



Attitudes Towards Success and Failure

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Abstract

Individuals often attach a special meaning to obtaining a certain goal, and getting past a threshold marks the difference between what they consider a success or a failure. In this paper we take a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility setting with an exogenous reference point that separates success from failure, and define attitudes towards success and failure as features of preferences over lotteries. The distinctive feature of our definitions is that they all concern a local reversal of the decision maker's risk attitude between risk-aversion and risk-lovingness across the reference point. Our findings provide a unified view of several well-known models of reference-dependent preferences in economics, finance and psychology, and also include novel representations. Moreover, we introduce orderings over the primitive space of preferences to define different attitudes with which each attitudes can be displayed, and characterize them in terms of the representation, with indices analogous to the well-known Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion. Our findings shed new light on frequently used notions of reference-dependent preferences, and suggest that new comparative statics analyses be conducted in these settings. Finally, we argue that our framework may prove useful to incorporate, within a standard economic model, behavioral manifestations of personality traits that have received increasing attention within the empirical economics literature.

Keywords: expected utility; loss aversion; aspirations; risk aversion; reference-dependence.

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1 Introduction

Individuals often attach a special meaning to obtaining a certain goal, and whether or not they get past a threshold marks the difference between what they perceive as being successful and what they perceive as having failed. This general metaphor of success and failure emerges in different forms, both in economics and in psychology, in ways that are not fully understood. The study of personality, for instance, considers attitudes towards achieving a goal (in tenacity, perseverance and conscientiousness; cf. Deary et al. (2009)), as does the vast literature on reference dependence, with the notion of gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992)).¹ In development economics too, the idea of aspirations (Genicot and Ray (2017)) relates to achieving a goal that one aspires to. In business and finance, benchmarking and aspiration level models (Payne et al. (1980, 1981)) refer to the objective of reaching a specific target, and they are closely related to the idea of “gambling for survival” that is familiar in political science.

The formal models above are apparently disconnected, but they all share the feature that their utility representations induce reversals of the decision maker’s risk-attitude, around the critical threshold: for instance, an otherwise risk-averse agent may be risk-loving over lotteries that can make the difference between a failure and a success. Concerning the personality traits mentioned above, which are increasingly used in empirical economics (e.g., Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Almlund et al. (2011), Proto, Sofianos and Rustichini (2019, 2020), Heckman et al. (2021), etc.), but for which there is currently no agreed upon formal representation, we perhaps have an intuitive understanding of their meaning, but we lack a definition of these traits in terms of preferences and choice, the way we have for instance with risk and time attitudes. More broadly, we do not know whether the shared metaphor of success and failure, and the corresponding attitudes which are studied in these different areas of research, are in some way linked to each other, and what are their fundamental economic underpinnings.

The aim of this paper is to systematically analyze various attitudes towards success and failure underlying the concepts alluded to in several branches of research. We do this while remaining within the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility (EU) framework, which we supplement with an *exogenous* reference point, x_0 , that serves as the threshold between success and failure: any outcome above x_0 is a success, and any outcome below is a failure. Within this setting, we define the various attitudes towards success and failure in terms of primitive preferences over monetary lotteries, just as is done for risk-aversion, and we obtain representations of each attitude in terms of properties of the corresponding Bernoulli utility function. These representations highlight the connections between the various attitudes, and show that the seemingly distinct concepts discussed in different research fields interconnect in ways that may not have seemed obvious, *prima facie*. We also define orderings over the intensity of these attitudes, and characterize them in terms of transformations over their utility representations,

¹Reference-dependence has a long history in economics, starting with the seminal works of Markowitz (1952) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and it has been explored from several angles, typically departing from the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Classic references of theoretical work include Gul (1991), Ok and Masatlioglu (2007, 2014), Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016), Wakker (2010), etc. Models with endogenous reference point include Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), Kibris, Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2021). As we explain below, in this paper we maintain the expected utility axioms, and take the reference point to be exogenous. For a survey of the most closely related ideas, see O’Donoghue and Sprenger (2018).

thereby providing a means to perform comparative statics exercises, in a manner analogous to risk-aversion indices such as the Arrow-Pratt coefficient. These orderings and their corresponding indices thus provide tractable models of decision-making that can be used to capture economically relevant personality traits using standard economics notions and techniques.

Motivated by the common feature of the disparate models mentioned above, we aim to understand how different attitudes towards success and failure affect a decision maker's willingness to take risk, and induce reversals between risk-lovingness and risk-aversion around the threshold between perceived failure and success. To do this, we maintain all the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for an EU representation, as well as monotonicity (i.e., more money is preferred to less). To isolate the role played by the critical threshold in inducing reversals of the individual's risk-attitude, we further assume that, at least over some (arbitrarily small) left- and right-neighborhood of the threshold, the agent can be (weakly) risk-averse or risk-loving, but does not switch from risk-aversion to risk-lovingness for lotteries that are 'on the same side' of x_0 . In contrast, all the attitudes we consider do entail a switch of risk attitude for lotteries that go *across* the threshold, in the sense that they attach positive probability to an outcome $x' > x_0$ and to an outcome $x < x_0$. The various attitudes differ in the way that such reversals manifest themselves.

As discussed above, several models of reference-dependence in the literature display the feature that the decision maker's risk attitude changes between risk-seeking and risk-aversion for lotteries across the threshold. But the idea of taking such reversals as the central feature of these behavioral phenomena is novel, to the best of our knowledge. As we argue next, this perspective provides a unified view on seemingly unrelated models of reference-dependent preferences, as well as shed a new light on familiar notions and patterns of behavior. It further allows for the identification of the reference point precisely for its inducement of the reversals in risk attitude.

The first two attitudes we consider are what we call *failure avoidance* and *success attachment*. Both attitudes posit a reversal of the risk-attitude for binary lotteries that go across x_0 : over such lotteries, individuals would be risk-averse for some and risk-loving for others. The difference between the two is given by the source of the reversal, which could be primarily driven by the potential failures, or by the potential successes. *Failure avoidance* concerns the agent's desire to avoid the failure region, no matter by how small a margin. The idea is that, for any potential failure x in some left-neighborhood of x_0 , the agent is willing to take a risk in order to attain a potential success $x' > x_0$, *no matter how small*, as long as the probability of failure is high enough. *Success attachment* instead captures the agent's desire to end up in the success region, no matter how small the potential failure might be. Symmetrically to failure avoidance, the idea is that for any potential success x' in some right-neighborhood of x_0 , the agent is willing to take a risk in order to avoid a potential failure $x < x_0$, *no matter how close* x is to the critical threshold, as long as the probability of failure is above a certain threshold.

In both attitudes, the agent switches from risk-lovingness to risk-aversion, as the probability of success increases. But the two definitions are symmetric in the role played by the potential failures and successes. This captures that, with failure avoidance, the agent's objective is to

pursue (via his willingness to take some risk) *any* success to get out of the failure region, while success attachment denotes the willingness to take some risk in order to avoid *any* failure.

Our first results characterize the shape of the utility function for both attitudes, and jointly reveal a striking finding: failure avoidance and success attachment cannot co-exist, except when there is a discontinuity at x_0 . They also reveal that a special case of failure avoidance, without success attachment, characterizes the hugely influential representation used in prospect theory, namely that of the kinked S-shaped utility function (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). An important outgrowth of our analysis therefore is to provide the first characterization of this important functional form in terms of the primitives that are standard in the theory of decisions under risk, i.e. the agent’s preferences over lotteries.²

Hence, independent of one’s perspective on the best specification of the outcome space (e.g., Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Rubinstein (2001); see also O’Donoghue and Sprenger (2018)), our results formally show that key behavioral phenomena that are commonly associated with prospect theory – namely, *loss aversion* and *diminishing sensitivity* – may be captured by risk preferences within a completely standard expected utility setting. As we discuss below, this characterization also brings in new insights about loss aversion, especially with respect to how to conduct comparative statics exercises over this prominent notion in decision theory.

We then introduce the attitudes dual to failure avoidance and success attachment, which we call *failure acceptance* and *success seeking*. The difference between these attitudes and the previous ones is that, rather than having reversals in which risk aversion is ‘at the top’ (i.e., for high probability of success), the switch occurs in the opposite direction, with risk-aversion ‘at the bottom’. In the case of failure acceptance, for instance, the agent is willing to take a risk to pursue an arbitrarily small failure, only when the probability of success is high enough. With success seeking, instead, the individual is unmotivated to take a risk to avoid an arbitrarily small failure, unless the likelihood of success is high enough. This last attitude is perhaps not as prevalent as the others, but we characterize it for completeness.

Equipped with the representation of the four attitudes, we then study how they interconnect with one another. This way, we obtain a complete map of how they determine the shape of the utility function, when they are displayed both individually and jointly (if possible). This is best seen graphically (see Figure 3, p. 12), but we briefly discuss some of the findings. As we already mentioned, the kinked S-Shape utility function is a special case of failure avoidance that precludes success attachment, which also cannot co-exist with failure acceptance or success seeking. Another noteworthy intersection is that of success attachment and failure acceptance, which characterizes an *aspiration* representation that has been used in development economics (e.g., Genicot and Ray (2017, 2019)). This intersection instead cannot co-exist with failure avoidance or success seeking. Finally, unlike failure avoidance or success attachment, which can only co-exist with a utility function that is *discontinuous* at x_0 , as in the so called “aspiration

²A large empirical and experimental literature has explored loss aversion under risk, eliciting subjects preferences over lotteries (for some classic and recent references, see, e.g., Camerer et al. (1997), Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv (2007), Crawford and Meng (2011), Imas (2016), Imas et al. (2016), Bernheim and Sprenger (2021), etc.). Theoretical investigations of its foundations have typically focused on settings with certainty or specified properties directly in the space of utility representations (cf. Wakker (2010) and references therein). Our results characterize loss aversion directly in terms of preferences over lotteries.

level” models in the finance literature (e.g., Payne et al. (1980, 1981), Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008)), failure acceptance and success seeking are mutually exclusive attitudes.

Following the definition of attitudes towards success and failure, we introduce orderings over the degrees of each attitude. We show that what may seem to be natural orderings would in fact lack crucial features. For instance, consider the case of failure avoidance, and the special case of the kinked S-shaped utility function that is typically used to represent *loss aversion*. It may seem natural to rank an agent with a sharper kink to be more failure avoidant (as with the standard definition of loss aversion, cf. Kobberling and Wakker (2005)). But this would be incomplete: an agent with a sharper kink, all else being equal, is more loss averse, but he also exhibits *less* manifestations of failure avoidance. A sharper kink therefore does not suffice to rank individuals by this attitude. We rectify this issue by defining our rankings directly in terms of the (more transparent) primitive preferences, less complete than the one characterized by the sharpness of the kink, and then obtaining as a result indices in the utility space that characterize each ranking. These indices involve both a ranking of the sharpness of the kink at the threshold, and measures of concavity of the Bernoulli utility functions around it.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the general framework and the maintained axioms. Section 3 introduces the four attitudes towards success and failure, as well as the corresponding representation theorems. Section 4 discusses the joint implications of the main representation theorems, and discusses some special cases of interest, such as loss aversion, aspirations, and the discontinuous case. Section 5 focuses on the interpersonal comparisons of the four attitudes (both their behavioral definitions and their utility characterizations). Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

We let \mathbb{R} denote the space of monetary outcomes, and let L denote the set of simple lotteries over monetary outcomes, with typical elements $p, q, r \in L$. For any $x, x' \in \mathbb{R}$, we let $\Delta(x, x') \subseteq L$ denote the set of lotteries with support included in $\{x, x'\}$. With a slight abuse of notation, in that case we let p denote both the lottery itself, as well as the probability $p \in [0, 1]$ attached to the high prize, $x' \geq x$ (x receives probability $(1 - p)$). For any lottery $p \in L$, we let Ep denote its expected value, and for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$, we let $\delta_x \in L$ denote the degenerate lottery which assigns probability one to x .

We assume that the decision maker (DM)’s preferences are represented by a weak order \succsim , with symmetric and asymmetric parts \succ and \sim , respectively. For any $p \in L$, we let $CE(p) \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the certainty equivalent of p , if it exists, as the degenerate lottery $\delta_{CE(p)}$ which satisfies $\delta_{CE(p)} \sim p$. We maintain throughout all the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1954, vNM) axioms for an expected utility (EU) representation, as well as monotonicity:

- **[Weak Order:]** \succsim is complete and transitive.
- **[Independence:]** For any $p, q, r \in L$ and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, $p \succsim r$ if and only if $\alpha p + (1 - \alpha)r \succsim \alpha q + (1 - \alpha)r$.

