting their consumption, and equation (19b) says the aggregate value of financial assets equals the aggregate net worth of savers after consumption. In equation (19c), aggregate consumption equals a fraction $1 - \beta$ of the aggregate net worth of domestic residents. The aggregate net worth of engineers is the sum of the net worth of continuing and new engineers in equation (19d), and the aggregate net worth of savers is sum of the net worth of new and continuing savers in equation (19e).

The economy exhibits endogenous growth $G$: along a steady state path, such that

\[
\frac{H_{t+1}}{H_t} = \frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} = \frac{C_{t+1}}{C_t} = G,
\]

\[
GN_t^E = N_{t+1}^E = \pi^E R^E \beta N_t^E + \pi^S R^S N_t^S, \quad GN_t^S = N_{t+1}^S = (1 - \pi^E) R^E \beta N_t^E + (1 - \pi^S) R^S N_t^S.
\]

Substituting out $N_t^E$, we find that $G$ solves

\[
G = \pi^E R^E \beta + \pi^S R^S \beta \frac{(1 - \pi^E) R^E \beta}{G - (1 - \pi^S) R^S}.
\]

The growth rate depends on the rates of return for engineers and savers as well as on the wealth distribution between them.

Now, under certain conditions, we can verify our initial guess that no plant owner stops in the steady state:\footnote{All proofs and details of derivations are in Appendix B. Proposition 3(b) is demonstrated numerically.}
**Proposition 1:** If the opportunity cost for using building for production is smaller than some critical value $f_{\text{critical}}$, then there is a steady state equilibrium in which
(a) no plant owner stops;
(b) the aggregate ratio of tools to plant stays one-to-one: $h = 1$;
(c) all plant is maintained at the initial productivity level: $z = z^* = 1$;
(d) All plant has output $y = a$.

We call this a **Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping**, that exists when the model’s parameters lie in the P-Region. In Appendix B, we derive a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the existence of a pure equilibrium with no stopping:

$$f < a \frac{R(1 - \theta - \eta)}{\lambda(1 - \theta)} \left[1 - \frac{R - \lambda}{R} \left(\frac{R - \lambda \theta}{R}\right)^{-\frac{\eta}{\theta-\eta}}\right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

**4 Mixed Equilibrium**

What happens if the condition for the pure equilibrium with no stopping is violated, i.e. the opportunity cost is higher than the critical level $f_{\text{critical}}$ in Proposition 1? It turns out there is a clear dichotomy for the plant owner between continuing forever and stopping after a finite number of periods (for a given wage and interest rate):

**Lemma:**
(a) If the current plant productivity $z$ is below some cutoff value, $z^\dagger$, it is optimal for the plant owner to stop after, say, $T_{\text{max}}(z) < \infty$ periods.
(b) If $z$ is above $z^\dagger$, it is optimal to continue forever.
(c) The cutoff value $z^\dagger$ increases with the opportunity cost $f$. It is also a function of the wage rate and the interest rate.

In Figure 2, we plot the per-unit plant value, as a function of the current productivity $z$, for a given wage $w$ and interest rate $R$, and for different stopping horizons $T$. The function $S^\infty(z; w, R)$ is the value when the plant owner chooses to maintain production forever. The upper envelope of all these functions is the value function of plant $V(z; w, R)$ with an optimal choice of stopping (including non-stopping). If $z$ is very low, then it is optimal for the owner to shut down the plant immediately. If $z$ is higher than $f/a$, 

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then it is optimal to continue at least for one period because, minimally, the plant owner can obtain output which is larger than the opportunity cost of operating plant by hiring no engineers. Thus, if $z$ is higher than $f/a$ but lower than $z^1$, the owner will shut down plant not immediately but in a finite horizon, where the horizon is an increasing function of $z$. At $z = z^1$, the plant owner is indifferent between continuing forever and shutting down in a finite time (for this numerical example, in 20 periods). If $z$ is higher than $z^1$, the plant owner will continue forever – that is, until the plant dies exogenously.

In Figure 3, we plot $S^T(z; w, R)$ as a function of horizon $T$ for three different levels of plant productivity, $z = 0.9z^1$, $z^1$, and $1.1z^1$. If plant productivity is relatively low, at $z = 0.9z^1$, then the value reaches a maximum with finite horizon: for our example, around $T = 15$ so that the owner will shut down in 15 periods. If plant productivity is exactly equal to $z^1$, then the plant owner is indifferent between shutting down in 20 periods ($T = 20$) and continuing forever ($T = \infty$). If plant productivity is relatively high, at $z = 1.1z^1$, then the owner finds that $S^\infty(z; w, R) > S^T(z; w, R)$ for any finite $T$ so that he will continue forever.

In general equilibrium, the wage rate $w$ and the value of $z^1$ are endoge-
Figure 3: Value functions $S^T(z)$ near threshold $z^\dagger$ where plant owner is indifferent between stopping in a finite horizon or continuing forever.
nous. The aggregate dynamics of net worth, tools, financial asset holdings and consumption are still described by equations (19a) – (20) but, in contrast to Proposition 1, there is now stopping:

Proposition 2: If the opportunity cost for operating a unit of plant \( f \) is larger than a critical value \( f^{\text{critical}} \) from Proposition 1, then there is an equilibrium in which:

(a) Plant owners are initially indifferent between stopping in finite time \( T \) and continuing forever: \( z^\dagger = 1 \); in particular,
   (i) if the initial output is larger than the opportunity cost, \( a > f \), then plant owners are initially indifferent between stopping in finite time \( T \geq 1 \) and continuing forever, whereas
   (ii) if the initial output is smaller than the opportunity cost \( (a < f) \), then plant owners are initially indifferent between stopping immediately \( (T = 0) \) and continuing forever;

(b) The aggregate ratio of tools-to-plant is larger than one-to-one for continuing plant: \( h > 1 \);

(c) With decreasing returns to scale, \( \theta + \eta < 1 \), the productivity of continuing plant increases over time, converging to some \( z^* \in (1, \infty) \); whereas with constant returns to scale, \( \theta + \eta = 1 \), the productivity of continuing plant grows at some constant rate \( g > 1 \);

(d) If \( f \in (f^{\text{critical}}, a) \), then the productivity of stopping plant decreases over time;

(e) There is no equilibrium where all plant stops in finite time.

We call this a Mixed Equilibrium, that exists when the model’s parameters lie in the M-Region (the complement of the P-Region). Within this region, the initial productivity is exactly equal to the critical productivity \( z^\dagger \) for shutting down, so that some plant is stopped and some continues forever (modulo depreciation). Because the owners of stopping plant do not hire many tools, the aggregate ratio of tools to plant is larger than one-to-one for continuing plant: \( h > 1 \). With an abundant supply of tools per plant, continuing plant keeps improving in productivity. If the maintenance technology has decreasing returns to scale, \( \theta + \eta < 1 \), the productivity of continuing plant converges to some finite steady state level \( z^* \). If the maintenance technology has constant returns to scale, \( \theta + \eta = 1 \), the productivity of continuing plant grows at some rate \( g > 1 \). Therefore, even though all plant is homogeneous when new, some plant improves in productivity while the rest fails to main-
tain productivity and eventually exits (or immediately exits if $a < f$). That is, firms evolve heterogeneously in their productivity and output even though they start off homogenous and face no idiosyncratic shocks.\footnote{This is different from the standard approach taken by Jovanovic (1981) and Hopenhayn (1992) in which initial heterogeneity and/or subsequent heterogeneity (induced by idiosyncratic shocks) are essential to firm dynamics. Even allowing for idiosyncratic shocks (see Section 5), our approach may provide a different perspective on firm dynamics. Our model is more closely related to, for example, Atkeson and Burnstein (2010), Clementi and Palazzo (2016), Ericson and Pakes (1995), Klette and Kortum (2004), and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), all of which stress the interaction between heterogeneity, idiosyncratic shocks, and investment. Griliches and Regev (1995) presents evidence that the productivity of many firms starts deteriorating before exiting, calling it the "shadow of death."}

If all plant were to stop in finite time, the market for tools (engineers) would be in excess supply: because of exit the quantity of active plant would be smaller than tools, plus there would be little demand for tools by plant owners who are planning to stop, so the equilibrium wage rate for tools would fall to the point where at least some plant owners switch strategy and continue forever.

5 Effects of Falling Interest Rate

Figure 4 adds to Figure 1 the opportunity cost of using operating plant instead of liquidating in Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping. The grey and red heights are the plant owner’s share of output net of the opportunity cost $f$. In the near horizon his net share is positive (the grey area), as might be expected. But in the far horizon his net share has switched to become negative (the red area).

This begs the question: Why doesn’t the plant owner shut down at this point and liquidate the plant? The reason is that, while the present wage bill equals the present value of engineers’ current contribution to future revenues, past wage bills are sunk costs for the plant owner. As long as the present value of his future cash flows exceeds the opportunity cost, $a - w > f$, the owner wants to continue with maintenance and production.

Because terms in the more distant future are more sensitive to a permanent change of interest rate, a fall in $R$ may not expand the engineer’s
fund-raising capacity as much as the building price. In particular, when 
\( \theta + \eta = 1 \), we can solve (15):

\[
b = \frac{aR}{\theta}.
\] (22)

Notice that the plant owner’s share of gross output decreases with the horizon 
by factor \( \lambda \theta \), because the owner in effect pays to engineers an increasing 
fraction of more distant future output for their maintenance services. In 
contrast, the engineer’s investment cost per unit equals

\[ x + q = x + \frac{f}{R - \lambda} \]

which is the sum of goods and building cost per unit. Since \( \lambda > \lambda \theta \), building 
has a longer horizon than the owner’s share of gross output: a fall in \( R \) does 
not expand the present value of the plant owner’s share of gross revenues 
(engineer’s pledgeable returns) in (22) as much as the unit investment cost. 
This can increase the downpayment \( x + q - b \) which the engineer has to pay 
from her net worth.
Proposition 3 (Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping):
(a) For an open subset of the P-Region, in particular for $R$ and $\lambda$ not too far from unity, there is a pure equilibrium with no stopping such that an unexpected permanent drop in the interest rate $R$ leads to a lower steady state growth.

(b) Immediately following the drop in $R$, all agents (engineers and savers) can be strictly worse off.

In a pure equilibrium with no stopping, an unexpected permanent drop in the interest rate $R$ leads to a lower steady state growth rate $G$ if $\pi^S = 0$ and

$$f > a \frac{R - \lambda(\theta + \eta)}{R - \lambda \theta} - a \frac{G - \beta R \pi^E \lambda \eta (R - \lambda)}{G - \beta \lambda \pi^E (R - \lambda \theta)^2}.$$  

This inequality and a sufficient condition for the existence of Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping (21) are mutually consistent if $R$ and $\lambda$ are not too far from unity.\textsuperscript{14}

To understand why a fall in $R$ can stifle investment and growth, consider the effect on the equation for gross investment:

$$\text{gross investment } (H_{t+1}) \downarrow = \beta \text{ saving rate} \times \frac{\text{net worth of engineers } (N_{t+1}^E) \uparrow}{\text{investment cost } (x + q) \uparrow \uparrow - \text{ borrowing capacity } (b) \uparrow}.$$  

Although engineers’ net worth increases with a fall in $R$ (primarily through a rise their wage $w$), a decrease in their borrowing capacity may have a larger negative effect on investment, and therefore on growth. Much of the macro finance literature (including Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) has emphasized effects on net worth in the numerator. Here we are focussing on the effect on borrowing capacity in the denominator.

\textsuperscript{14}If $\pi^S > 0$, then a sufficient condition for the growth rate to fall with an unexpected permanent drop in the interest rate is that

$$\lambda (1 - \theta) f > (R - \lambda)^2 x + \lambda (1 - \theta - \eta) a.$$  

This condition guarantees that the rate of return for an investing engineer is an increasing function of the interest rate. See Appendix B. Because – unlike (23) – this condition involves $x$, it cannot be readily juxtaposed with (21).
In terms of welfare, a fall in $R$ can make all domestic agents (engineers and savers) strictly worse off. It is not surprising that savers may be worse off with a lower rate of return on financial assets. The reason why engineers may be worse off is that their leveraged rate of return

$$R^E = \frac{w + \lambda(x + q - b)}{x + q - b}$$

can fall though increase of downpayment $x + q - b$. Appendix B derives the welfare of engineers and savers immediately after an unanticipated and permanent fall in the interest rate, taking into account the stochastic arrival of future investment opportunities.

Suppose the economy was in steady state at date $t - 1$, for a presumed constant interest rate. Unexpectedly at date $t$, the interest rate falls permanently. If the parameters satisfy the condition of Proposition 2(a), then the long-run growth rate falls. Figure 5 shows the movement of the aggregate values of investment, consumption, output and foreign debt holdings, when the real interest rate unexpectedly falls from 2.5% to 1.5% permanently at date 5.

Initially, the measured value $I^m_t$ of total investment value increases because buildings are more expensive and the new engineers have greater net worth due to capital gains on the buildings they hold from the previous period. Consumption increases too, with the greater net worth. Because domestic absorption (investment and consumption) expands more than output, foreign debt rises rapidly during the transition. Despite the boom, the growth rate of plant and human capital eventually falls. As the boom fades, the slower growth of productive capacity, exacerbated by a larger foreign debt-to-income ratio, causes secular stagnation.\footnote{This sequence of events may correspond better to southern European countries in the early 2000s than to Japan in late 1980s, insofar as the fall in their interest rate was fast and considered to be permanent.}

It has been observed that during the credit and asset price booms in Japan in the late 1980s and in southern Europe in the early 2000s, the aggregate values of credit and assets grew faster than productive capacity. (See Hoshi and Ito (2020) and Gopinath, Kalemi-Ozcan, Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez (2017)). In the macro-finance literature, many authors have observed that credit booms associated with asset price booms are often followed by financial crises. (See for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Schularick}
Figure 5: Impulse Response to Permanent Fall in Interest Rate
and Taylor (2012) and Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2018). These authors consider such booms as being associated with excessive expansion of credit and assets values. Our model provides a different perspective, even though we do not deny the possibility of excessive assets values.

From this perspective, a persistently lower real interest rate leads to an initial credit and asset value boom, but stagnation in the long run, not because the boom was excessive, but because the underlying growth rate of the productive capacity declined.\footnote{Another, complementary, perspective to ours is that credit and asset price booms associated with lower interest rates tend to lead to greater misallocation of capital when the domestic financial system is underdeveloped. See, for example, Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2007), Reis (2013), Gopinath, Kalemi-Ozcan, Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez (2017), and Asriyan, Martin, Vanasco and Van der Ghote (2020).}

For the Mixed Equilibrium we have limited analytical results, and derive our findings by numerical simulations:

**Proposition 4 (Mixed Equilibrium)**

An unexpected permanent drop in the interest rate $R$ can lead to a lower steady state growth rate $G$.

In Figure 6, we illustrate how nine endogenous variables depend on the interest rate $R$ in the range between 1 and 1.03 (between 0 and 3\% net) in steady state equilibrium. We choose the parameters so that the economy is in the pure no-stopping region (P-Region) for $R \in [1.015, 1.03]$ and in the mixed equilibrium region (M-Region) for $R \in [1, 1.015]$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>share of past productivity in maintenance</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>share of engineer in maintenance</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>one minus depreciation rate</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>productivity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f$</td>
<td>opportunity cost</td>
<td>0.2091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x$</td>
<td>investment cost per plant</td>
<td>6.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>utility discount factor</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^E$</td>
<td>probability of staying to be engineer</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi^S$</td>
<td>probability of saver to become engineer</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6: Lower real rate, credit horizons and stagnation.
In the top-left panel of Figure 6, the wage rate is a decreasing function of the interest rate because an engineer’s contribution to future output through maintenance work has a long horizon. In the top-middle panel, the engineer’s borrowing capacity increases with the interest rate because the plant owner’s share of output has a shorter duration than opportunity cost. Notice that this effect is smaller in the M-Region, with an endogenous adjustment of the fraction of stopping plant (extensive margin) and of the stopping time (intensive margin). In the top-right panel, the economy’s growth rate is an increasing function of interest rate, albeit that the sensitivity is weaker in the M-Region.

In the middle-left panel, the asymptotic plant productivity $z^*$ equals 1 in the P-Region and is a decreasing function of $R$ in the M-Region. The threshold plant productivity for continuing and stopping $z^\dagger$ equals 1 (initial productivity) in the M-Region (consistent with plant owners being indifferent between stopping and continuing) and is a decreasing function of $R$ in the P-Region (consistent with plant owners gaining more indirectly from the lower wage rate than hurting directly from the higher interest rate). In the middle-middle panel, the number of periods before stopping ($T_{\text{max}}$) is finite and is an increasing function of $R$ for those who choose to stop in the M-Region. In the P-Region, no-one stops and $T_{\text{max}} = \infty$. In the middle-right panel, the fraction of stopping plant is zero in the P-Region and is a decreasing function of $R$ in the M-Region.

In the bottom-left panel, we see that the net financial asset holdings of foreigners is negative, i.e., domestic residents lend to foreigners in net terms. Despite the foreign interest rate being lower than the subjective interest rate ($R < \bar{1}/\bar{\beta}$), the domestic economy has a shortage of means of saving due to the financial friction and needs to make use of foreign bonds. With a lower interest rate, the financing constraint is tighter and domestic savers hold a yet larger position in foreign bonds. In the bottom-middle panel, the welfare of a representative engineer (who holds the average net worth of engineers) is an increasing function of $R$ in the P-Region, i.e., welfare is lower with lower $R$. In our example, when $R$ falls from 1.03 to 1.015 unexpectedly and permanently, the welfare of a representative engineer falls by the equivalent of a 0.12% permanent fall in consumption. We do not have comparable results for the M-Region, because one cannot define simply what is meant by a representative engineer. In the bottom-right panel, the welfare of savers is an increasing function of $R$ in the P-Region. The effect on savers is larger: when $R$ falls from 1.03 to 1.015 unexpectedly and permanently, their welfare
falls by the equivalent of a 1.2% permanent fall in consumption.