- **[Archimedean Property:]** For all $p, q, r \in L$ such that $p \succ q \succ r$, there exists an $a, b \in (0, 1)$ such that $ap + (1 - a)r \succ q \succ bp + (1 - b)r$.
- **[Monotonicity:]** $\delta_{x'} \succsim \delta_x$ if and only if $x' \geq x$.

We recall that the first three axioms (i.e., the standard vNM axioms) hold if and only if the preferences have an EU representation, i.e. there exists a Bernoulli utility function $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $p \succsim q$ if and only if $\sum_{x \in X} p(x)u(x) \geq \sum_{x \in X} q(x)u(x)$. We also remind the reader that these axioms alone do not impose any particular structure on u (cf. Kreps (1987), Gilboa (2010)). In particular, they impose neither continuity of u nor concavity or convexity properties, but they do identify the utility function uniquely, up to positive affine transformations. If monotonicity is also assumed, then u is increasing. For later reference, it is also useful to recall the standard (model-free) definition of *risk-aversion*, as well as some basic results:

Definition 1. Preferences \succsim exhibit (global) risk-aversion if $\delta_{Ep} \succsim p$ for every $p \in L$.

Result. Under the maintained axioms above: (1.) If p is s.t. $CE(p)$ exists, then $\delta_{Ep} \succsim p$ if and only if $CE(p) \leq Ep$; (2.) If $CE(p)$ exists for every $p \in L$, then \succsim exhibits (global) risk aversion if and only if $CE(p) \leq Ep$; (3.) \succsim_i exhibits (global) risk aversion if and only if u_i is concave.

As explained in the introduction, we aim to understand how different attitudes towards success and failure affect a decision maker's willingness to take risk, and induce reversals between risk-lovingness and risk-aversion, for lotteries that can mark the difference between what he perceives as a failure or as a success. To this end, we let $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ denote the (exogenous) *threshold*, that separates successful outcomes ($x' > x_0$) from failures ($x < x_0$). All the attitudes we consider do entail a switch of risk attitude for lotteries that go *across* the threshold: that is, for lotteries that attach positive probability to an outcome $x' > x_0$ and to an outcome $x < x_0$, the agent would be risk-averse for some probability of success, and risk-loving for others.³

In order to isolate the role that the threshold plays in inducing reversals of the agent's risk-attitude, we further assume that at least for some (arbitrarily small) left- and right-neighborhoods of the threshold, the agent can be (weakly) risk-averse or risk-loving, but does not switch between one and the other for lotteries that are supported over such (arbitrarily small) intervals, and "on the same side" of x_0 . Hence, all our notions will have in common the following features: (i) There is *no reversal* of the agent's risk-attitude (be it risk-aversion or risk-lovingness, or risk-neutrality) over lotteries whose prizes are all *on the same side* of the reference point; (ii) There is a *reversal* of the agent's risk-attitude for lotteries *across* the reference point: over such lotteries, the agent would be risk-averse for some and risk-loving for others. The various attitudes will differ in the way that such reversals manifest themselves.

To formalize these ideas, for any interval (x_l, x_w) that contains x_0 , and for any $x \in [x_l, x_w]$, we define the set $S_{x_l}^{x_w}(x, x_0)$ of all outcomes $y \in [x^l, x^w]$ which are on the same side of x^0 as outcome x .⁴ Then, we can define the property of *Same-Side No Reversal* over an interval:

³As we further discuss below, it will be easy to see from the definitions that the position of the threshold can be identified from choice. We nonetheless fix x_0 from the outset in order to simplify the notation.

⁴Formally, $S_{x_l}^{x_w}(x, x_0) := \{y \in [x_l, x_w] : \text{sign}(x - x_0) = \text{sign}(y - x_0)\}$.

Definition 2 (Same-Side No Reversal). *Let $x_l < x_0 < x_w$. Preferences \succsim display Same Side No-Reversal (SSNR) over the interval (x_l, x_w) if, for any $x \in [x_l, x_w]$, $\nexists x' \in S_{x_l}^{x_w}(x, x_0)$ s.t. $\delta_{E_{p'}} \succ p'$ and $p \succ \delta_{E_p}$ for some $p, p' \in \Delta(x, x')$.*

3 Attitudes Towards Success and Failure

In this section we introduce attitudes towards success and failures, and the corresponding representation theorems. All such attitudes posit a *reversal* of the risk-attitude for binary lotteries that go across x_0 – that is, lotteries that assign prize $x' > x_0$ with probability $p \in (0, 1)$, and $x < x_0$ otherwise: over such lotteries, individuals would be risk-averse for some and risk-loving for others. The difference between them is given by the source of the reversal, which could be primarily driven by the potential failures, or by the potential successes, and by the direction of such reversal. We start with *failure avoidance* and *success attachment*, before moving to their “duals”, *success seeking* and *failure acceptance*.

3.1 Failure Avoidance and Success Attachment: Model-Free Definitions

We introduce next the formal definition of *failure avoidance* and *success attachment*. As discussed, *failure avoidance* concerns the agent’s desire to avoid the failure region, no matter by how small a margin. The idea is that, for any potential failure x in some left-neighborhood of x_0 , the agent is willing to take a risk in order to attain a potential success $x' > x_0$, *no matter how small*, as long as the probability of failure is high enough. But once the probability of success is high enough, he reverts instead to being risk-averse. We formalize these ideas as follows:

Definition 3 (Failure Avoidance). *Preferences \succsim display failure avoidance at $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t.: (i) \succsim display SSNR over (x_l, x_w) ; and (ii) $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0)$, $\exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w) : \forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, $\exists p, p' \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $p > p'$, $\delta_{E_p} \succ p$ and $p' \succ \delta_{E_{p'}}$.*

The formal definition of *success attachment* is completely symmetrical to that of *failure avoidance*, with the roles of failures and successes swapped:

Definition 4 (Success Attachment). *Preferences \succsim display success attachment at $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t.: (i) \succsim display SSNR over (x_l, x_w) ; and (ii) $\forall x' \in (x_0, x_w]$, $\exists \underline{x} \in [x_l, x_0) : \forall x \in [\underline{x}, x_0)$, $\exists p, p' \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $p > p'$, $\delta_{E_p} \succ p$ and $p' \succ \delta_{E_{p'}}$.*

In both attitudes, the agent switches from risk-lovingness to risk-aversion, as the probability of success increases. But notice that the order of quantifiers over failures and successes is different. This captures that, with failure avoidance, the agent’s objective is to pursue (via his willingness to take some risk) *any* success to get out of the failure region, while success attachment denotes the willingness to take some risk in order to avoid *any* failure. The difference between the two concepts is thus given by the ultimate source of the reversal of the agent’s risk-attitude. Common to both attitudes is the direction of the switch, with the agent going from risk-loving to risk-averse as the probability p of the success outcome increases.

We note that these notions (including the SSNR requirement, as well as the attitudes we introduce in Section 3.3), are local notions, in the sense that they refer to properties of the

agent’s preferences for lotteries supported on some neighborhood of the threshold. In fact, the definitions refer to a particular attitude *at a threshold* x_0 , with no implication that x_0 is the *only* point at which the agent displays a specific attitude. So, for instance, different thresholds may be relevant for the same agent, and trigger the same or different attitudes at different levels. For example, the same gambler may display failure avoidance for gambles that can mark the difference between ‘winning something’ and ‘losing’ (i.e., for $x_0 = 0\$$), and display instead success attachment over gambles that may take him right above or right below some other salient threshold, e.g., for $\hat{x}_0 = 1M\$$.⁵ The definitions above also clarify that, while such thresholds are exogenous in our model, in the sense that they don’t depend on the menu of choices that are presented to the agent, their position can be identified from choice: a particular outcome $\hat{x} \in \mathbb{R}$ is a ‘threshold’ if and only if the agent’s preferences over lotteries around it satisfy the kind of reversals of risk-attitude that are entailed by the definitions (as well as the SSNR property on either side of it – cf. Definitions 2-6).

3.2 Failure Avoidance and Success Attachment: Representation Theorems

Before moving to the representation theorems, it is useful to first introduce some notation. Given the Bernoulli utility function that represents the agent’s preferences (its existence is ensured by the vNM axioms), $u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and the threshold $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$, we let $u^-(x_0) := \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} u(x)$, $u^+(x_0) := \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^+} u(x)$, and for any $[x_l, x_w]$ and any $x \in [x_l, x_w] \setminus \{x_0\}$, we let

$$m(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{u(x) - u^+(x_0)}{x - x_0} & \text{if } x > x_0 \\ \frac{u(x) - u^-(x_0)}{x - x_0} & \text{if } x < x_0 \end{cases}$$

denote the average slope of the utility function in the interval (x_0, x) or (x, x_0) , depending on whether $x > x_0$ or $x < x_0$. (By monotonicity, $m(x) \geq 0$ for any x). Also define $m^- := \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} m(x)$ and $m^+ := \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^+} m(x)$, and $K := u^+(x_0) - u^-(x_0)$.


We state next the first representation theorem for failure avoidance.

Theorem 1 (Failure Avoidance: Representation). *Under the vNM plus monotonicity, \succsim displays failure avoidance at x_0 if and only if there exist $x_w, x_l \in \mathbb{R} : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ such that either: (i) u is continuous on (x_l, x_w) , strictly convex on (x_l, x_0) , either concave or convex on (x_0, x_w) , and such that $m^- > m^+$; or (ii) u is discontinuous at x_0 , it is either convex or concave on each interval (x_l, x_0) and (x_0, x_w) , and such that $m^+ < \infty$.*

The logic is as follows (see Fig. 1). Consider first the continuous case. With failure avoidance, the agent is strictly risk-loving, over lotteries that go across the threshold, whenever the probability of the outcome in the failure *region* is sufficiently high. For this reason, his utility must be strictly convex on that region (locally, on an interval (x_l, x_0)). But since there must be a reversal from risk-lovingness to risk-aversion, this convexity must be counteracted by some form of concavity. This concavity does *not* come from concave utility on the success region, because the switch from risk-lovingness to risk-aversion occurs for binary lotteries that include

⁵Markovitz (1952) provides an early argument for the existence of multiple points of risk-attitude reversals.

Figure 1: Failure Avoidance: Bernoulli Utility Representation



Graphical illustration of the possible Bernoulli utility functions under failure avoidance.

any success, no matter how small (i.e., how close to x_0). Instead, it must come at the threshold itself, and it must come in form of a kink. Hence, $m^- > m^+$. The requirement on the success region is simply that due to SSNR, that there is concavity or convexity locally, without any imposition on which of the two it is.

This intuition captures two important features of the continuous case, whose logic will be adapted to all the attitudes we discuss: (i) since the attitude require a reversal, it require countervailing forces, one that provides risk-lovingness (convexity) and one that provides risk-aversion (concavity), and (ii) there is an asymmetry between the two regions. In the failure region, there is convexity over an *interval*, because the agent aims to avoid that entire region. An analogous curvature (concavity) is not required on the success region; instead, there is a *kink* at the threshold x_0 that captures the concavity.


Considering now the discontinuous case, the switch from risk-lovingness at the bottom to risk-aversion at the top comes from the discontinuity at x_0 directly. Intuitively, on the left of the discontinuity, the agent is willing to take a risk to ‘jump up’ to the success side. But if success is likely enough, so that it is likely enough to be on the success side, then the agent is risk-averse so as to avoid being on the left of the jump down. As for the requirement of convexity or concavity on either side, this is again due to SSNR. Note that, unlike the continuous case, there is no apparent asymmetry between the two regions in the logic above. This is because here, the discontinuity trumps the need for a curvature on the left and the kink at the thresholds, and itself serves both purposes.

The next result, analogous to Theorem 1, characterizes the properties of the Bernoulli utility function for preferences that display *Success Attachment*, as per Def. 4:

Theorem 2 (Success Attachment: Representation). *Under the vNM plus monotonicity, \succsim displays Success Attachment at x_0 if and only if there exist $x_w, x_l \in \mathbb{R} : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ such that either: (i) u is discontinuous at x_0 , it is either convex or concave on each interval (x_l, x_0) and (x_0, x_w) , and such that $m^- < \infty$; or (ii) u is continuous on (x_l, x_w) , strictly concave on (x_0, x_w) , either concave or convex on (x_0, x_l) , and such that $m^- < m^+$.*

A similar logic to that of the previous theorem holds (see Fig. 2). Here as well, there is an asymmetry for the continuous case between the two regions. But now, note that it is the success

Figure 2: Success Attachment: Bernoulli Utility Representation



Graphical illustration of the possible Bernoulli utility functions under success attachment.

region over which the agent is risk-averse due to success attachment, and so here the curvature on an interval must be on the right. As it is risk-aversion, this corresponds to concavity of u . The counteraction to obtain a reversal can again not come from curvature on the failure region, as the agent is aiming not to be in any failure, no matter how small. Hence, it must again come from a kink at x_0 . Since now the kink must counteract concavity, it must provide convexity. In other words, it must be that $m^- < m^+$.

As for the discontinuous case, the logic here is identical, as is the result. Risk-aversion at the top is induced by the desire not to jump down, while risk-aversion at the bottom is induced by the desire to jump up. Again, the discontinuity trumps the curvature on either side, and hence requirement for concavity or convexity is required other than that due to SSNR.

While the definitions of the two attitudes and the logic behind the theorems above are related, note that there is a conflict in the continuous case of the representation theorems. The kink for failure avoidance must provide concavity ($m^- > m^+$) to counteract the convexity in the failure region, but for success attachment it must provide convexity ($m^- < m^+$) to counteract convexity in the success region. These two are incompatible, and so the two attitudes cannot coexist in the continuous case. They can only coexist in the discontinuous case, where the jump itself is responsible for the reversal, and provides the two counteracting forces.

Corollary 1. *Under the vNM plus monotonicity, \succsim displays both Success Attachment and Failure Avoidance at x_0 if and only if it is discontinuous at x_0 .*

Notice also that a special case of the continuous representation of failure avoidance is one that takes the classical form, as in Fig. 1, of loss aversion: u is convex in the failure region, concave in the success region, and the slope on the left is steeper than on the right ($m^- > m^+$). It is only a special case because, while convexity and this kink shape are required for failure avoidance, concavity at the right is not. By the corollary above, it is immediate that loss aversion is incompatible with success attachment. We will return to this point more formally once all of the attitudes have been defined.

3.3 Failure Acceptance and Success Seeking

In this section we introduce attitudes that are dual to failure avoidance and success attachment, in the sense that rather than having reversals in which risk-aversion is ‘at the top’ (i.e., for high probability of success), the switch occurs in the opposite direction, with risk-aversion ‘at the bottom’. The only difference compared to Definitions 3 and 4 is thus the direction of the inequality between the p and p' over which the agent is risk-averse and risk-loving:

Definition 5 (Failure Acceptance). *Preferences \succsim display failure acceptance at $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t.: (i) \succsim display SSNR over (x_l, x_w) ; and (ii) $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0], \exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w] : \forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}], \exists p, p' \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $p < p', \delta_{Ep} \succ p$ and $p' \succ \delta_{Ep'}$.*

Definition 6 (Success Seeking). *Preferences \succsim display success seeking at $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t.: (i) \succsim display SSNR over (x_l, x_w) ; and (ii) $\forall x' \in (x_0, x_w], \exists \underline{x} \in [x_l, x_0) : \forall x \in [\underline{x}, x_0), \exists p, p' \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $p < p', \delta_{Ep} \succ p$ and $p' \succ \delta_{Ep'}$.*


In words, with failure acceptance the agent is willing to take a risk to pursue an arbitrarily small success, as long as the probability of success is high enough. With success seeking, instead, the individual is willing to take a risk to avoid an arbitrarily small failure, if success is sufficiently likely. The next two results are analogous to the previous representation theorems, for these two attitudes:

Theorem 3 (Failure Acceptance: Representation). *Under the vNM plus monotonicity, \succsim displays Failure Acceptance at x_0 if and only if there exist $x_w, x_l \in \mathbb{R} : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ such that: u is continuous on (x_l, x_w) , strictly concave on (x_l, x_0) , either concave or convex on (x_0, x_w) , and such that $m^+(x_0) > m^-(x_0)$.*

Theorem 4 (Success Seeking: Representation). *Under the vNM plus monotonicity, \succsim displays Failure Acceptance at x_0 if and only if there exist $x_w, x_l \in \mathbb{R} : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ such that: u is continuous on (x_l, x_w) , strictly convex on (x_0, x_w) , either concave or convex on (x_0, x_l) , and such that $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$.*

The logic of these results is completely analogous to those we discussed in the previous section, adequately adjusting the roles of convexity/concavity and the restrictions on the ‘kink’. In particular, where failure avoidance requires convexity in the failure region and the kink to have $m^- > m^+$ to counteract it, failure acceptance requires concavity and $m^- < m^+$. Likewise, where success attachment requires concavity in the success region and $m^- < m^+$, success seeking requires convexity in the success region and $m^- > m^+$. As a consequence, unlike the attitudes discussed in the previous sections, Success Seeking and Failure Acceptance are mutually exclusive. This is because here too the continuous cases cannot coexist, since they require kinks in different directions, and furthermore they do not have discontinuous analogues where they can. In the next section we discuss the relationship with Success Attachment and Failure Avoidance, and more generally the relationship between all four attitudes.

Figure 3: Attitudes Towards Success and Failures: A Full Map



Graphical illustration of the logical relationship between the four representation theorems.

4 Attitudes Towards Success and Failures: A Full Map

What is especially informative at this point is to reflect on the full picture that emerges from the four representations theorems considered jointly, and the corollaries that follow from drawing the implications of all possible combinations of conjunctions and disjunctions of the four attitudes, which we summarize in Figure 3, and in the corollaries in the next Section, which will discuss some important special cases that emerge from Theorems 1-4.

4.1 Special Cases of Interest

As we already mentioned, some special cases of our representation are especially significant, and have emerged in different contexts in different parts of the literature.

Loss Aversion: A widely used representation within economics and psychology corresponds to the case, typically with $x_0 = 0$, where the utility function is convex on the losses (failure) and concave on the gains (success), and that it has a kink around the reference point such that $m^- > m^+$. The first feature is typically referred to as *diminishing sensitivity*, the second as *loss aversion*, to capture the idea that losses loom larger than commensurate gains. This representation is widely used in cumulative prospect theory and in the related literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979); see also Wakker (2010), O'Donoghue and Sprenger (2018), and references therein), both with a non-linear rank dependent weighting function and with a linear weighting function (the latter is especially common in applications). In the following we maintain a linear weighting function, as the vNM axioms are maintained throughout this paper.⁶

⁶Allowing for non-linearities would be an interesting extension. For a recent experimental assessment of

As there should be no confusion here as to its meaning, we will refer to this as the *loss-aversion representation*.

A frequent specification of this functional form, for instance, takes $v : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ to be a concave increasing function defined on the gains domain, and letting the overall utility function $u : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be such that:

$$u(x) := \begin{cases} v(x - x_0) & \text{if } x > x_0 \\ -\lambda v(-(x - x_0)) & \text{if } x < x_0 \end{cases}, \quad (1)$$

where the parameter $\lambda > 1$ is used to capture the notion of loss aversion (e.g., Wakker (2010), Imas (2016), etc.), and is equivalent to the ratio m^-/m^+ in our notation.

Despite the importance of this representation in the literature, to the best of our knowledge no axiomatic characterization has been provided to relate the notion of loss aversion to the underlying preferences over lotteries. Theorems 1-4 jointly provide such a characterization, thereby complementing the literature: as is immediately clear from Fig. 3, the loss-aversion representation is a special case of failure-avoidant preferences, and is incompatible with any of the other attitudes. As previously mentioned, it is incompatible with success attachment, which joint with failure avoidance would entail a discontinuity. But it is also incompatible with failure acceptance, whose kink goes in the other direction, and with success seeking, for which the utility function must be convex in the success region. This characterization therefore serves to provide insight into the nature of preferences that are compatible with loss aversion. Formally:

Corollary 2. *Under the maintained vNM and monotonicity axioms, preferences are represented by a Bernoulli utility function that displays loss aversion at x_0 (i.e., convex on a left-neighborhood of x_0 , concave on a right-neighborhood, and with $m^- < m^+$) if and only if they display Failure Avoidance, but none of the other attitudes.*

It is also worth stressing that this result shows that a behavioral characterization of the loss aversion representation, and hence of certain behavioral phenomena that are commonly associated with prospect theory (such as *loss aversion* and *diminishing sensitivity*), can be given within a completely standard expected utility setting. Hence, setting aside the important and long-debated issue of whether the outcome space should be regarded as that of total wealth, prospects, or the result of other forms of narrow bracketing (see, e.g., Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Rubinstein (2001), etc.), our results formally show that loss aversion may be captured by standard risk preferences under the vNM axioms. That is, it need not involve other components of Prospect Theory, such as non-linear probability weighting or rank-dependence. Besides providing a formal result concerning this point of debate, Corollary 2 may thus also serve as a preliminary step to understand the behavioral foundation of other components of Prospect Theory, which have typically been considered jointly and which therefore have not been fully understood in terms of their distinct roles in accommodating deviations from the classical expected utility benchmark.

The Discontinuous Case: The discontinuous model has a long tradition within the finance alternative models based on such a Bernoulli utility function, see Bernheim and Sprenger (2021).

literature, in which it is often referred to as the *aspiration level model* (see, e.g., Payne et al. (1980, 1981)), and has been studied both theoretically and experimentally.


Within the decision theoretic literature, Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) also present a model of decision under risk with a discontinuous Bernoulli utility in correspondence to what they call ‘aspiration level’. Like ours, their model is also within a standard expected utility setting. The key axioms in that paper (other than vNM and stochastic dominance), however, are not in terms of preferences over lotteries, but they are formulated directly as continuity properties of the Bernoulli utility function. Hence, another outgrowth of Theorems 1 and 2 – namely, Corollary 1 – is to provide a fully preference-based foundation to the discontinuous utility function, and hence to the broader finance literature on the ‘aspiration level model’.

From an empirical viewpoint, several findings in the literature are suggestive of the existence of discontinuities. Fishburn (1977, p. 122), for instance, reports that similar preferences are often found in the literature, which can be represented by a ‘pronounced change in the shape of their utility function.’ Within finance, Mezas (1988) provides evidence in this sense in the pricing of securities in the stock market, when there is a fixed and predetermined benchmark return (similar evidence was provided by earlier work, e.g. Swalm (1966) and Holthausen (1981)). The influential paper by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) is also consistent with a discontinuity around the ‘benchmark’ return, although in that case the phenomenon may be at least partly due to a discontinuity in the reward scheme of the managers, in addition to the possible discontinuity in their primitive preferences. A few papers have further tested experimentally the existence of discontinuities at specific points (typically at $x_0 = 0$, as customary within the finance literature), with contrasting results. For instance, Payne (2005) finds experimental evidence in support of the discontinuity hypothesis, with findings replicated by Venkatraman et al. (2009, 2014). Markle et al. (2018) find evidence suggestive of discontinuities in a context of marathon running. Diecidue et al. (2015), instead, find no evidence of discontinuities at $x_0 = 0$.

Aside from the possibly supportive experimental evidence, it is worth noting that the discontinuous representation is often a convenient modeling tool to capture the basic feature of the attitudes introduced above, namely the reversal of the decision maker’s risk-attitude around the critical threshold. Alaoui and Fons-Rosen (2021), for instance, use a Bernoulli utility function with a discontinuity around the critical threshold to represent the effects of ‘tenacity’ on a gambling task, so as to capture the cost of failure. Their experimental analysis relate subjects’ behavior in the task with *grit*, as measured by the questionnaire of Duckworth and Quinn (2006).

Aspirations: A large literature within economics has studied the origins and implications of *aspirations*, modeled as a reference points that serve as a dividing line between achievement and failure (see Genicot and Ray (2019) for a survey of the literature). The focus of that literature is largely on the determinants of such reference points, and on the interplay between individual behavior and economic development, which affects the former through its effect on aspirations, and hence preferences (e.g., Ray (1998, 2006), Appadurai (2004), Genicot and Ray (2017), etc.). The literature has studied various mechanisms for the determination of aspirations levels. As discussed in Genicot and Ray (2019), the key ideas of this notion of aspirations can be modeled by a utility functions that is concave on both sides of the reference point, with a ‘convex kink’

Figure 4: A model of aspirations



The functional form in the aspiration model of Genicot and Ray (2017).

at the aspiration threshold (i.e., with $m^- < m^+$), as in the representation that is characterized by the intersection of *Success Attachment* and *Failure Acceptance*. For instance, the functional form in Genicot and Ray (2017), presumes that crossing the threshold is “celebrated” by an additional, separable payoff. That is, letting z denote the threshold, and w_0 and w_1 denote two concave real functions over \mathbb{R}_+ , the overall utility $u(x)$ is given by $w_0(x)$ if $x < x_0$, and by $w_0(x) + w_1(x - x_0)$ if $x \geq x_0$ (see Figure 4).

The next result provides a behavioral characterization of this class of functional forms:

Corollary 3. *Under the maintained vNM and monotonicity axioms, preferences are represented by a Bernoulli utility function that displays an aspiration point at x_0 (i.e., concave on a left- and right-neighborhood of x_0 , with $m^- < m^+$) if and only if they display both failure acceptance and success attachment.*

This result shows that the key feature that aspiration models typically capture in a risk-less setting – namely, the sudden increase in marginal utility past the aspiration threshold, for an otherwise concave utility function – can be given a behavioral characterization in a standard choice setting with risk.