6 Extension: idiosyncratic uncertainty

In the model thus far, even though plant produces output deterministically, we find that equilibrium plant dynamics emerge in the mixed equilibrium where some plant owners hire insufficient engineers to maintain plant productivity and slowly exit. In this section, we further connect our theory to the literature on plant dynamics by introducing idiosyncratic shocks to plant productivity. We study how these shocks affect plant owners’ decisions on maintenance and exit.

Let us modify the production technology (4) to:

\[
\text{plant of productivity } z \to \begin{cases} 
\text{y = az goods} \\
\text{h tools} \\
\text{plant of productivity } z' = \epsilon z^\theta h^n, \\
\text{h tools}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \epsilon \) is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, i.i.d. across plant and over time. It follows a lognormal distribution whose mean is normalized to one:

\[
\log \epsilon \sim N(-\sigma^2/2, \sigma^2).
\]

The value of a unit of plant of productivity \( z \) at the end of a period is

\[
V(z) = \max \left\{ q, \frac{1}{R} \max_h [az - wh + \lambda EV(\epsilon z^\theta h^n)] \right\}.
\] (24)

Compared with the plant value without productivity uncertainty, the only difference is that the continuation value of the firm is subject to the idiosyncratic shock, \( \epsilon \).

To illustrate the effect of the idiosyncratic shock, we continue with the numerical example in the previous sections (\( \theta = 0.9, \eta = 0.09, \lambda = 0.98, a = 1, f = 0.2091, R = 1.015, \) and \( w = 0.6497 \)).

When the productivity shock has a small variance, the owner’s productivity maintenance decision is similar to that in a deterministic environment. Figure 7 illustrates the maintenance decision, \( h \), and the expected productivity in the following period, \( z' \), when idiosyncratic shocks have a small dispersion, \( \sigma = 0.0001 \). In this case, there still exists a dichotomy between
Figure 7: Productivity maintenance with small idiosyncratic risk, $\sigma = 0.0001$. 
those plants that the owners intend to exit and those that the owners intend to continue. If current plant productivity $z$ is below a critical value, $z^\dagger$, the plant owner does not hire much maintenance service and most likely exits in random finite number of periods but not immediately. If $z$ is above $z^\dagger$, the plant owner hires distinctively larger engineering service and continues operating until the plant dies exogenously, unless extremely unlucky idiosyncratic shocks bring down the plant productivity below $z^\dagger$.

At $z = z^\dagger$, the plant owner has two distinct optimal levels of maintenance: his expected value from maintenance has twin peaks. If he chooses the slow exit strategy, he saves some maintenance costs but receives less profit from future production. If he chooses to continue operating the plant for the long haul, he pays more to maintain the plant and in return receives more profit from future production. The maintenance input $h$ and expected productivity $z^\prime$ increase discontinuously as current productivity $z$ moves up across the critical value $z^\dagger$, as the plant owner finds it optimal to operate the plant for the long haul.

Figure 8 illustrates the plant owner’s maintenance decision, $h$, and productivity distribution in the following period, $z^\prime$, when the idiosyncratic shocks are large, $\sigma = 0.02$. In the figure on realized productivity, $z^\prime$, the blue curve represents the expected productivity in the following period. The red curves represent the realized productivity that are three standard deviations above or below the expected value. With large productivity shocks, the dichotomy between exiting and continuing is blurred: the plant owner’s maintenance input is a continuous function of the current plant productivity $z$. This is because even when the plant owner would like to improve productivity, a large negative idiosyncratic shock may still lead to a low productivity. This smooths the plant owner’s expected payoff from maintenance and makes it single-peaked.

7 Policy

When the competitive equilibrium is not efficient, it is natural to ask whether the government could improve welfare through taxes and subsidies. The sole departure from the Arrow-Debreu model in our framework is the non-exclusivity constraint: a saver who buys plant from an engineer (the creditor who lends to the engineer against the plant) cannot prevent this engineer
Figure 8: Productivity maintenance with large idiosyncratic risk, $\sigma = 0.02$. 
from working for another plant in future. In effect, we are supposing it is impossible to keep track of each engineer’s trading history.

However, because the plant is easy to locate, it may be possible for the government to keep track of how much the plant owner buys the maintenance services of engineers – even though government does not know the identity of engineers. Suppose government can tax the payroll for engineers of each plant owner at rate $\tau$, and use the tax revenue to subsidize engineers by $s$ per unit of investment. We ignore idiosyncratic shocks to the realized productivity after maintenance and restrict our attention to the steady state of a Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping (the parameters lie in Region P). We assume the government’s budget is balanced:

$$\tau wH = sI = s(G - \lambda)H.$$  

$\tau wH$ is the payroll tax revenue and $sI = s(G - \lambda)H$ is the investment subsidy.

Because plant owners equate the marginal contribution of engineers’ expertise to the wage cost including the payroll tax, we have

$$(1 + \tau)w = w^0 = \frac{\eta \lambda}{R - \lambda} a,$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

where $w^0$ and $w$ are wage rates for the plant owners and engineers. The last equality comes from (12) with $h_t = z_t = 1$ in the steady state. Notice that the payroll tax does not affect the wage cost to the plant owner, but reduces the wage rate for engineers. Together, these equations imply that

$$s = \frac{\tau}{1 + \tau} \frac{w^0}{G - \lambda};$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

The price of new plant is unchanged at

$$b = V(1) = \frac{a - w^0}{R - \lambda}.$$  

The budget constraint of the agent becomes

$$c_t + (x + q - b - s)\delta_t + \frac{d_t + 1}{R} = wh_t + d_t.$$  

Solving for the individuals’ choices and aggregating across agents, we get

$$(x + q - b - s)H_{t+1} = \beta \pi^E [w + \lambda(x + q - b - s)] H_t + \beta \pi^S D_t,$$
\[
\frac{D_{t+1}}{R} = \beta (1 - \pi^E) \left[ w + \lambda (x + q - b) \right] H_t + \beta (1 - \pi^S) D_t.
\]

As in (20), the steady state growth rate becomes
\[
G = \beta R^E \left[ \pi^E + \frac{\pi^S (1 - \pi^E) R\beta}{G - (1 - \pi^S) R\beta} \right],
\]
where the rate of return for the engineer to invest with maximum leverage is
\[
R^E = \frac{w + \lambda (x + q - b - s)}{x + q - b - s} = \frac{w^o}{(1 + \tau)(x + q - b) - \tau \frac{w^o}{G - \lambda}} + \lambda,
\]
using (25, 26). Then we learn that the rate of return from investment changes with the tax and subsidy in the neighborhood of \(\tau = 0\) as
\[
\frac{\partial R^E}{\partial \tau} = \frac{w}{(x + q - b)^2} \left[ \frac{w}{G - \lambda} - (x + q - b) \right]
= \frac{w}{(x + q - b)(G - \lambda)} \left[ \left( \frac{w}{x + q - b} + \lambda \right) - G \right]
= \frac{w}{(x + q - b)(G - \lambda)} (R^E - G).
\]

Because the growth rate of the economy \(G\) is the weighted average of the growth rate of engineers, \(\beta R^E\), and savers, \(\beta R\), where \(R^E > R\) in our economy, we learn \(G < \beta R^E < R^E\) and
\[
\frac{\partial R^E}{\partial \tau} > 0.
\]

The equilibrium growth rate in (27) solves
\[
\beta \pi^F R^E = \frac{G}{\pi^E + \pi^S (1 - \pi^E) \beta R}.
\]
Since the RHS is an increasing function of \(G\), we have
\[
\frac{\partial G}{\partial \tau} > 0.
\]
Thus the introduction of this tax and subsidy scheme increases steady state investment, and therefore growth, relative to the laissez-faire.

To get a handle on the overall effect of this policy intervention on the welfare of the domestic economy, we define a measure of social welfare as the population-weighted average of the expected discounted utilities of engineers and savers. The point is that we need to account for any short-term losses (as well as gains) at the time the policy is introduced, in addition to the longer-term benefits of higher growth. We show in Appendix B that, by this measure, social welfare goes up.

Why? In our framework, because of the non-exclusivity constraint (an individual engineer can work for any plant owner without getting traced by her creditors ex post), the engineers each face a borrowing constraint ex ante at the time of investment. By taxing the payroll of the plant owners, the government in effect acts as a collective creditor – the receipts from which, when fed back to the engineers, subsidize investment. It is as if, through the government intervention, the engineers as a group promise to pay back a portion of each others’ debt obligations.\footnote{In our model, the burden of the payroll tax is entirely borne by the engineers, because plant owners face unchanged wage costs and plant prices. In this sense, it is the most favorite case for the tax-subsidy scheme to boost the growth rate. In more general model, the tax burden would be split between the engineers and plant owners.} Crucial to the effectiveness of this policy is the government’s ability to keep an eye on all the various units of plant (presumed to be fixed in buildings), to tax the owners’ payments to engineers, in a context where the identities of the engineers themselves cannot be traced.
8 References


9 Appendix

9.1 Appendix A

In the main text, we assume that output is proportional to plant productivity. More generally, suppose that gross output \( \hat{y} \) depends upon plant productivity \( \hat{z} \) and unskilled labor \( \hat{h} \) as

\[
\hat{y} = \hat{a} \hat{z}^{\alpha_1} \hat{h}^{\alpha_2}, \quad \text{where } \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 \leq 1.
\]

Suppose there is a competitive labor market for unskilled workers at wage rate \( \hat{w} \). Then we can define the per-unit gross profit of a plant owner as

\[
y = \max_{\hat{h}} \left( \hat{a} \hat{z}^{\alpha_1} \hat{h}^{\alpha_2} - \hat{w} \hat{h} \right) = \hat{a} z, \tag{29}
\]

where

\[
z = \hat{z}^{\frac{\alpha_1}{1 - \alpha_2}}, \quad a = (1 - \alpha_2) \left( \frac{\alpha_2}{\hat{w}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha_2}{1 - \alpha_2}} \hat{a}.
\]

If the supply of unskilled labor is perfectly elastic, we can treat \( a \) as exogenous – this is the case of our model. (Otherwise, we need to take into account the general equilibrium effect on \( a \) through \( \hat{w} \).)

If plant productivity depends upon initial plant productivity and human capital of engineer \( h \) as

\[
\hat{z}' = \hat{z}^{\theta} h^{\hat{\eta}}, \quad \text{where } \theta + \hat{\eta} \leq 1.
\]

we can rewrite this as

\[
z' = z^{\theta} h^{\eta}, \quad \text{where } \eta = \frac{\alpha_1}{1 - \alpha_2} \hat{\eta}. \tag{30}
\]

Thus we obtain the formulation in the text: \(29, 30\).
9.2 Appendix B

9.2.1 Individual Choice

An individual agent takes wage, building price, plant price and interest rate \( \varpi = \{w, q, b, R\} \) as given. An engineer chooses consumption, gross investment on tools and financial assets \((c, h', d')\) as a function of net worth \( n \) to maximize \( V^E(n; w, b, R) \),

\[
V^E(n; \varpi) = \max_{c, h', d'} \{ \ln c + \beta \left[ \pi^E V^E(n'; \varpi) + (1 - \pi^E) V^S(n'; \varpi) \right] \}, \quad (31)
\]

subject to the budget constraint

\[
c + (x + q - b) h' + \frac{d'}{R} = n, \ \text{and} \ \ n' = [w + \lambda (x + q - b)] h' + d'.
\]

Define the leveraged rate of return on investment as

\[
R^E = \frac{w + \lambda (x + q - b)}{x + q - b}.
\]

The first order conditions of the engineer’s optimization problem are

\[
\frac{1}{c} \geq R^E \frac{\beta}{c}, \ \text{where} \ \ = \ \text{holds if} \ h' > 0,
\]

\[
\frac{1}{c} \geq R^E \frac{\beta}{d}, \ \text{where} \ \ = \ \text{holds if} \ d' > 0.
\]

Thus if \( R^E > R \), we have \( d' = 0 \), \((10a, 10b)\) and

\[
n' = R^E \beta n. \quad (32)
\]

A saver chooses consumption and financial assets \((c, d')\) as a function of net worth \( n \) to maximize

\[
V^S(n; \varpi) = \max_{c, d'} \{ \ln c + \beta \left[ \pi^S V^E(n'; \varpi) + (1 - \pi^S) V^S(n'; \varpi) \right] \} \quad (33)
\]

subject to the budget constraint

\[
c + \frac{d'}{R} = n, \ \text{and} \ \ n' = d'.
\]
Using the first order condition

\[ \frac{1}{c} = R^\beta c \]

we get \((11a, 11b)\) and

\[ n' = R \beta n. \quad (34) \]

From these, we conjecture that the value functions of the engineer and the saver are given by

\[ V^E(n; \varpi) = \nu^E(\varpi) + \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \ln n, \quad (35a) \]
\[ V^S(n; \varpi) = \nu^S(\varpi) + \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \ln n. \quad (35b) \]

From \((10b, 32, 11b, 34)\), the conjecture is verified if and only if

\[ \nu^E(\varpi) = \beta \pi^E \nu^E(\varpi) + \beta(1 - \pi^E) \nu^S(\varpi) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \ln R^E(\varpi) + \ln(1 - \beta), \]
\[ \nu^S(\varpi) = \beta \pi^S \nu^E(\varpi) + \beta(1 - \pi^S) \nu^S(\varpi) + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \ln R + \ln(1 - \beta), \]

when there is no change of \(\varpi = \{w, q, b, R\}\) in the future. Then we get

\[ \nu^E(\varpi) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{(1 - \beta + \beta \pi^S) \ln (R^E(\varpi)) + \beta(1 - \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln(1 - \beta)}{1 - \beta}, \quad (36) \]
\[ \nu^S(\varpi) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{\beta \pi^S \ln (R^E(\varpi)) + (1 - \beta \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln(1 - \beta)}{1 - \beta}. \quad (37) \]

The plant owner/saver’s choice is given by the value function \((5)\) in the main text. The first order condition for those who choose to continue operating the plant this period is

\[ w \geq \eta \frac{z'}{h} \lambda V'(z'; \zeta), \quad \text{where} \quad \zeta = \text{holds if} \ h > 0, \quad (38) \]
\[ V'(z; \zeta) = \frac{1}{R} [a + \theta \frac{z'}{z} \lambda V'(z'; \zeta)]. \quad (39) \]
where \( \varsigma = \{ w, q, R \} \) is aggregate state variables that the plant owner takes as given. From these, if \( h_t, h_{t+1}, \ldots > 0 \), we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega &= \frac{\lambda}{R} \left[ \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} a + \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} \lambda V'(z_{t+2}; \varsigma) \right] \\
&= \frac{\lambda}{R} \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} a + \left( \frac{\lambda}{R} \right)^2 \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} + \left( \frac{\lambda}{R} \right)^3 \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} + \left( \frac{\lambda}{R} \right)^4 \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \theta \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}} + \ldots
\end{align*}
\]

This is (12) in the text. Multiplying through by \( h_t \), and simplifying, we get (13) in the text. Then we get

\[
V(z; \varsigma) = \frac{1}{R} (y_t - wh_t) + \frac{\lambda}{R^2} (y_{t+1} - wh_{t+1}) + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3} (y_{t+2} - wh_{t+2}) + \ldots
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{R} y_t + \frac{\lambda}{R^2} y_{t+1} (1 - \eta) + \frac{\lambda^2}{R^3} y_{t+2} (1 - \eta - \eta \theta) + \ldots
\]

This implies (14) in the text.

If \( h_t, h_{t+1} > 0 \), we can use (38, 39) to derive an alternative first order condition as

\[
\omega = \frac{\lambda}{R} \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} a + \frac{\lambda}{R} \theta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} \frac{\eta}{h_{t+1}} \frac{z_{t+2}}{z_{t+1}}
\]

\[
= \frac{\lambda}{R} \eta \frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t} a + \frac{\lambda}{R} \theta \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} w.
\]

(40)

Note that the second term on the right hand side equals the discounted wage rate times the marginal rate of substitution between \( h_t \) and \( h_{t+1} \) to keep \( z_{t+2} \) constant. Thus equation (40) says the marginal cost of increasing \( h_t \) by one unit equals the discounted value of marginal benefit – the sum of additional output through \( z_{t+1} \) and saving of wage bill, keeping \( z_{t+2} \) constant.

In the case of constant-returns-to-scale maintenance technology, \( \theta + \eta = 1 \), we conjecture

\[
S^\infty(z; \varsigma) = aA^\infty z,
\]

\[
S^T(z; \varsigma) = aA^T z + \frac{\lambda^T}{RT} q.
\]
For plant which continues forever, we conjecture and verify that

\[
\frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} = \frac{z_{t+1}}{z_t} = \left(\frac{h_t}{z_t}\right)^{1-\theta} = g > 1.
\]

Then from (40), we get

\[
w = \frac{\lambda \eta^{\frac{z_{t+1}}{h_t}} a}{1 - \frac{\lambda}{R} \theta g} = \frac{\lambda (1 - \theta) a}{R - \lambda \theta g} g^{-\frac{\phi}{1-\theta}}.
\]  

(41)

Then from (5), we learn that the Bellman equation for continuing plant holds if and only if

\[
A^\infty = \frac{1}{R - \lambda \theta g}.
\]  

(42)

For stopping plant in finite time, (38) implies that

\[
w = (1 - \theta) \left(\frac{z^T}{h^T}\right)^{\theta} \lambda a A^{T-1},
\]  

(43)

where \(z^T\) and \(h^T\) are the productivity and tools of plant when it stops in \(T\) periods. Then from (5), we learn that the Bellman equation for continuing plant holds if and only if

\[
A^T = \frac{1}{R} \left[1 + \lambda \theta a A^{T-1} \left(\frac{1 - \theta}{w} \lambda a A^{T-1} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\sigma}}\right]
\]

= \[
\frac{1}{R} \left[1 + \lambda \theta g (R - \lambda \theta g)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\sigma}} (A^{T-1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}\right],
\]  

(44)

using (41). Here \(A^1\) is given by \(A^1 = \frac{1}{R}\).