Other Cases: The remaining cases, which are characterized by success seeking, or by failure acceptance without Success Attachment, are perhaps not as frequently encountered, but they complete the map of possible attitudes. It is worth mentioning though that, motivated by the classic paper by Friedman and Savage (1948) – who observe the existence of decision makers who simultaneously buy insurance for moderate risks and tickets for actuarially unfair lotteries – Markovitz (1952) argues for a utility function over gains and losses (as opposed to wealth levels), with a pattern of risk lovingness followed by risk aversion as the stakes increase for gains, and the opposite for losses. We note that this suggestion is indeed consistent with the pattern characterized by success seeking without failure avoidance at $x_0 = 0$.

The empirical literature on loss aversion has also produced some evidence of behavior consistent with such representations, again for the $x_0 = 0$ threshold. In the experiment conducted by Schmidt and Traub (2002), for instance, 24 percent of subjects behave exactly opposite to

loss aversion, i.e., as if they focus more on gains than on losses. In a decision context involving health outcomes and no risk, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2002) instead find that the proportion of such *gain-seeking* subjects is very low, between 0 and 2.5 percent.

4.2 Discussion and Variations

It is easy to show that equivalent formulations of the attitudes in definitions 3-6 can be provided in terms of certainty equivalents, as it is standard for the notion of risk-aversion. Also, note that the definitions only require the existence of two lotteries, p and p' , over which the decision maker displays opposite risk attitudes, but without imposing any form of ‘single crossing’ condition. It can be shown that strengthening 3-6 so as to impose such a single crossing conditions would have no impact on the representation theorems, and hence it would be an equivalent way to formulate the same attitudes. This is so due to the combination of the maintained SSNR condition, and due to the local nature of our notions (cf. discussion in p. 7).

In practice, it is essentially impossible to test exactly whether an individual’s utility function is continuous at a particular point. So, just as it is impossible to literally test *global* risk-aversion, and as it is standard in the lab to elicit subjects’ preferences over a ‘grid’ of outcomes, so the representations in Theorems 1-4 could only be tested up to some neighborhood around the threshold. This could be given a formal foundation by providing weaker versions of definitions 3-6 which are not referred to a specific threshold x_0 , but to some threshold within a (small) interval.⁷ The corresponding representation, and hence the predictions that are directly testable, are exactly those that can be obtained from those in the theorems above, for x and x' that do not converge to x_0 (as it would be in the continuum), but to $x_0 \pm \epsilon$, where ϵ denotes the smallest available discrete increment. For failure avoidance, for instance, it would still be the case that the agent would be risk-loving for lotteries concentrated on the left of $x_0 - \epsilon$, and for each $x \leq x_0 - \epsilon$ on the discrete grip, and for $x' = x + \epsilon$, there would exist a probability $p^* \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that the agent is risk-loving for all $p < p^*$ and risk-averse for all $p > p^*$.

5 Interpersonal Comparisons

In this section we provide model-free definitions to rank individuals by the intensity of the four attitudes we introduced above. We first focus on *failure avoidance*, which thanks to its close connection with the well-understood loss aversion representation, is best suited to explain the key features that an adequate ordering of this attitude must satisfy. The corresponding notions of the orderings for the other attitudes will follow a similar logic, and will be introduced later.

5.1 Failure Avoidance: Interpersonal Comparisons

We next introduce interpersonal comparisons of agents’ attitude of failure avoidance. Intuitively, an individual is *more failure avoidant* than another one if, compared to the preferences of the latter, his preferences satisfy the following two requirements: i) first, there is a smaller set of

⁷We are thankful to Antonio Cabrales for this suggestion.

lotteries which he regards as ‘net successes’, and (ii) there is a smaller set of lotteries over which he is unwilling to take a risk in order to get out of the failure region.

Formally, for any $x < x_0$ and $x' > x_0$, we define the following sets:

$$\mathcal{S}_i(x, x') := cl \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) > x_0\}, \quad (2)$$

$$RA_i(x, x') := cl \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) < Ep\}. \quad (3)$$

In words, the $\mathcal{S}_i(x, x')$ set represents (the closure of) the set of lotteries which he regards as *net successes*, in the sense that their certainty equivalent is larger than x_0 . The $RA_i(x, x')$ set instead represents the set of lotteries over which failure avoidance is not manifested, in the sense that the agent is *not* willing to take risk in order to avoid the potential failure, provided that a certainty equivalent exists. In the continuous case, these sets could be equivalently defined, respectively, as $\mathcal{S}_i(x, x') = \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : p \succsim \delta_{x_0}\}$ and $RA_i(x, x') = \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : \delta_{Ep} \succsim p\}$, which have a straightforward interpretation.⁸ For the discontinuous case, however, the formulations above add the further requirement that $CE_i(p)$ exists (which of course is not guaranteed for all p , when u is discontinuous).

To gain some intuition as to why it is desirable to specify this further requirement in the discontinuous case, note that implicit in Def. 3 there is the idea that the agent starts out from being risk-averse for high $p \in [0, 1]$ – or, in certainty equivalents terms, they start out by having $Ep > CE_i(p)$ for sufficiently high p . Their desire to avoid failure is what may upset their risk-aversion, and in particular the ranking $Ep > CE_i(p)$, either by turning it into the opposite direction, or (for the case of a discontinuous Bernoulli utility function) by first preventing the existence of $CE(p)$. So, either the inversion of the inequality, or the non-existence region for the CE, are manifestations of a desire to avoid failure. Since, under Def. 3, $CE_i(p) < Ep$ implies that $CE_i(p') < Ep'$ for all $p' > p$, the set $RA_i(x, x')$ thus represents the set of lotteries over which this phenomenon is *not* (yet) manifested, and similarly $\mathcal{S}_i(x, x')$ represents the set of lotteries that are viewed as net successes, before the discontinuity (and, hence, the non-existence of the certainty equivalence) has kicked in. Fig. 5 illustrates the \mathcal{S}_i and RA_i sets for preferences that display failure avoidance, both in the discontinuous and in the loss aversion case.


The next definition states that an agent is more failure avoidant than another one if he is both more reluctant to regard a lottery as a net success (i.e., a smaller \mathcal{S}_i set), and if he manifests a desire to avoid failure for a larger set of lotteries (i.e., a smaller RA_i set), for all the x and x' which identify the phenomenon of failure avoidance (as per Def.3):

Definition 7. *Let preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def.3 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, \succsim_1 displays (weakly) more failure avoidance than \succsim_2 if, $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t. $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0)$, $\exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w]$ such that, for each $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, both the following conditions are satisfied: (i) $\mathcal{S}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{S}_2(x, x')$, and (ii) $RA_1(x, x') \subseteq RA_2(x, x')$.*

The next result provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the relationship between two Bernoulli utility functions, for their corresponding preferences to be ranked by their failure

⁸In fact, the equivalence between the two formulations would hold for any u_i that is right-continuous at x_0 .

Figure 5: Illustration of the \mathcal{S}_i and RA_i sets



The \mathcal{S}_i and RA_i sets for the *discontinuous* (left) and *loss aversion* case (right).

avoidance, as we just defined.⁹

Theorem 5 (Failure Avoidance: Interpersonal Comparisons). *Let \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def. 3 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ and such that $m_i^+ > 0$ and $m_i^- < \infty$ for both $i = 1, 2$. Then, \succsim_1 displays more failure avoidance than \succsim_2 only if one of the following applies:*

1. $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$
2. $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+} > 0$ and $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$.
3. $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+} = 0$, $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$, and $\left(\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \right) \geq \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}$

These conditions are also sufficient if all the inequalities hold strictly.

The conditions in this theorem have a straightforward interpretation. First, the condition $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$ says that the size of the discontinuity at x_0 , normalized by m_i^+ , is larger for 1 than for 2. Hence, this result implies that the first determinant of the relative failure avoidance is the size of the *normalized discontinuity*. In case of ties in this first component, if the utility functions are discontinuous, then the ranking is determined by the sharpness of the *kink* of the utility function around x_0 , which is captured by the ratio m_i^-/m_i^+ : the larger the ratio, the stronger the failure avoidance. If instead the functions are continuous, then agent 1 displays stronger failure avoidance than agent 2 if not only its utility function displays a sharper kink ($\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$), but also if u_1 is *sufficiently more convex* than u_2 in some left-neighborhood of x_0 .

⁹Theorem 10 in the Appendix provides tight (but harder to read) if and only if conditions.

To see that this is the content of the limit condition in point 3 of the result, note that $\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \geq 1$ is equivalent to requiring that u_1 is more convex than u_2 (in the Arrow-Pratt sense) in some left-neighborhood of x_0 . Condition 3 strengthens this requirement by requiring the limit of this ratio to not be just larger than one, but also larger than $\frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}$, which is a measure of the ratio of the kinks of the two utility functions (which in turn is also required to be larger than one, under the condition $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$). Intuitively, a sharper kink determines a stronger concavity on some right-neighborhood of x_0 ; the condition in point 3 requires that u_1 not only has a sharper kink, but it is also sufficiently more convex on the losses than u_2 , so as to offset the stronger concavity on the successes associated with its sharper kink.

The intuition above is perhaps easiest to see in the case of differentiable utility functions, in which the conditions above take an easy-to-interpret form, analogous to the classical Arrow-Pratt indices of risk-aversion. Letting Du_i^- and Du_i^+ denote the left- and right-derivatives of u_i at x_0 , and $D^2u_i^-$ the second left-derivative at x_0 , we have:

Theorem 6 (F.A. Indices under Differentiability). *Suppose that $(\succsim_i)_{i=1,2}$ are such that $m_i^+ > 0$ and $m_i^- < \infty$ and u_i is twice differentiable in some left- and right-neighborhoods of x_0 . Then: \succsim_1 displays more failure avoidance than \succsim_2 **only if** one of the following applies:*

1. $\frac{K_1}{Du_1^+} \geq \frac{K_2}{Du_2^+}$
2. $\frac{K_1}{Du_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{Du_2^+} > 0$ and $\frac{Du_1^-}{Du_1^+} \geq \frac{Du_2^-}{Du_2^+}$.
3. $\frac{K_1}{Du_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{Du_2^+} = 0$, $\frac{Du_1^-}{Du_1^+} \geq \frac{Du_2^-}{Du_2^+}$ and $\frac{D^2u_1^-}{Du_1^- - Du_1^+} \geq \frac{D^2u_2^-}{Du_2^- - Du_2^+}$

*These conditions are also **sufficient** if all the inequalities hold strictly.*

5.1.1 Ordering Failure Avoidance: Discussion

In this section we discuss the role of the two components that make up our definition of interpersonal comparison of failure avoidance, in terms of both the \mathcal{S}_i and RA_i sets.

First, as can be seen from proof of Theorem 5, the following holds:

Lemma 1. *Let u_i be discontinuous at x_0 and represent preferences that exhibit failure avoidance at x_0 . Then, $\exists x_l < x_0$ s.t.: $\forall x \in (x_l, x_0)$, $\exists \bar{x} > x_0$: $\forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, $\mathcal{S}_i(x, x') = RA_i(x, x')$.*

That is, in the case of discontinuous representation, the \mathcal{S}_i and RA_i sets coincide. Hence, the two conditions involved in Def. 7 are equivalent to each other if both u_1 and u_2 are discontinuous at x_0 . For continuous Bernoulli utility functions, however, the two conditions are distinct. Hence, dropping either part of Def. 7 would have no bearing on the ranking of discontinuous utility functions, and it would yield a more complete order over the continuous utility functions. Either of these more complete orders, however, would not yield a satisfactory ranking of *failure avoidance*. To see this, first suppose that part (ii) is dropped from Def. 7, so that the ranking is solely based on the \mathcal{S}_i sets. Then, the proof of Theorem 5 also shows the following:

Lemma 2. *Let u_1 and u_2 be continuous utility functions that represent preferences that exhibit failure avoidance at x_0 . Then: $\exists x_l < x_0$ s.t.: $\forall x \in (x_l, x_0)$, $\exists \bar{x} > x_0 : \forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, $\mathcal{S}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{S}_2(x, x')$ if and only if $m_1^-/m_1^+ \geq m_2^-/m_2^+$, with the set inclusion being strict if $m_1^-/m_1^+ > m_2^-/m_2^+$.*

In words, given two agents whose preferences display *Failure Avoidance* at x_0 , their Bernoulli utility functions are such that u_1 has a *sharper kink* than u_2 if and only if, for any x and x' (with the order of quantifiers as in Def. 3), the set of lotteries $p \in \Delta(x, x')$ that 1 regards as ‘net successes’ is a subset of those that 2 regards as ‘net successes’.

Now, consider a sequence of utility functions $(u^{(n)})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$u^{(n)}(x) = \begin{cases} \hat{u}(x) & \text{if } x \geq x_0 \\ -(2m^+ - \alpha(n)) \cdot (x_0 - x)^{\frac{1}{(1-\alpha(n))}} & \text{if } x < x_0 \end{cases},$$

where \hat{u} is an arbitrary concave function, with corresponding m^+ , and $\alpha(n)$ is a decreasing sequence such that $\alpha(1) < \min\{m^+, 1\}$ and such that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \alpha(n) = 0$. As $n \rightarrow \infty$, the kink gets sharper along this sequence, and hence it is increasing in the ranking induced by part (i) of Def. 7, but $\hat{u}^{(n)}$ approaches risk neutrality over the loss domain, and hence at the limit, $u^* := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \hat{u}^{(n)}$, the u^* function is globally concave, and hence there is no failure avoidance. Thus, an order based on part (i) of Def. 7 alone would allow the possibility of sequences of increasingly failure avoidant preferences which converge to preferences that display no failure avoidance. This would not be a desirable property for an adequate ordering of failure avoidance.

Alternatively, suppose that part (i) was dropped, so that utility functions were ranked solely based on part (ii) of Def. 7. First, the proof of Theorem 5 also shows the following result:

Lemma 3. *Let u_1 and u_2 be continuous utility functions that represent preferences that exhibit failure avoidance at x_0 . Then:*

$$\left(\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \right) \geq \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}.$$

if and only if $\exists x_l < x_0$ s.t.: $\forall x \in (x_l, x_0)$, $\exists \bar{x} > x_0 : \forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, $RA_1(x, x') \subseteq RA_2(x, x')$.

Now, let \hat{u} be a continuous utility function which satisfies the condition of the representation theorem, and which is linear in the success region. Next, consider a sequence of utility functions $(u^{(n)})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that, for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$u^{(n)}(x) = \begin{cases} \hat{u}(x) & \text{if } x \leq x_0 \\ \alpha(n) \cdot \hat{u}(x) & \text{if } x > x_0 \end{cases},$$

where $\alpha(n)$ is an increasing sequence of real numbers such that $\alpha(1) = 1$ and $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \alpha(n) = \frac{\hat{m}^-}{\hat{m}^+}$. Then, it can be verified that the sequence $u^{(n)}$ is increasing in the order defined by part (ii) of Def. 7, and yet $u^* := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} u^{(n)}$ is globally convex, and hence does not display any failure avoidance. Thus, just like the case discussed above, also an the order only based on part (ii) of Def. 7 would allow for the possibility of sequences of increasingly failure avoidant preferences

which converge to preferences that display no failure avoidance at all. This, again, would not be a desirable feature for a conceptually sound notion of comparative failure avoidance.

5.1.2 Ordering Loss Aversion

The discussion above is also significant in relation to established notions of comparative loss aversion, which rank loss aversion by the sharpness of the kink, so that agent 1 is more loss averse than agent 2 if and only if $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} > \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$ (cf. Kobberling and Wakker (2005), Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv (2007); see also Wakker (2010) and references therein) – or, in the parametric specification of eq. (1), if and only if $\lambda_1 > \lambda_2$. To the best of our knowledge, such interpersonal comparisons have been defined only in the space of the utility representation, but a characterization of such orderings in terms of primitive preferences is lacking. The next result provides such a characterization, and hence it also serves to open another perspective on loss aversion, in terms of preferences over lotteries:

Proposition 1 (Ordering Concave Kinks). *Let u_1 and u_2 be continuous utility functions. Then: $m_1^-/m_1^+ \geq m_2^-/m_2^+$ if and only if there exist $\underline{x} < x_0$ and $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that, for all $x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$ and for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, $\mathcal{S}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{S}_2(x, x')$, with the set inclusion being strict if $m_1^-/m_1^+ > m_2^-/m_2^+$.*

Namely, agent 1 has a sharper kink at x_0 than agent 2 if and only if, for all failures $x < x_0$ and successes $x' > x_0$ in some neighborhood of x_0 , $\mathcal{S}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{S}_2(x, x')$ – meaning that the binary lotteries across the threshold that 1 views as *net successes* are a subset of those that agent 2 views as such. We note that the order of quantifiers in Proposition 1 is slightly different from that of Lemma 2, in that it is symmetric on both sides of the threshold. The reason is that Proposition 1 follows directly from the joint implications of Lemma 2 and of an analogous result for the ordering of Success Seeking that also involves a condition on the nestedness of the \mathcal{S} -sets, but for an order of quantifiers that is symmetric with respect to that involved in the definition of Failure Avoidance (see Section 5.2).

The discussion in the previous section is also relevant for the literature on loss aversion: it demonstrates that, as long as loss aversion is defined as something to be ranked solely by the sharpness of the kink, then it is distinct from our notion of failure avoidance. In particular, while a more loss averse agent 1 will have \mathcal{S}_1 to be a subset of that of a less loss averse agent 2, it need not be the case that RA_1 will also be a subset of RA_2 . In fact, the increased sharpness of the kink on its own provides a force in the *opposite* direction. Intuitively, this is because a sharper kink effectively leads to a more concave function, which on its own implies that there are fewer lotteries over which the agent is willing to take a risk to avoid failure.¹⁰ In the limit, failure avoidance disappears altogether. Hence, while the first requirement of Definition 7 is satisfied, the second requirement is violated. It is in fact for this reason that in our index, point 3 of Theorem 5 (the relevant case here) requires a sufficient increase in the convexity to offset the concavity associated with the sharper kink. This highlights that ranking loss aversion merely by the sharpness of the kink in the representation is appropriate in capturing the idea of losses looming more than gains (cf. Kobberling and Wakker (2005) and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt

¹⁰Theorem 5 in Kobberling and Wakker (2005) formalizes precisely this argument.

and Paraschiv (2007)). But it does not adequately capture a ranking of the *reversals* of the risk-attitude, which is the focus of this paper. Such a ranking requires an opposition of forces, in that any force that leads to an increase in risk aversion must be countervailed by a force that increases the risk-lovingness.¹¹

5.2 Ordering the Remaining Attitudes

An analogous exercise to that of ordering failure avoidance can be conducted for success attachment, success seeking and failure acceptance as well. Much of the reasoning above carries through, *mutatis mutandis*, to the definitions and results of these attitudes, as we now discuss.

Concerning success attachment, the first requirement will be that the more success-attaching agent will have a smaller set of lotteries that he regards as net *failures*, in the sense of being worse than the certain x_0 . In the continuous case, this would be identical to saying that there is a larger set of lotteries that he regards as net successes, and so the first requirement is simply the reverse of that for failure avoidance. But, as discussed above, for the discontinuous case it is important to account for the existence of certainty equivalents, and hence the notion of *net failure* is adequately captured by a set, $\mathcal{F}_i(x, x')$, whose definition is specular to $\mathcal{S}_i(x, x')$ above:

$$\mathcal{F}_i(x, x') := cl \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) < x_0\} \quad (4)$$

Similarly, we define the set $RL_i(x, x')$ of lotteries over which success attachment is *not* manifested, symmetrically to the $RA_i(x, x')$ sets above:

$$RL_i(x, x') := cl \{p \in \Delta(x, x') : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) > Ep\}. \quad (5)$$

The ranking over success attachment is thus defined as follows:

Definition 8. *Let preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def.4 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, \succsim_1 displays (weakly) more success attachment than \succsim_2 if there exist $x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w : \forall x' \in (x_0, x_w], \exists x \in [x_l, x_0)$ such that, for each $x \in [x_l, x_0)$, both the following conditions are satisfied: (i) $\mathcal{F}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{F}_2(x, x')$, and (ii) $RL_1(x, x') \subseteq RL_2(x, x')$.*

Analogous of Theorems 5 and 6 hold for this definition too. Here we only reproduce the statement of the differentiable case, which is easier to read and most useful in applications:

Theorem 7 (Success Attachment: Interpersonal Comparisons). *Suppose that $(\succsim_i)_{i=1,2}$ are such that $Du_i^- > 0$ and $Du_i^+ < \infty$ and u_i is twice differentiable in some left- and right-neighborhoods of x_0 . Then: \succsim_1 displays more success avoidance than \succsim_2 **only if** one of the following applies:*

1. $\frac{K_1}{Du_1^-} \geq \frac{K_2}{Du_2^-}$
2. $\frac{K_1}{Du_1^-} = \frac{K_2}{Du_2^-} > 0$ and $\frac{Du_1^+}{Du_1^-} \geq \frac{Du_2^+}{Du_2^-}$.

¹¹While in this paper we remain within the vNM model, it may be interesting for future research to analyze what our model would imply in settings which allow for a non-linear reweighting of probabilities. Such a reweighting provides another source of reversal of risk-attitude, and may perhaps require a reformulation of SSNR.

$$3. \frac{K_1}{Du_1^-} = \frac{K_2}{Du_2^-} = 0, \frac{Du_1^+}{Du_1^-} \geq \frac{Du_2^+}{Du_2^-} \text{ and } \frac{D^2u_1^+}{Du_1^- - Du_1^+} \geq \frac{D^2u_2^+}{Du_2^- - Du_2^+}.^{12}$$

These conditions are also **sufficient** if all the inequalities hold strictly.

For the remaining two attitudes, Success Seeking and Failure Acceptance, things are simpler, due to the fact they only admit a continuous representation, and hence the certainty equivalent existence requirement in the definitions of the \mathcal{S} , \mathcal{F} , RA and RL sets are moot. As a consequence, the \mathcal{F} and RL sets are, respectively, the complements of the \mathcal{S} and RA sets, and hence $\mathcal{F}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{F}_2$ if and only if $\mathcal{S}_2 \subseteq \mathcal{S}_1$, and $RA_1 \subseteq RA_2$ if and only if $RL_2 \subseteq RL_1$. The definitions of the orderings for these two attitudes therefore may be equivalently expressed in several ways.

Definition 9. Let preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def.5 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, \succsim_1 displays (weakly) more failure acceptance than \succsim_2 if there exist $x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t. $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0), \exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w]$ such that, for each $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, both the following conditions are satisfied: (i) $\mathcal{F}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{F}_2(x, x')$, and (ii) $RA_1(x, x') \subseteq RA_2(x, x')$.

Definition 10. Let preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def.4 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, \succsim_1 displays (weakly) more success seeking than \succsim_2 if there exist $x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t.: $\forall x' \in (x_0, x_w], \exists \underline{x} \in [x_l, x_0)$ such that, for each $x \in [\underline{x}, x_0)$, both the following conditions are satisfied: (i) $\mathcal{S}_1(x, x') \subseteq \mathcal{S}_2(x, x')$, and (ii) $RL_1(x, x') \subseteq RL_2(x, x')$.

The next results provide the characterization of these orderings in the space of utility representations. They are completely analogous to the previous two theorems, with the only difference that they only account for the continuous case, and hence $K_i = 0$ for both agents:

Theorem 8 (Failure Acceptance: Interpersonal Comparisons). Suppose that $(\succsim_i)_{i=1,2}$ are such that $Du_i^- > 0$ and $Du_i^+ < \infty$ and u_i is twice differentiable in some left- and right-neighborhoods of x_0 . Then: \succsim_1 displays more success avoidance than \succsim_2 **only if** both (i) $\frac{Du_1^+}{Du_1^-} \geq \frac{Du_2^+}{Du_2^-}$ and (ii) $\frac{D^2u_1^-}{Du_1^- - Du_1^+} \geq \frac{D^2u_2^-}{Du_2^- - Du_2^+}$. These conditions are also **sufficient** if all the inequalities hold strictly.

Theorem 9 (Success Seeking: Interpersonal Comparisons). Suppose that $(\succsim_i)_{i=1,2}$ are such that $Du_i^- < \infty$ and $Du_i^+ > 0$ and u_i is twice differentiable in some left- and right-neighborhoods of x_0 . Then: \succsim_1 displays more success seeking than \succsim_2 **only if** both (i) $\frac{Du_1^-}{Du_1^+} \geq \frac{Du_2^-}{Du_2^+}$ and (ii) $\frac{D^2u_1^+}{Du_1^- - Du_1^+} \geq \frac{D^2u_2^+}{Du_2^- - Du_2^+}$. These conditions are also **sufficient** if all the inequalities hold strictly.