When the maintenance technology is decreasing returns to scale, \(\theta + \eta < 1\), we conjecture that the productivity of plant that continues forever will converge to a steady state productivity

\[
z = z^*.
\]

Thus the amount of tools employed converges to

\[
h = h^* = (z^*)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\eta}}.
\]
We also conjecture that

\[ S^\infty(z; \zeta) = az^* U^\infty \left( \frac{z}{z^*}; R \right), \]

\[ S^T(z; \zeta) = az^T U^T \left( \frac{z}{z^*}; R \right) + \mu^T \frac{R^T q}{R}. \]

Using (40) for plant to continue forever in steady state, we get

\[ w = \frac{\lambda \eta a}{R - \lambda \theta} (z^*)^{1 - \eta - \theta}. \] (45)

Define \( \tilde{z} = \frac{z}{z^*} \). Using the relationship \( h = (\frac{z}{z^*})^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \), we get

\[ \frac{wh}{az^*} = \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{z^*}{z^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}. \]

Thus the guess is verified if \( U^\infty(\tilde{z}) \) and \( U^T(\tilde{z}) \) solve

\[ U^\infty(\tilde{z}; R) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{\tilde{z}} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{z^*}{z^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} + \lambda U^\infty(\tilde{z}', R) \right], \] (46)

\[ U^T(\tilde{z}; R) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{\tilde{z}'} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{z^*}{z^*} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} + \lambda U^{T-1}(\tilde{z}', R) \right], \] (47)

where \( U^1(\tilde{z}; R) = \frac{1}{R} \tilde{z} \).

9.2.2 Market Clearing

In order to describe the aggregate economy, let \( K_t(\tau) \) be the aggregate number of age-\( \tau \) plant which continues forever at date \( t \). Suppose some owners choose to operate new plant for \( T \) periods and then stop. Let \( L^{T-\tau}_t(\tau) \) be aggregate number of age-\( \tau \) plant which stops in \( T - \tau \) periods at date \( t \). Then we have the transition

\[ K_t(\tau) = \lambda K_{t-1}(\tau - 1), \]

\[ L^{T-\tau}_t(\tau) = \lambda L^{T-\tau+1}_{t-1}(\tau - 1), \text{ for } \tau = 1, 2, \ldots, T - 1. \] (48)
We also have
\[ I_t = K_{t+1}(0) + L_t^T(0), \] (49)
where \( I_t \) is aggregate investment at date \( t \).
We also know that
\[
\begin{align*}
 b & = S^\infty(1; \zeta) = S^T(1; \zeta) \text{ in M-Region}, \quad (50) \\
 b & = S^\infty(1; \zeta) \quad \text{and} \quad L_t^T(0) = 0 \text{ in P-Region}.
\end{align*}
\]
Let \( z_t^{T-\tau}(\tau) \) be the productivity of age-\( \tau \) plant which stops in \( T-\tau \) periods at date \( t \). Let \( h_t^{T-\tau}(\tau) \) be the number of tools employed by one unit of age-\( \tau \) plant to stop in \( T-\tau \) periods. Then the aggregate output and demand for tools (and engineers) are given by
\[
\begin{align*}
 Y_t & = \sum_{\tau=0}^\infty a z_t^\infty(\tau) K_t(\tau) + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} a z_t^{T-\tau}(\tau) L_t^{T-\tau}(\tau), \quad (51) \\
 H_t & = \sum_{\tau=0}^\infty h_t^\infty(\tau) K_t(\tau) + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} h_t^{T-\tau}(\tau) L_t^{T-\tau}(\tau). \quad (52)
\end{align*}
\]
Aggregate domestic asset holding at the beginning of period \( t \) equals the sum of gross profit and the value of plant from the last period minus net foreign debt:
\[
\begin{align*}
 D_t & = Y_t - w H_t - D_t^* \\
 & \quad + \sum_{\tau=1}^\infty V(z(\tau)) K_t(\tau) + \sum_{\tau=1}^T S^{T-\tau}(z_t^{T-\tau}(\tau)) L_t^{T-\tau}(\tau). \quad (53)
\end{align*}
\]
The goods market clearing condition is given by
\[
C_t + (x + q) I_t + D_t^* - \frac{D_{t+1}^*}{R} = Y_t, \quad (54)
\]
Output equals consumption, investment and net export (which equals net debt repayment to foreigners). One of the market clearing conditions for output, tools and financial asset is not independent by Walras’ Law.
9.2.3 Pure Equilibrium with No Stopping

When no plant owner stops his plant, the total number of continuing plant equals the total number of tools,

$$\sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} K_\tau(\tau) = H_t,$$

and the ratio of tools to plant remains at the initial ratio

$$h^\infty_t(\tau) = 1, \text{ for all } \tau \text{ and } t.$$

The plant productivity remains at the initial level as

$$z^\infty_t(\tau) = [z^\infty_{t-1}(\tau - 1)]^\theta [h^\infty_{t-1}(\tau - 1)]^{\eta} = 1, \text{ for all } \tau \text{ and } t.$$

Thus the plant growth rate \( g = 1 \) with constant-returns-to-scale maintenance technology, steady state productivity \( z^* = 1 \) with decreasing-returns-to-scale maintenance technology, and

$$w = \frac{\lambda \eta a}{R - \lambda \theta} = w(R), \quad (55a)$$

$$b = \frac{a - w}{R - \lambda} = \frac{a}{R - \lambda} \frac{R - \lambda (\theta + \eta)}{R - \lambda \theta} = b(R). \quad (55b)$$

In order to show that non-stopping is an optimal strategy for the plant owner, we need to check

$$b(R) > \max_{T} S_T(1; \varsigma(R)) = \max_{T} [a U_T(1; \varsigma(R)) + \frac{\lambda T}{R_T} q(R)], \quad (56)$$

for any finite \( T \), where \( U_T(1; R) \) is given by (47) with decreasing returns to scale and equals \( A_T \) with the constant returns to scale maintenance technology, and \( \varsigma(R) = \{w(R), q(R), R\} \) takes into consideration the dependance of wage rate and building price on interest rate \( R \).

Then from (51,53), we have

$$Y_t = a H_t,$$
$$D_t = (a - w) H_t + b \lambda H_t - D^*_t. \quad (57)$$

We also have

$$C_t = (1 - \beta) [(w + \lambda (x + q - b)) H_t + D_t]. \quad (58)$$
From (19a, 54), we obtain the transitions:

\[
(x + q - b)H_{t+1} = \beta \left\{ \pi^E (w + \lambda(x + q - b))H_t + \pi^S D_t \right\}, \quad (59a)
\]

\[
\frac{D_{t+1}^*}{R} = -aH_t + C_t + (x + q)(H_{t+1} - \lambda H_t) + D_t^* . \quad (59b)
\]

\[
(w, q, b) \text{ is a function of } R \text{ and the other parameters, and } (D_t, C_t) \text{ is a function of } (H_t, D_t^*) \text{ and } R \text{ (through } w \text{ and } b). \text{ Then, the perfect foresight equilibrium (aside from a unanticipated permanent shock on } R \text{) is characterized recursively by } (H_{t+1}, D_{t+1}^*) \text{ as a function of } (H_t, D_t^*, R).
\]

In steady state, we can use (20) to find steady-state growth rate where

\[
R^E = \frac{w(R) + \lambda \left[ x + q(R) - b(R) \right]}{x + q(R) - b(R)}.
\]

### 9.2.4 Mixed Equilibrium

For the mixed equilibrium, we only describe the steady state equilibrium.

**Mixed equilibrium under constant returns to scale maintenance technology** From (41, 42), we have

\[
w = \frac{\lambda (1 - \theta) a}{R - \lambda \theta g} g^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}} = w(g; R)
\]

\[
b = \frac{a}{R - \lambda \theta g} = b(g; R).
\]

Find \( \{A^1, A^2, A^3, \ldots, A^T\} \) to solve (44) with \( A^1 = \frac{1}{R} \) as a function of \((g; R)\).

Find \( g \) to solve the indifference condition:

\[
b(g; R) = \operatorname{Max}_{g \in T} \left[ a A^T(g; R) + \frac{\lambda^T}{R^p} q(R) \right]. \quad (60)
\]

Equilibrium stopping time is \( \arg \operatorname{Max}_{g} [ a A^T(g; R) - \lambda T f ] \) for this equilibrium \( g \).

Then we can find the steady state growth rate from (20) by using

\[
R^E = \frac{w(g; R) + \lambda \left[ x + q(R) - b(g; R) \right]}{x + q(R) - b(g; R)}.
\]
For plant that continues forever, because \( z^\infty(0) = 1 \), we get \( z^\infty(\tau) = g^\tau \) and 

\[
h^\infty(\tau) = \left[ \frac{z^\infty(\tau + 1)}{(z^\infty(\tau))^{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} = g^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}+\tau}.
\]

For those stopping in \( T \) periods, we get from the first order condition (43)

\[
\frac{h^{T-\tau}(\tau)}{z^{T-\tau}(\tau)} = \left[ \frac{(1 - \theta)\lambda}{w/\alpha A^{T-\tau-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}} = \left( \frac{A^{T-\tau-1}}{A^\infty} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} g^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \tag{61}
\]

for \( \tau = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, T-2 \). Because \( z^T(0) = 1 \), we obtain \( \{h^{T-\tau}(\tau), z^{T-\tau-1}(\tau + 1)\} \) which satisfies (61) and 

\[
z^{T-\tau-1}(\tau + 1) = \left( \frac{A^{T-\tau-1}}{A^\infty} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} g z^{T-\tau}(\tau),
\]

for \( \tau = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, T-2 \).

**Mixed equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale maintenance technology**  With decreasing returns, from (45), we get

\[
w = \frac{\lambda \eta a}{R - \lambda \theta} (z^*)^{-\frac{1-\theta-a}{\eta}} = w(z^*; R).
\]

For plant to continue for ever, we have from (46):

\[
U^\infty(\tilde{z}) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{\tilde{z}'} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{\tilde{z}'}{\tilde{z}^{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + \lambda U^\infty(\tilde{z}') \right]
\]

\[
\tilde{z}' = \arg \max_{\tilde{z}'} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{\tilde{z}'}{\tilde{z}^{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + \lambda U^\infty(\tilde{z}') \right] \equiv \varphi^\infty(\tilde{z})
\]

Let \( \tilde{z}^\infty(\tau) \) and \( \tilde{h}^\infty(\tau) \) be productivity and number of tools of age-\( \tau \) plant which continues forever relative to the steady state. The we have

\[
\tilde{z}^\infty(\tau) = (\varphi^\infty)^{\tau} (\tilde{z}^\infty(0)) = (\varphi^\infty)^{\tau} \left( \frac{1}{z^*} \right)
\]

\[
\tilde{h}^\infty(\tau) = \left[ \frac{\tilde{z}^\infty(\tau + 1)}{(\tilde{z}^\infty(\tau))^{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}}.
\]

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For plant to stop in $T$ periods, we have from (47):

$$U^T(z^*) = \frac{1}{R} \max_{\tilde{z}} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{\tilde{z}'}{\hat{\tilde{z}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} + \lambda U^{T-1}(\tilde{z}') \right]$$

$$\tilde{z}' = \arg\max_{\tilde{z}'} \left[ \tilde{z} - \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \lambda \theta} \left( \frac{\tilde{z}'}{\hat{\tilde{z}}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} + \lambda U^{T-1}(\tilde{z}') \right] \equiv \varphi^T(\tilde{z}) ,$$

where $U^1(\tilde{z}) = \frac{1}{R} \tilde{z}$. Let $z^{T-\tau}(\tau)$ and $\tilde{h}^{T-\tau}(\tau)$ be productivity and tools of age-$\tau$ plant which stops in $T - \tau$ periods relative to the steady state. Then we have

$$z^{T-\tau}(\tau) = \varphi^T \cdot \varphi^{T-1} \cdot \ldots \cdot \varphi^{T-\tau+1} \left( \frac{1}{z^*} \right)$$

$$\tilde{h}^{T-\tau}(\tau) = \left[ \frac{z^{T-\tau-1}(\tau + 1)}{(z^{T-\tau}(\tau))^{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\eta}} .$$

We then find $z^*$ to satisfy the indifference condition

$$a z^* U^\infty \left( \frac{1}{z^*} \right) = \max_{\text{finite } T} \left[ a z^* U^T \left( \frac{1}{z^*} \right) + \frac{\lambda^T}{R^T} q(R) \right] \quad (62a)$$

$$= b(z^*; R) \quad (62b)$$

This common value under equilibrium $z^*$ is the engineer’s borrowing capacity. Equilibrium stopping time equals $\arg\max \left[ a z^* U^T \left( \frac{1}{z^*} \right) + \frac{\lambda^T}{R^T} q(R) \right]$.

We can find the steady state growth rate from (20) with

$$R^E = \frac{w(z^*; R) + \lambda \left[ x + q(R) - b(z^*; R) \right]}{x + q(R) - b(z^*; R)} = R^E (z^*; R) .$$

### 9.2.5 Tools and goods market clearing in mixed equilibrium

In the steady state, we observe

$$G = \frac{H_{t+1}}{H_t} = \frac{K_{t+1}(\tau)}{K_t(\tau)} = \frac{L^T_{t+1}(\tau)}{L^T_t(\tau)} .$$

For both constant and decreasing returns-to-scale maintenance technology, we have aggregate output under mixed equilibrium as (51). Using (48), we
obtain
\[ Y_t = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} a z^{\infty}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^\tau} K_t(0) + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} a z^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^\tau} L_t^T(0). \]

Similarly, aggregate demand for tools (52) becomes
\[ H_t = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} h^{\infty}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^\tau} K_t(0) + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} h^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^\tau} L_t^T(0). \] (63)

Because \( I_t = (G - \lambda) H_t = K_{t+1}(0) + L^T_{t+1}(0) \), dividing (63) by \( H_t \), we find in the steady state:
\[ 1 = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} h^{\infty}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)i^k + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} h^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)(1 - i^k), \] (64)
where \( i^k \equiv \frac{K_{t+1}(0)}{I_t} \in (0, 1) \). We can solve for \( i^k \in (0, 1) \) to satisfy (64).

Similarly, output per tool is
\[ \frac{Y_t}{H_t} = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} a z^{\infty}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)i^k + \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} a z^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)(1 - i^k). \] (65)

Aggregate domestic financial asset holding (53) under constant-returns-to-scale maintenance technology is given by
\[ D_t = Y_t - wH_t - D^*_t \]
\[ + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{a}{R - \lambda\theta g} \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^\tau} K_t(0) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{T-1} a A^{T-\tau} z^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}} L_t^T(0), \]
or
\[ \frac{D_t}{H_t} = \frac{Y_t}{H_t} - w - d^*_t \]
\[ + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{a}{R - \lambda\theta g} \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)i^k + \sum_{\tau=1}^{T-1} a A^{T-\tau} z^{T-\tau}(\tau) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1}}(G - \lambda)(1 - i^k), \]
where \( d^*_t = D^*_t / H_t \).

Similarly, domestic financial asset holding per tool under decreasing returns to scale is
\[ \frac{D_t}{H_t} = \frac{Y_t}{H_t} - w - d^*_t \]
\[ + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} a z^\tau U(\bar{z}^\infty(\tau)) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1} + \lambda} (G - \lambda) t^k + \sum_{\tau=1}^{T} a z^\tau U(\bar{z}^{T-\tau}(\tau)) \frac{\lambda^\tau}{G^{\tau+1} + \lambda} (G - \lambda) (1 - t^k). \]

We also find
\[
\frac{C_t}{H_t} = (1 - \beta) \left[ w + \lambda(x + q - b) + \frac{D_t}{H_t} \right].
\]

From (54), in steady state,
\[
\frac{Y_t}{H_t} = \frac{C_t}{H_t} + (x + q)(G - \lambda) + d^* - \frac{G}{R} d^*
\]
or
\[
\left(1 - \frac{G}{R}\right) d^* = \frac{Y_t}{H_t} - \frac{C_t}{H_t} - (x + q)(G - \lambda).
\]

From this, we find the ratio of net foreign debt to tools in steady state.