6 Conclusions

This paper aims to understand, at a fundamental level, attitudes towards success and failure that are crucial to decision-making, as evidenced by their emergence in several influential fields. Within a standard expected-utility setting, we provide characterizations of these attitudes in terms of properties of the Bernoulli utility function. This exercise serves several purposes: First, it reveals the interconnection between different models of reference-dependent preferences. Second, it provides a decision theoretic foundation to important representations used in economics,

¹²Note that, given the restrictions imposed by Theorem 2, both the numerators and the denominators on both sides of the latter inequality are negative.

finance and psychology (including influential models of *aspirations* and *loss aversion*), for which a standard preference-based characterization was lacking. This not only favors more direct comparisons of these models with standard expected utility notions, but it also uncovers subtleties which may be easily overlooked by only looking at the space of utility representations. A case in point is provided by the rankings that we introduce in order to perform interpersonal comparisons on the intensity of each attitude. The indices we develop, which are akin to those used for studying risk aversion, shed a new light on seemingly intuitive notions of comparative statics that are directly based on the utility representation of reference-dependent models.

The distinctive feature of our approach, which enables a unified perspective on several influential models of reference dependence, is to identify the core of such behavioral phenomena in the *reversals* of the decision maker’s risk-attitude (between risk-aversion and risk-lovingness) over lotteries that go across a reference point. This novel perspective not only enables us to derive behavioral characterizations of several known models of decision making, and requires the development of new orderings for interpersonal comparisons, but it also provides a direct way of identifying reference points through choice, by the occurrences of such reversals around them.

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, individuals’ attitudes towards success and failures are the focus of central notions in the literature on personality traits, such as grit, tenacity, conscientiousness and neuroticism (e.g., Deary et al. (2009)). The key methodology in this literature involves ‘indices’ that are essentially scores on non-incentivized questionnaires, often based on self-reported scales, which are intended to capture various aspects of personality. The empirical economics literature has paid increasing attention to these measurements, both for cognitive and non-cognitive skills, showing that they are often predictive of systematic differences in behavior and measures of economic performance (e.g., Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Almlund et al. (2011), Kautz et al. (2014), Burks et al. (2015)), Alan et al. (2020), Gill and Prowse (2016), Proto, Sofianos and Rustichini (2019, 2020), Heckman et al. (2021), etc.). These findings confirm that such psychological measures capture fundamental components of individuals’ heterogeneity, and the next natural step is to develop economic models of these traits, so as to perform comparative statics and counterfactual analysis in structural models. But several features of the psychology approach to personality traits make it difficult to perform a direct translation of those concepts into tractable economics notions: First, the lack of precise and agreed-upon definitions of terms such as grit, tenacity, conscientiousness, etc., as something that is separate from their way of measurement. Second, although related, the high dimensionality of the objects involved in each trait.

In contrast, albeit possibly limited in its richness, the straightjacket of economic analysis has proven very successful in providing rigorous definitions of behavioral notions, which can be used both to make theoretical predictions as well as for empirical measurement. The analysis of risk is especially paradigmatic in this sense: risk-aversion, for instance, is clearly defined in the fundamental space of economics primitives (namely, preferences); the preference-based definitions provide a direct basis for choice-based measurements of these attitudes; representation theorems provide tractable modeling tools for theoretical predictions; the Arrow-Pratt indices of risk-aversion provide a direct link between the choice-based measurements and scalar variables

which may be used in empirical analysis. Our approach to attitudes towards success and failure mimics the development of the risk analysis program, building from the bottom up notions that are directly expressed in terms of primitive preferences and within the dictamen of the economics methodology. Further empirical research is needed to assess to what extent the attitudes formalized by our notions are correlated with the psychology measures of personality traits.¹³ However, while our notions inevitably miss some of the richness of the psychology definitions, they are directly amenable both to measurement based on choice data, and to theoretical and counterfactual analysis. In this sense, our framework may prove useful to incorporate, within a standard economic model, behavioral manifestations of personality traits that have proven relevant in empirical analysis, but that have still appeared to be elusive to formal modeling and structural analysis.

Appendix

A Representation Theorems: Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1:

Step 1. First note that, under the vNM axioms, SSNR (Def. 2) holds if and only if there exist intervals $[x_l, x_0)$ and $(x_0, x_w]$, with $x_l < x_0 < x_w$, such that u is either concave or convex on $[x_l, x_0)$, and either concave or convex on $(x_0, x_w]$. We also know that we cannot have global concavity nor global convexity, since the first would imply that $Ep \succsim p$ for all p and the second would imply that $p \succsim Ep$ for all p , contrary to Def. 3.

Step 2. [The discontinuous case] For the sufficiency part, suppose that $m^+(x_0) < \infty$. Then, because u is discontinuous at x_0 , and letting $K := \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^+} u(x) - \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} u(x) > 0$, there exists $x_w > x_0$ and $x_l < x_0$ s.t. $\frac{u(x') - u(x)}{x' - x} > \max\{m^+(x_0), m(x_w)\}$ for all $x \in (x_l, x_0)$ and for all $x' \in (x_0, x_w)$. Hence, for any $x \in (x_l, x_0)$ and for all $x' \in (x_0, x_w)$, the straight line connecting $u(x)$ to $u(x')$ never intersects $u(\cdot)$ (other than at its extremes, that is), and is such that it is below $u(\cdot)$ on the interval (x_0, x_w) , and above it on (x_l, x_0) , which implies that the agent is risk averse for all $p \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $Ep > x_0$, and risk-loving otherwise. Hence, preferences satisfy Def. 3.

For the necessity part, given Step 1, the only thing which is left to prove for the discontinuous case is that $m^+(x_0) < \infty$. So, suppose that $m^+(x_0) = \infty$ (first note that this is only possible if u is concave in the success region). Then, for any $x < x_0$, we can find $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that for any $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, $\frac{u(x') - u(x)}{x' - x} < m(x')$. Hence, the straight line connecting $u(x)$ to $u(x')$ is always above $u(\cdot)$, and never intersects it other than at its extremes, contrary to Def. 3.

Step 3. [The continuous case] Given Step 1 above, for the case in which u is continuous, the remaining possibilities are the following:

1. u is concave on both the losses (i.e., on $[x_l, x_0)$) and on the gains (i.e., on $(x_0, x_w]$), but with $m^-(x_0) < m^+(x_0)$ (otherwise it would be concave on $[x_l, x_w]$);

¹³Jagelka (2020), for instance, recently explored the correlation between various psychological traits and standard notions of risk preferences. Further extending that agenda so as to account for the novel notions put forward by this paper is part of ongoing research.

2. u is concave on the losses and convex on the gains;
3. u is convex on the loss and on convex the gains, with $m(x_0)^- > m^+(x_0)$ (otherwise it would be convex on $[x_l, x_w]$);
4. u is convex on the losses and concave on the gains.

We show that Cases 1 and 2 can be discarded, and that failure avoidance holds if and only either a) Case 3 holds with u being strictly convex on some interval $[\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$ or Case 4 holds with $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$ and u being strictly convex on some interval $[\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$.

Case (1) can be discarded geometrically. First, since $m^-(x_0) < m^+(x_0)$, by continuity of u , there exists $\hat{x}_l \in [x_l, x_0)$ such that, $m(\hat{x}_l) < m^+(x_0)$. We now show that for any $x \in [\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, there is no $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, $\exists p > p' \in \Delta(x, x')$ such that $Ep \succ p$ and $p' \succ Ep'$. To this end, note that since $m(\hat{x}_l) < m^+(x_0)$, it follows from the continuity of u that $\exists \bar{x} > x_0$ such that, for all $x' \in [x_0, \bar{x}]$, $m(\hat{x}_l) < \frac{u(x')-u(\hat{x}_l)}{x'-\hat{x}_l}$, and such that the line segment connecting $u(\hat{x}_l)$ to $u(x')$ does not cross the utility function on $[x_0, x')$. Moreover, on $[\hat{x}_l, x_0]$, by concavity the slope $m(x)$ is decreasing which implies $m(x) \leq m(\hat{x}_l)$, and by the utility function being below the line segment between $u(\hat{x}_l)$ to $u(x')$, it implies $\frac{u(x')-u(\hat{x}_l)}{x'-\hat{x}_l} < \frac{u(x')-u(x)}{x'-x}$. Therefore, it must be that $m(x) < \frac{u(x')-u(x)}{x'-x}$ for any $x \in [\hat{x}_l, x_0)$ and $x' \in [x_0, \bar{x}]$.

For the reversal in Def. 3 to hold for \hat{x}_l , for any $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, the line segment connecting $u(\hat{x}_l)$ to $u(x')$ must cross the utility function somewhere in (\hat{x}_l, x') . By the previous argument, it cannot be in $[x_0, x')$, and so it must be in (\hat{x}_l, x_0) . Let x^* denote such a point. Note that since $x^* \in (\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, the slope $m(x^*) < \frac{u(x')-u(x^*)}{x'-x^*}$, so that the line segment crosses the utility function from below. Since this must hold for any such point, it must be that there is at most one crossing. Moreover, since it crosses from below, there exists a lottery p_t on $\Delta(\hat{x}_l, x')$ such that $p_t \sim Ep_t$, and such that for all $p > p_t$, $p \succ Ep$, and for all $p' < p_t$, $Ep' \succ p'$. Since the same argument would hold replacing \hat{x}_l with any $\hat{x}'_l \in (\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, this implies that Condition 2 of failure avoidance cannot hold for this case.

Case (2). For this case, we consider three subcases:

- if $m^-(x_0) < m^+(x_0)$, then it can be discarded based on the same argument as above, since that argument did not rely on the shape of the function on $(x_0, x_w]$.
- If $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$, then by continuity, there exists an $\hat{x}_l \in [x_l, x_0)$ such that $m(\hat{x}_l) > m^+(x_0)$, and there exists a $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that $\frac{u(x')-u(\hat{x}_l)}{x'-\hat{x}_l} > m^+(x_0)$ for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$. Since, the slope m is decreasing on $[\hat{x}_l, x_0)$ by concavity in that interval, and since the above inequality holds, then for any such x' , $Ep \succ p$,
- If $m^-(x_0) = m^+(x_0)$, it is easy to verify geometrically that for any $x' \in [x_l, x_0)$ and $x'' \in (x_0, x_w]$, $\exists p^* \in \Delta(x', x'')$ such that $p^* \sim Ep^*$ and such that $p \succ Ep$ for all $p > p^*$, and $Ep \succ p$ for all $p < p^*$, thereby violating the reversal condition in Def. 3.

Cases (1) and (2) are thus both discarded. We are left with Cases (3) and 4, in which the utility is convex in the loss domain.

Case (3). Considering Case (3), the necessity of the condition $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$ follows directly from the fact that Condition 2 in Def. 3 can only hold if u is not convex on the entire interval $[x_l, x_w]$. Moreover, if the utility function is linear on any interval $[\tilde{x}'_l, x_0]$, where $\tilde{x}'_l < x_0$, then for any $x' > x_0$, the line segment going from \tilde{x}'_l to x' will be below the utility function, and hence $Ep \succeq p$ for any binary lottery $p^* \in \Delta(\tilde{x}''_l)$. As this is true for any such interval, there must be some \tilde{x}_l for which u is strictly convex on $[\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$. We next show that u being as in case (3), with strict convexity on some interval $[\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$, is also sufficient to satisfy the conditions in Def. 3. Since $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$, by continuity of u $\exists \hat{x}_l \in [\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$ such that $m(\hat{x}_l) > m^+(x_0)$, and there exists a $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that $\frac{u(x') - u(\hat{x}_l)}{x' - \hat{x}_l} > m^+(x_0)$ for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$. Since u is strictly convex on $[\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, the slope $m(x)$ is strictly increasing on $[\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, and since the above inequality holds, then $\forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, $\exists p^* \in \Delta(\hat{x}_l, x')$ such that $p^* \sim Ep^*$, and such that $Ep \succ p$ whenever $p > p^*$, and $p \succ Ep$ whenever $p < p^*$. The same argument would hold replacing \hat{x}_l with any $x_l \in [\hat{x}_l, x_0)$, which implies that Def. 3 holds for this case.

Case (4). For Case 4, we will show that it is consistent with Def. 3 if and only if (i) $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$, and (ii) there is an \tilde{x}_l such that u is strictly convex on the interval $[\tilde{x}_l, x_0]$. To this end, we consider three subcases:

- Suppose that $m^-(x_0) < m^+(x_0)$. Taking any $\hat{x}_l \in [x_l, x_0)$, by convexity $m(x) < m^-(x)$ for any $x \in \hat{x}_l, x_0)$, and so $m(x) < m^+(x_0)$. Moreover, by continuity there exists an $\bar{x} > x_0$ such that $\frac{u(x') - u(\hat{x}_l)}{x' - \hat{x}_l} < m^+(x_0)$ for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$. Hence, a line segment from \hat{x}_l to \bar{x} is above (weakly at the endpoints) the utility function on \hat{x}_l, \bar{x} , and so $p \succeq Ep$ for all p on $\Delta(\hat{x}_l, x')$. The reversal condition in Def. 3 therefore is violated.
- If $m^-(x_0) = m^+(x_0)$, then a similar logic to the one above applies. First, observe that if there is no $\hat{x}_l \in [x_l, x_0)$ such that $m(\hat{x}_l) < m_{\hat{x}_0}^-$ (i.e., if it is locally linear in the losses), then the function $[x_l, x_w]$ is weakly concave, and will not satisfy failure avoidance. Hence, it must be that there exists a $\hat{x}_l \in [\tilde{x}_l, x_0)$ such that $m(\hat{x}_l) < m_{\hat{x}_0}^- = m^+(x_0) =$. The rest of the argument is then identical to the case above.
- If $m^-(x_0) > m^+(x_0)$ then the logic from Case 3 above applies, and \succeq display failure avoidance. Moreover, as in the case of $m^-(x_0) = m^+(x_0)$, the utility function cannot be locally linear on any interval $[\hat{x}_l, x_0]$, since it would imply that the function on $[\hat{x}_l, x_w]$ is weakly concave, and hence the reversal condition in Def. 3 could not be satisfied. Noting that this holds for \hat{x}_l arbitrarily close to x_0 , it must then be that there is an interval $[\tilde{x}'_l, x_0]$ on which u is strictly convex.

Lastly, since we have covered all possible cases for continuous u , it must be that for a continuous u , Def. 3 holds if and only if there exists an $x_l < x_0 < x_w$ such that u is strictly convex on $[x_l, x_0)$, concave or convex on (x_0, x_w) and such that $m_{x_0}^0 > m_{x_0}^+$. ■

The proofs of Theorems 2-4 are completely specular to that of Theorem 1, inverting the role of convexity and concavity, and the order of quantifiers in the success and failure regions, according to the corresponding definitions.

B Interpersonal Comparisons: Proofs

Proof of Theorem 5:

Consider the following objects:

$$\bar{p}_i(x, x') := \inf \{p \in \Delta(\{x, x'\}) : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) \geq x_0\} \text{ and} \quad (6)$$

$$\hat{p}_i(x, x') := \inf \{p : CE_i(p) \text{ exists and } CE_i(p) < Ep\}. \quad (7)$$

First note that, from the definition of the $W_i(x, x')$ and $RA_i(x, x')$ sets, it is clear that $S_1(x, x') \subset S_2(x, x')$ if and only if $\bar{p}_1(x, x') > \bar{p}_2(x, x')$, and $RA_1(x, x') \subset RA_2(x, x')$ if and only if $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$. The following observation follows immediately:

Lemma 4. *Let \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 satisfy the properties of Def. 3 with respect to x_0 . Then:*

1. *Part (i) of Def. 7 holds if and only if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t. $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0), \exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w]$ such that, for each $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, $\bar{p}_1(x, x') > \bar{p}_2(x, x')$.*
2. *Part (ii) of Def. 7 holds if and only if $\exists x_l, x_w : x_l < x_0 < x_w$ s.t. $\forall x \in [x_l, x_0), \exists \bar{x} \in (x_0, x_w]$ such that, for each $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x}]$, $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$.*

Hence, the proof of the theorem will crucially rely on understanding the properties of the objects defined in equations (6) and (7).

First notice that, letting u_i denote the Bernoulli utility functions which represent preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 , as per Theorem 1, $\bar{p}_i(x, x')$ can be equivalently defined as follows:

$$\bar{p}_i(x, x') := \frac{u_i^+(x_0) - u_i(x)}{u_i(x') - u_i(x)}. \quad (8)$$

The equivalence of (6) and (8) follows directly from observing that (8) implies $\bar{p}_i(x, x') \cdot u_i(x') + (1 - \bar{p}_i(x, x')) \cdot u_i(x) = u_i^+(x_0)$, and the fact that, under the maintained assumptions, u_i is both continuous and strictly increasing on (x_0, x') .

Lemma 5. *For any $x < x_0$ and $x' > x_0$, $\bar{p}_1(x, x') > \bar{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if*

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} (x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} (x_0 - x).$$

Proof. Exploiting the representation theorem, and the notation introduced above, $\bar{p}_i(x, x')$ can be rewritten as follows:

$$\bar{p}_i(x, x') := \frac{u_i^+(x_0) - u_i(x)}{u_i(x') - u_i(x)} = \frac{K_i + m_i(x)(x_0 - x)}{K_i + m_i(x)(x_0 - x) + m_i(x')(x' - x_0)}$$

Re-arranging terms and simplifying, it can be shown that $\bar{p}_1(x, x') > \bar{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if $\frac{K_1 + m_1(x)(x_0 - x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{K_2 + m_2(x)(x_0 - x)}{m_2(x')}$.

***** Part (i): Characterization, Necessary and Sufficient conditions *****

Lemma 6 (Part (i): Characterization). *Part (i) of Def. 7 holds if and only if there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t. for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$:*

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')}(x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}(x_0 - x). \quad (9)$$

Proof. This result follows directly from Lemma 5 and part 1 of Lemma 4.

The next results provide necessary and sufficient conditions for part (i) of Def. 7:

Lemma 7 (Part (i): Necessity). *If $m_i^+(x_0) > 0$ for both $i = 1, 2$, then:*

1. *Part (i) of Def. 7 implies $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$.*

2. *If $m_i^-(x_0) < \infty$ for both $i = 1, 2$, and $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, then Part (i) of Def. 7 implies*

$$\frac{m_1^-(x_0)}{m_1^+(x_0)} \geq \frac{m_2^-(x_0)}{m_2^+(x_0)}$$

Proof. For part 1, note that, by definition, $m_i(x) \cdot (x_0 - x) = u_i(x) - u_i^-(x_0)$, and hence Lemma 6 implies that there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t. for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$: $\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{(u_1^-(x_0) - u_1(x_n))}{m_1(x')} > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{(u_2^-(x_0) - u_2(x_n))}{m_2(x')}$, and hence we can construct a sequence $(x_n, \bar{x}_n, x'_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to (x_0, x_0) such that, for every n , we have

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{(u_1^-(x_0) - u_1(x_n))}{m_1(x')} > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x'_n)} + \frac{(u_2^-(x_0) - u_2(x_n))}{m_2(x'_n)}$$

Taking limits, and particularly for $x_n \rightarrow x_0$, since the $(u_i^-(x_0) - u_i(x_n))$ terms on both sides go to 0, and both the $u_i(\cdot)$ and $m_i(\cdot)$ functions are continuous on the relevant range, with $m_i(x'_n) \rightarrow m_i^+$ (which, by assumption is non-zero), we obtain the condition in the statement: $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$.

For part 2, Lemma 6 again implies that there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t. for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$:

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')}(x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}(x_0 - x). \quad (10)$$

Holding x fixed, and taking limits as $x' \rightarrow x_0^+$, this yields the condition:

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1^+(x_0)}(x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2^+(x_0)}(x_0 - x).$$

Using the hypothesis $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, and dividing everything by $(x_0 - x)$, this holds if and only if

$$\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2^+(x_0)}.$$

Hence, taking limits as $x \rightarrow x_0^-$, we have $\frac{m_1^-(x_0)}{m_1^+(x_0)} \geq \frac{m_2^-(x_0)}{m_2^+(x_0)}$

Lemma 8 (Part (i): Sufficiency). *If $m_i^+(x_0) > 0$ for both $i = 1, 2$, then:*

1. $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$ implies that Part (i) of Def. 7 holds.

2. If $m_i^-(x_0) < \infty$ for both $i = 1, 2$, and $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, then $\frac{m_1^-(x_0)}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{m_2^-(x_0)}{m_2^+(x_0)}$ implies that Part (i) of Def. 7 holds.

Proof. For Part 1, if $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, then $\forall \varepsilon > 0, \exists \bar{x} > x_0$ s.t. $\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} - \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} > \varepsilon$ for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$. Hence, $\underline{x} < x_0$ can be chosen close enough to x_0 to ensure that $\left[\frac{m_1(x_n)}{m_1(x'_n)} - \frac{m_2(x_n)}{m_2(x'_n)} \right] (x_0 - x_n) < \varepsilon$ for all $x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, satisfying the condition stated in Lemma 6.

For Part 2, if $\frac{m_1^-(x_0)}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{m_2^-(x_0)}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, then $\exists \underline{x} < x_0$ s.t.

$$\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1^+(x_0)}(x_0 - x) > \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2^+(x_0)}(x_0 - x)$$

for all $x' \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$. Furthermore, since $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$, for any such $x \in (\underline{x}, x_0), \exists \bar{x} > x_0$ s.t. $\forall x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} (x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} (x_0 - x).$$

Then, the result follows from Lemma 6.

*** Part (ii): Characterization, Necessary and Sufficient conditions ***

We turn next to the characterization of part (ii) of Def. 7. As discussed above, this requires focusing on the ranking of the $\hat{p}_i(x, x')$. However, as shown by next lemma, $\hat{p}_i(x, x')$ is the same as $\bar{p}_i(x, x')$ when u_i is discontinuous at x_0 :

Lemma 9. *If u_i is discontinuous, then $\hat{p}_i(x, x') = \bar{p}_i(x, x')$, and $E\bar{p}_i(x, x') > x_0$.*

Proof. As shown in Fig. 5,, p.18, the two numbers coincide in the discontinuous case merely because the existence of the certainty equivalent, common to both definitions, is the binding constraint for both notions when u is discontinuous.

Lemma 10. *If both u_1 and u_2 are discontinuous, the following are equivalent:*

1. Part (i) of Def. 7 holds
2. Part (ii) of Def. 7 holds
3. There exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t. for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$:

$$\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} (x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} (x_0 - x).$$

Proof. This follows immediately from part 2 of Lemma 4, Lemma 9, and Lemma 6.

The next Lemma summarizes what we have learned so far about part (ii) of Def. 7:

Lemma 11. *If u_1 is continuous and u_2 is discontinuous, then part (ii) of Def. 7 does not hold.*

Proof. For any $x < x_0$ and $x' > x_0$, if u_1 is continuous then $E\hat{p}_1(x, x') < x_0$, and if u_2 is discontinuous implies $E\hat{p}_2(x, x') = E\bar{p}_2(x, x') > x_0$. It follows that $\hat{p}_1(x, x') < \hat{p}_2(x, x')$, which (by Lemma 4) implies that part (ii) of Def. 7 does not hold.

Lemma 12 (Part (ii): Summary of discontinuous case). *The following holds:*

1. *If u_1 and u_2 are discontinuous, $m_i^+(x_0) > 0$ for both $i = 1, 2$, then part (ii) of Def. 7 holds if $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$, or if $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+} > 0$ and $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$; and only if either $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$, or $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+} > 0$ and $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$.*
2. *If u_1 is discontinuous and u_2 is continuous, then part (ii) of Def. 7 holds (and hence, by Lemma 10, point (i) holds as well).*
3. *If u_1 is continuous and u_2 is discontinuous, then part (ii) of Def. 7 does not hold.*

Proof. We consider each point separately:

1. For the (\Rightarrow) direction, note that if u_1 and u_2 are discontinuous, part (ii) of Def. 7 implies part (i) of Def. 7, and hence $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$ by Lemma 7. This of course can either be $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$ or $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} = \frac{K_2}{m_2^+}$. If the latter, it also needs to satisfy $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t, for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$: $\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')}(x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}(x_0 - x)$, or it would contradict Lemma 10 (particularly, the fact that point 2 implies point 3). It then follows from continuity of u aside from at x_0 that in the limit, $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+} + \frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+}(x_0 - x) \geq \frac{K_2}{m_2^+} + \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}(x_0 - x)$, and hence that $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$.

For the (\Leftarrow) direction, in the case in which $\frac{K_1}{m_1^+(x_0)} > \frac{K_2}{m_2^+(x_0)}$ holds, the result follows from Lemma 8. In the other case, it follows from $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} > \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$ and the continuity of u aside from at x_0 that there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$ s.t. $\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} + \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')}(x_0 - x) > \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} + \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}(x_0 - x)$. The statement then follows from lemma 10 (particularly, from the fact that point 3 implies point 2).

2. If u_1 is discontinuous and u_2 is continuous, then for any $x < x_0$ and $x' > x_0$, we have $E\hat{p}_1 > x_0 > E\hat{p}_2$, which implies $\hat{p}_1 > \hat{p}_2$, and hence the result follows from the second part of Lemma 4.
3. This is just the statement of Lemma 11.

Part 1 of this lemma concludes the proof of parts 1 and 2 of the theorem, which concern the comparison between utility functions for which at least of them is discontinuous at x_0 . We now focus on the rest of the proof of part 3 of the theorem.

Hence, to complete the characterization of Part (ii) of Def. 7, we need to characterize the condition in part 2 of Lemma 4.