### 9.3 Proof of Proposition 2

We first derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure non-stopping equilibrium in P-region:

\[
V(1) = \frac{1}{R - \lambda} a - \frac{R - (\theta + \eta)\lambda}{R - \theta\lambda} \\
\geq \frac{a}{R} \left(1 - \frac{\theta R}{R}\right) \frac{\frac{\eta}{1 - \theta - \eta}}{1 - \theta} + \frac{\frac{\theta R}{1 - \theta} \frac{\eta}{1 - \theta}}{R - \theta\lambda} + \frac{\lambda f}{R - \lambda}
\]

We consider a sufficient condition of (56)
\[ b(R) > \max_T S^T(1; w(R), R), \]

for the case of decreasing-returns-to-scale maintenance technology. Consider an optimal stopping strategy where the plant owner stops in \( T \) periods in the RHS as
\[
\{z^T(0) > z^{T-1}(1) > \ldots > z^0(T)\} = \{z_0 > z_1 > \ldots > z_T\}
\]

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such that $z_0 = 1$ and $z_T \geq z = f/a$. Associated with $\{z_t\}$, there is a sequence of human capital demand $h_t = \left( \frac{z_{t+1}}{z_t} \right)^{1/\eta}$. Let $v(h|z)$ denote the flow payoff of the owner of a unit of plant with productivity $z$ who hires $h$ units of tools.

$$v(h|z) = az - wh.$$  

Because optimal stopping strategy $z_t > z_{t+1}$ is better than staying at $z_t$ with $h = \frac{1-\theta}{\eta}$, we get

$$v(h_t|z_t) + \lambda V(z_{t+1}) \geq v \left( \frac{z_{t}^{1-\theta}}{z_{t}^{\eta}} \right) + \lambda V(z_t),$$

or

$$V(z_t) - V(z_{t+1}) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[ v(h_t|z_t) - v \left( \frac{z_{t}^{1-\theta}}{z_{t}^{\eta}} \right) \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (68)

Let $\phi(z|z_t) \equiv v \left( \frac{z}{z_{t}^{\theta}} \right) = az_t - w \left( \frac{z}{z_{t}^{\theta}} \right)$.

$$v(h_t|z_t) - v \left( \frac{z_{t}^{1-\theta}}{z_{t}^{\eta}} \right) = \int_{z_{t+1}}^{z_t} -\phi'(z|z_t)dz,$$

where

$$-\phi'(z|z_t) = \frac{w}{\eta} \frac{z^{\frac{1}{\eta} - 1}}{z_t^{\frac{\theta}{\eta}}}.$$

Notice that because

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial z_t} [-\phi'(z|z_t)] < 0,$$

we have

$$-\phi'(z|z_t) = \frac{w}{\eta} \frac{z^{\frac{1}{\eta} - 1}}{z_t^{\frac{\theta}{\eta}}} \leq \frac{w}{\eta} z^{\frac{1-\theta}{\eta} - 1} = -\phi'(z),$$

for $z_{t+1} \leq z \leq z_t$.

Then,

$$v(h_t|z_t) - v \left( \frac{z_{t}^{1-\theta}}{z_{t}^{\eta}} \right) = \int_{z_{t+1}}^{z_t} -\phi'(z|z_t)dz \leq \int_{z_{t+1}}^{z_t} -\phi'(z|z)dz.$$  

Combining this inequality with inequality (68), we have

$$V(z_t) - V(z_{t+1}) \leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[ v(h_t|z_t) - v \left( \frac{z_{t}^{1-\theta}}{z_{t}^{\eta}} \right) \right] \leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \int_{z_{t+1}}^{z_t} \frac{w}{\eta} z^{\frac{1-\theta}{\eta} - 1}dz,$$

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\[ V(1) - V(z_T) = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} [V(z_t) - V(z_{t+1})] \leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \int_{z_T}^{T} \frac{w}{\eta} \frac{1-\theta}{1-\eta} dz, \]

where we use \( z_1 = 1 \) in the last inequality. Because

\[ V(z_T) = \frac{1}{R} (az_T + \lambda q) \]

and

\[ \frac{1}{\lambda} \int_{z_T}^{1} \frac{w}{\eta} \frac{1-\theta}{1-\eta} dz = \frac{w}{\lambda(1-\theta)} \left( 1 - z_T^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \right), \]

we have

\[ V(1) \leq \frac{1}{R} (az_T + \lambda q) + \frac{w}{\lambda(1-\theta)} \left( 1 - z_T^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}} \right) \equiv RHS(z_T), \quad (69) \]

if we are not in region \( P \), i.e., some plant owners stop their plant.

To derive a sufficient condition for Region \( P \), we use the fact that equilibrium wage in this region satisfies

\[ \frac{w}{a} = \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \theta \lambda}. \]

Then RHS of (69) reaches the maximum when

\[ z_T = \left( 1 - \frac{\theta \lambda}{R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \]

\[ RHS = \frac{a}{R} \left( 1 - \frac{\theta \lambda}{R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{1 - \theta} + \frac{a \eta}{(1 - \theta)(R - \theta \lambda)} + \frac{\lambda}{R} q. \]

A sufficient condition for the economy to be in Region \( P \) is

\[ V(1) = \frac{a}{R} \left( \frac{R - (\theta + \eta) \lambda}{R - \theta \lambda} \right) \]

\[ \geq \frac{a}{R} \left( 1 - \frac{\theta \lambda}{R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{1 - \theta} + \frac{a \eta}{(1 - \theta)(R - \theta \lambda)} + \frac{\lambda}{R} q. \]

This yields an upper bound on \( f/a \):

\[ \frac{f}{a} \leq \frac{R (1 - \theta - \eta)}{\lambda(1 - \theta)} \left[ 1 - \frac{R - \lambda}{R} \left( 1 - \frac{\theta \lambda}{R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \right] \equiv \mathcal{T}(f/a). \]
\( T(f/a) \) denotes an upper bound for \( f/a \) as a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure equilibrium with no stopping.

Now we proceed to derive a lower bound on \( f/a \) such that the growth rate is an increasing function of real interest rate in state equilibrium. From (20), we learn

\[
0 = (G - \pi^E \beta R^E)[G - (1 - \pi^S)\beta R] - \pi^S(1 - \pi^E)\beta^2 RR^E
\]

\[
= \left[ G - \pi^E \beta \left( \lambda + \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) \right] \left[ G - (1 - \pi^S)\beta R \right] - \pi^S(1 - \pi^E)\beta^2 R \left( \lambda + \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right)
\]

\[
= \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right). \tag{70}
\]

Because we assume \( \beta R < 1 \), we restrict our attention the case

\[ G > (1 - \pi^S)\beta R. \]

Then we learn

\[ G \geq \pi^E \beta \left( \lambda + \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right). \]

Then we learn

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial G} \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) > 0, \]

in the neighborhood of the equilibrium \( G \). We can easily check

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial R} \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x - b} \right) < 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial \left( \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right)} \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) < 0. \]

Thus a sufficient condition for

\[
\frac{dG}{dR} = - \frac{\partial}{\partial G} \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) + \frac{\partial}{\partial \left( \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right)} \Psi \left( G; R, \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) \frac{d}{dR} \left( \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) > 0
\]

is

\[
0 < \frac{d}{dR} \left( \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{w}{(x + q - b)^2(R - \lambda)^2(R - \lambda \theta)} \left[ \lambda(1 - \theta) f - (R - \lambda)^2 x - \lambda(1 - \theta - \eta) a \right],
\]

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or
\[ \lambda (1 - \theta) f > (R - \lambda)^2 x + \lambda (1 - \theta - \eta) a. \] (71)

If \( \pi^S = 0 \), then from (20), we have
\[ G = \pi^E \beta \left( \lambda + \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right), \]
or
\[ x = F(R, G) = \frac{a - f - w}{R - \lambda} + \frac{\beta \pi^E}{G - \beta \lambda \pi^E} w \]
\[ = \frac{a - f}{R - \lambda} - \frac{G - \beta R \pi^E}{(R - \lambda) (G - \beta \lambda \pi^E)} w. \]

Because \( F_G < 0 \), \( dG/dR > 0 \) if and only if \( F_R > 0 \). And because
\[ (R - \lambda) F_R = -\frac{a - f - w}{R - \lambda} + \frac{G - \beta R \pi^E}{G - \beta \lambda \pi^E} \frac{a \eta \lambda}{(R - \theta \lambda)^2}, \]
d\( G/dR > 0 \) iff
\[ f/a > \frac{R - (\theta + \eta) \lambda}{R - \theta \lambda} - \frac{G - \beta R \pi^E}{G - \beta \lambda \pi^E} \frac{\eta \lambda (R - \lambda)}{(R - \theta \lambda)^2} \equiv E(f/a) \]
when \( \pi^S = 0 \). For the growth-enhancing effect of interest rate in Region \( P \),
we need
\[ T(f/a) - E(f/a) > 0 \]
or
\[ \frac{T(f/a) - E(f/a)}{R - \lambda} = \frac{R (1 - \theta - \eta) - \lambda (1 - \theta)(\theta + \eta)}{\lambda(1 - \theta)(R - \theta \lambda)} \]
\[ - \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{\lambda(1 - \theta)} \left( 1 - \frac{\theta \lambda}{R} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{1 - \theta - \eta}} + \frac{G - \beta R \pi^E}{G - \beta \lambda \pi^E} \frac{\eta \lambda}{(R - \theta \lambda)^2} > 0. \]

Suppose both \( R \) and \( \lambda \) are close to 1,
\[ \frac{T(f/a) - E(f/a)}{R - \lambda} \approx \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{(1 - \theta)^2} - \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{(1 - \theta)} \left( 1 - (1 - \theta) \frac{\eta}{1 - \theta - \eta} \right) + \frac{\eta}{(1 - \theta)^2} \]
\[ = \frac{1 - \theta - \eta}{1 - \theta} \left[ 1 - (1 - \theta) \frac{\eta}{1 - \theta - \eta} \right] > 0. \]

This proves that for any \( f/a \), there exists an open set of interest rates and depreciation rates, both of which are close to 1, where we have the property
that the growth rate is an increasing function of the interest rate in Region $P$.

To examine the effect of an unanticipated fall in real interest rate on welfare in the pure non-stopping region, we use $(35a, 35b, 36, 37)$. Continue to assume $\pi^S = 0$. Then we have

$$\frac{dV^E}{dR} = \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \frac{d}{dR} \left( \ln n^E \right)$$

$$+ \frac{\beta}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta \pi^E)} \frac{d}{dR} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{w + \lambda(x + q - b)}{x + q - b} \right) \right]$$

$$+ \frac{\beta^2(1 - \pi^E)}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 - \beta \pi^E)} \frac{d}{dR} \ln R.$$ (72)

From $(55a, 55b)$, we have

$$\frac{dw}{dR} = \frac{w}{R - \lambda \theta},$$

$$\frac{db}{dR} = \frac{1}{R - \lambda} \left( \frac{w}{R - \lambda \theta} - b \right).$$

Then we get

$$\frac{d}{dR} \ln \left[ w + \lambda(x + q - b) \right] = \frac{1}{w + \lambda(x + q - b)} \frac{1}{(R - \lambda)^2} \left( a - f - \frac{R^2 - \lambda^2 \theta}{(R - \lambda)^2} \eta \right),$$

$$\frac{d}{dR} \ln \left( \lambda + \frac{w}{x + q - b} \right) = \frac{w}{[w + \lambda(x + q - b)](x + q - b)(R - \lambda)^2(R - \lambda \theta)^2} \cdot \left[ \lambda \eta a - \lambda(1 - \theta)(a - f) - (R - \lambda)^2 x \right].$$

When $\pi^S = 0$, $n^E = [w + \lambda(x + q - b)] h$. Then from (72), we have

$$(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta \pi^E)(R - \lambda)^2(R - \lambda \theta)^2 [w + \lambda(x + q - b)] \frac{dV^E}{dR} / \lambda$$

$$= (1 - \beta \pi^E) \left[ [(R - \lambda \theta)^2(a - f) - (R^2 - \lambda^2 \theta)\eta \alpha] \right]$$

$$+ \frac{\beta \alpha \eta}{x - b} [\lambda \eta a - \lambda(1 - \theta)(a - f) - (R - \lambda)^2 x]$$

$$+ \frac{\beta^2(1 - \pi^E)(R - \lambda)(R - \lambda \theta)}{1 - \beta} \{ (R - \lambda \theta)[(R - \lambda)x - (a - f)] + R \eta \}. 58$$
9.4 Welfare effect of policy

From (35a, 35b, 36, 37), we learn that the welfare of a continuing engineer, retiring engineer, new engineer, and continuing saver are

\begin{align*}
V^{EE} &= \beta \frac{(1 - \beta + \beta \pi^S) \ln R^E + \beta (1 - \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln[w + \lambda(x + q - b - s)]}{1 - \beta} h + \text{constant}, \\
V^{ES} &= \beta \frac{\beta \pi^S \ln R^E + (1 - \beta \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln[w + \lambda(x + q - b - s)]}{1 - \beta} h + \text{constant}, \\
V^{SE} &= \beta \frac{(1 - \beta + \beta \pi^S) \ln R^E + \beta (1 - \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln d}{1 - \beta} + \text{constant}, \\
V^{SS} &= \beta \frac{\beta \pi^S \ln R^E + (1 - \beta \pi^E) \ln R}{(1 - \beta)^2(1 + \beta \pi^S - \beta \pi^E)} + \frac{\ln d}{1 - \beta} + \text{constant},
\end{align*}

where \( h \) is the number of tools and \( d \) is financial asset held from the last period. Notice that government tax-subsidy does not affect the value of plant \( b \) and thus it does not affect \( d \). From (25, 26, 28), we see that in the neighborhood of \( \tau = 0 \),

\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial}{\partial \tau} \ln R^E &= \frac{w}{[w + \lambda(x + q - b)](G - \lambda)(R^E - G)}, \\
\frac{\partial}{\partial \tau} [w + \lambda(x + q - b - s)] &= -\frac{w}{[w + \lambda(x + q - b)](G - \lambda) G}.
\end{align*}

In steady state, we learn that the fractions of population of engineers and savers, \((m_E, m_S)\), satisfy

\[ \pi^S m_S = (1 - \pi^E) m_E, \]

where the LHS is the flow of savers to become engineers and the RHS is the flow of retiring engineers. Thus

\[ m_E = \frac{\pi^S}{\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E}, \quad m_S = \frac{1 - \pi^E}{\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E}. \]

We consider a welfare measure as the population-weighted average of the welfare of each type of agents:

\[ V = m_E \left[ \pi^E V^{EE} + (1 - \pi^E) V^{ES} \right] + m_S \left[ \pi^S V^{EE} + (1 - \pi^S) V^{SS} \right]. \]
Using the above expressions, we learn

\[
V = \frac{\pi^S \nu^E + (1 - \pi^E) \nu^E}{\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E} + \frac{\pi^S \ln[w + \lambda(x + q - b)]}{\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E} + \text{constant}
\]

\[
= \frac{\pi^S}{(\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E)(1 - \beta)^2} \{ \beta \ln R^E + (1 - \beta) \ln[w + \lambda(x + q - b)] \} + \text{constant}.
\]

Therefore the effect of a tax and subsidy on the social welfare is

\[
\frac{\partial V}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\pi^S}{(\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E)(1 - \beta)^2 \{ w + \lambda(x + q - b)(G - \lambda) \}} [\beta(R^E - G) - (1 - \beta)(G - \lambda)]
\]

\[
= \frac{\pi^S}{(\pi^S + 1 - \pi^E)(1 - \beta)^2 \{ w + \lambda(x + q - b)(G - \lambda) \}} \beta R^E - G
\]

\[
> 0.
\]

The last inequality is obtained because the growth rate of economy is the weighted average of growth rate of engineers \( \beta R^E \) and savers \( \beta R \) and \( R^E > R \) in our economy.

Individually, if \( \pi^S \) is close to zero, we learn

\[
\frac{\partial V^{EE}}{\partial \tau} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial V^{ES}}{\partial \tau} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial V^{SE}}{\partial \tau} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial V^{SS}}{\partial \tau} > 0.
\]

For the continuing engineer, because the welfare gain from the higher rates of return dominates the loss from the lower new worth, welfare increases, \( \frac{\partial V^{EE}}{\partial \tau} > 0 \). For the retiring engineer, the loss from lower net worth dominates the gain from the higher rates of return when she becomes an engineer in the future, and thus welfare decreases, \( \frac{\partial V^{ES}}{\partial \tau} < 0 \). For those who were the savers in the previous period, there is no capital loss and only gains from the higher rates of return, and welfare increases, \( \frac{\partial V^{SS}}{\partial \tau}, \frac{\partial V^{SS}}{\partial \tau} > 0 \).

### 9.5 Calibration strategy

We choose the following parameter values, \( \theta, \eta, \lambda, \beta, \pi^E \) and \( \pi^S \). We normalize the productivity of plant productivity \( a \) to be 1.

We solve for \( f \) such that the economy is at the boundary between Region \( P \) and Region \( M \) at \( R = 1.015 \). We design an algorithm to solve for the infimum of the set of \( f \) for which a plant owner stops in a finite number of periods.
Suppose the plant owner stops in $T$ period at a particular value of $f$. Then $S^t(1; f, w, R)$ as a function of $t$ reaches its peak at $T$. Define a sequence of $f_t$ such that at $f = f_t$, for $z^* = 1$:

$$S^{t+1}(1; f_t, w, R) = S^t(1; f_t, w, R).$$

Intuitively, $f_t$ tracks the movement in the peak as we vary $f$. If $f = f_t$, the peak is either $t$ or $t + 1$. As $t$ goes to infinity, the peak shifts to infinity. Because

$$S^{t+1}(1; a, w, r) = U^{t+1}(1; R) + \frac{\lambda^{t+1}}{R^{t+1}} q$$

and

$$S^t(1; a, w, r) = U^t(1; R) + \frac{\lambda^t}{R^t} q,$$

we have

$$f_t = \frac{R^{t+1}}{\lambda^t} \left[ U^{t+1}(1; R) - U^t(1; R) \right].$$

The calibrated value of $f$ is equal to $\inf_{t=1,2,...,\ell} f_t$, which we approximate by $\min_{t=1,2,...,T} f_t$ with $T$ large enough. For any value of $f$ strictly above $\inf_{t=1,2,...,\ell} f_t$, there must exist a finite optimal stopping time. For any value of $f$ strictly below $\inf_{t=1,2,...,\ell} f_t$, there cannot exist a finite stopping time.

After we calibrate the value of $f$, we solve for $x$ to target a growth rate of 0.5% at gross interest rate $R = 1.015$.

$$x = a - f - w + \frac{\beta \Pi}{R - \lambda} w,$$

where $w = \frac{\lambda \eta}{R - \theta \lambda} a$ and

$$\Pi = \pi^E + \pi^S \frac{\beta R (1 - \pi^E)}{G - \beta R (1 - \pi^S)}.$$