Step 1:

First note that, if both u_1 and u_2 are continuous, then $K_1 = K_2 = 0$. In this case, by continuity, $CE_i(p)$ exists for all p , and hence, letting $E\hat{p}_i(x, x') = \hat{p}_i(x, x') \cdot x' + (1 - \hat{p}_i(x, x')) \cdot x$, the cutoff probability $\hat{p}_i(x, x')$ can be written in implicit form as:

$$E\hat{p}_i(x, x') = u_i^{-1} (E\hat{p}_i(x, x')), \quad (11)$$

From (11), and from the definition of $m_i(x)$, the continuity of u_i implies the following properties:

$$\lim_{x' \rightarrow x_0^+} E\hat{p}_i(x, x') = x_0^-, \quad (12)$$

$$\lim_{x' \rightarrow x_0^+} \hat{p}_i(x, x') = 1, \quad (13)$$

$$\lim_{x' \rightarrow x_0^+} m_i(E\hat{p}_i(x, x')) = m_i^-(x_0), \quad (14)$$

$$\lim_{x' \rightarrow x_0^+} m_i(x') = m_i^+(x_0). \quad (15)$$

With these results in hand, we proceed to the next Lemma.

Lemma 13. *Under the maintained assumptions of the representation theorem, if u_i is continuous, then:*

$$\left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) = \frac{m_i(x) - m_i(x')}{\left[m_i(E\hat{p}_i) \frac{(x_0 - x)}{(x' - x)} - m_i(x') \right]}. \quad (16)$$

Proof. To simplify notation, in the following we will write \hat{p}_i instead of $\hat{p}_i(x, x')$, with the understanding however that \hat{p}_i should still be regarded as a function of x' . From (11), it is easy to see that for any $x < x_0$ and $x' > x_0$, \hat{p}_i satisfies the following condition:

$$m_i(E\hat{p}_i) \cdot \frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} + m_i(x') \cdot \frac{x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} = m_i(x) \cdot \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} + m_i(x') \cdot \frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \quad (17)$$

adding and subtracting $m_i(x') \cdot \frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i}$ from the LHS, and rearranging terms, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) [m_i(E\hat{p}_i) - m_i(x')] + m_i(x') \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i + x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) &= m_i(x) \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) + m_i(x') \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \right) \\ \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) [m_i(E\hat{p}_i) - m_i(x')] + m_i(x') \left(\frac{x' - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) &= m_i(x) \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) + m_i(x') \cdot \frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \\ \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) [m_i(E\hat{p}_i) - m_i(x')] &= m_i(x) \cdot \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} + m_i(x') \left[\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} - 1 \right] \\ \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) [m_i(E\hat{p}_i) - m_i(x')] &= m_i(x) \cdot \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} - m_i(x') \left[\frac{x - x_0}{x' - x} \right] \\ \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) \left[m_i(E\hat{p}_i) \frac{(x_0 - x)}{(x' - x)} - m_i(x') \right] &= m_i(x) - m_i(x') \\ \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_i}{x' - E\hat{p}_i} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) &= \frac{m_i(x) - m_i(x')}{\left[m_i(E\hat{p}_i) \frac{(x_0 - x)}{(x' - x)} - m_i(x') \right]} \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 14. *If both u_1 and u_2 are continuous, $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if*

$$\frac{[m_1(E\hat{p}_1) - m_1(x)]}{m_1(x')} - \frac{[m_2(E\hat{p}_1) - m_2(x)]}{m_2(x')} > \left(\frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(E\hat{p}_1)}{m_2(x')} \right) \left[1 - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) \right].$$

Proof. Using the characterization of $\hat{p}_i(x, x')$ in (17), we have:

$$\begin{aligned} m_1(x) \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) + m_1(x') \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \right) &= m_1(E\hat{p}_1) \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) + m_1(x') \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right), \text{ or} \\ m_1(x') \left[\left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] &= [m_1(E\hat{p}_1) - m_1(x)] \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - m_1(E\hat{p}_1) \left[\left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

and, for $\alpha = \frac{m_1(x')}{m_2(x')}$, we also have that $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha m_2(x) \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) + \alpha m_2(x') \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \right) &> \alpha m_2(E\hat{p}_1) \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) + \alpha m_2(x') \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right), \text{ or} \\ \alpha m_2(x') \left[\left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x' - x_0}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] &> [\alpha m_2(E\hat{p}_1) - \alpha m_2(x)] \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \alpha m_2(E\hat{p}_1) \left[\left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Notice that, by the definition of α , the LHS of equation (18) is the same as the LHS of (19). Hence, equalizing both sides we obtain that $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} [m_1(E\hat{p}_1) - m_1(x)] \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - m_1(E\hat{p}_1) \left[\left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] \\ > \alpha [m_2(E\hat{p}_1) - m_2(x)] \left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \alpha m_2(E\hat{p}_1) \left[\left(\frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x} \right) - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

re-arranging, substituting for $\alpha = \frac{m_1(x')}{m_2(x')}$, and dividing everything by $m_1(x')$, this is equivalent to:

$$\frac{[m_1(E\hat{p}_1) - m_1(x)]}{m_1(x')} - \frac{[m_2(E\hat{p}_1) - m_2(x)]}{m_2(x')} > \left(\frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(E\hat{p}_1)}{m_2(x')} \right) \left[1 - \left(\frac{x_0 - E\hat{p}_1}{x' - E\hat{p}_1} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) \right].$$

Lemma 15. *If both u_1 and u_2 are continuous, $\hat{p}_1(x, x') > \hat{p}_2(x, x')$ if and only if*

$$\frac{m_1(y) - m_1(x)}{m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x)} > \frac{m_1(y) - m_1(x')}{m_2(y) - m_2(x')} + (1 - \beta)\gamma(x, x', y), \quad (20)$$

where $\gamma(x, x', y) = \frac{m_1(y)m_1(x)m_2(x') - m_2(x)m_1(x')^2}{m_1(x')(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x))}$.

Proof. Let $\beta := \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x}$, and note that $\beta \in (0, 1)$ and $\beta \rightarrow 1$ as $x' \rightarrow x_0$. Also let $y = E\hat{p}_1$, and note that $y \rightarrow x_0$ as $x' \rightarrow x_0$ (these facts will be useful in the lemmas that follow). Then, from Lemma 13, we have that:

$$\left(\frac{x_0 - y}{x' - y} \right) \left(\frac{x' - x}{x_0 - x} \right) = \frac{m_1(x) - m_1(x')}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')}. \quad (21)$$

Substituting this notation in the condition of Lemma 14, and particularly using eq. (21), we obtain

$$\frac{m_1(y) - m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(y) - m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} > \left(\frac{m_1(y)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(y)}{m_2(x')} \right) \left(1 - \frac{m_1(x) - m_1(x')}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')} \right). \quad (22)$$

Next, re-arrange (22) to:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{m_1(y)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(y)}{m_2(x')} \right) - \left(\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} \right) > \left(\frac{m_1(y)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(y)}{m_2(x')} \right) \left(1 - \frac{m_1(x) - m_1(x')}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')} \right) \\ & \iff \\ & \left(\frac{m_1(y)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(y)}{m_2(x')} \right) \left(\frac{m_1(x) - m_1(x')}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')} \right) > \left(\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} - \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} \right) \\ & \iff \\ & \frac{1}{m_1(x')} \left(\frac{m_1(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x'))}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')} - m_1(x) \right) > \frac{1}{m_2(x')} \left(\frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x'))}{\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x')} - m_2(x) \right) \\ & \iff \\ & \frac{m_1(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_1(x)(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))}{m_1(x')(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))} > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_2(x)(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))}{m_2(x')(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))} \\ & \iff \\ & \frac{m_1(y)((1 - \beta)m_1(x) - m_1(x')) + m_1(x)m_1(x')}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_2(x)(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))}{m_2(x')} \\ & \iff \\ & \frac{m_1(x')(m_1(x) - m_1(y)) + (1 - \beta)m_1(y)m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_2(x)(\beta m_1(y) - m_1(x'))}{m_2(x')} \\ & \iff \\ & m_1(x) - m_1(y) + \frac{(1 - \beta)m_1(y)m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) + m_2(x)m_1(x')}{m_2(x')} - \frac{\beta m_2(x)m_1(y)}{m_2(x')} \\ & \iff \\ & m_1(y) \left(\frac{\beta m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} - 1 \right) + m_1(x) > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) + m_2(x)m_1(x')}{m_2(x')} - \frac{(1 - \beta)m_1(y)m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} \\ & \iff \\ & \frac{m_1(y)(\beta m_2(x) - m_2(x')) + m_1(x)m_2(x')}{m_2(x')} > \frac{m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) + m_2(x)m_1(x') - \frac{(1 - \beta)m_1(x)m_1(y)m_2(x')}{m_1(x')}}{m_2(x')} \end{aligned}$$

from which we obtain the following:

$$m_1(y)(\beta m_2(x) - m_2(x')) - m_1(x')m_2(x) + \frac{(1 - \beta)m_1(x)m_1(y)m_2(x')}{m_1(x')} > m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_1(x)m_2(x'). \quad (23)$$

rearranging now Equation 20 (and writing γ rather than $\gamma(x, x', y)$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
& m_1(y)m_2(y) - m_1(y)m_2(x') - m_1(x)m_2(y) + m_1(x)m_2(x') > \\
& m_1(y)m_2(y) - \beta m_1(y)m_2(x) - m_1(x')m_2(y) + \beta m_1(x')m_2(x) - \gamma(1-\beta)(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x)) \\
& \iff \\
& m_1(y)(\beta m_2(x) - m_2(x')) - \beta m_1(x')m_2(x) > \\
& m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_1(x)m_2(x') - \gamma(1-\beta)(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x)).
\end{aligned}$$

Using that $-\beta m_1(x')m_2(x) = (1-\beta)m_1(x')m_2(x) - m_1(x')m_2(x)$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
m_1(y)(\beta m_2(x) - m_2(x')) - m_1(x')m_2(x) + [\gamma(1-\beta)(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x)) + (1-\beta)m_1(x')m_2(x)] > \\
m_2(y)(m_1(x) - m_1(x')) - m_1(x)m_2(x'). \tag{24}
\end{aligned}$$

For Inequality 23 to hold if and only Inequality 24 holds, it must be that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\gamma(1-\beta)(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x)) + (1-\beta)m_1(x')m_2(x) = \frac{(1-\beta)m_1(x)m_1(y)m_2(x')}{m_1(x')} \\
\iff \tag{25}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\gamma = \frac{\frac{m_1(y)m_1(x)m_2(x)}{m_1(x')} - m_1(x')m_2(x)}{(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x))} \tag{26}$$

$$\iff \tag{27}$$

$$\gamma = \frac{m_1(y)m_1(x)m_2(x') - m_2(x)m_1(x'^2)}{m_1(x')(m_2(y) - m_2(x'))(m_2(y) - \beta m_2(x))}, \tag{28}$$

which concludes the proof of the lemma.

Lemma 16 (Part (ii): Necessity). *If both u_1 and u_2 are continuous, and if $m_i^- < \infty$ for both $i = 1, 2$, then Part (ii) of Def.7 implies*

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \geq \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}.$$

Proof. Part 2 of Lemma 4 and Lemma 15 imply that, if part (ii) of Def.7 holds, then there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t., for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$,

$$\frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x)}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - \beta m_2(x)} > \frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x')}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_2(x')} + [1 - \beta(x, x')] \gamma(x, x'), \tag{29}$$

where $\beta = \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x}$, and $\gamma(x, x') = \frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x'))m_1(x)m_2(x') - m_2(x)m_1(x'^2)}{m_1(x')(m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_2(x'))(m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - \beta(x, x')m_2(x))}$. For any such $x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, taking limits as $x' \rightarrow 0^+$, and using the limits in equations (12)-(15), the condition in (29) converges to the following:

$$\frac{m_1^-(x_0) - m_1(x)}{m_2^-(x_0) - m_2(x)} \geq \frac{m_1^-(x_0) - m_1^+(x_0)}{m_2^-(x_0) - m_2^+(x_0)},$$

dividing both sides by m_1^-/m_2^- , this yields

$$\frac{[m_1^-(x_0) - m_1(x)]/m_1^-(x_0)}{[m_2^-(x_0) - m_2(x)]/m_2^-(x_0)} \geq \frac{1 - m_1^+(x_0)/m_1^-(x_0)}{1 - m_2^+(x_0)/m_1^-(x_0)}.$$

Since this needs to hold for all $x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, it also holds for $x \rightarrow x_0^-$, i.e.

$$\left(\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \right) \geq \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-},$$

which completes the proof of the Lemma.

Lemma 17 (Part (ii): Sufficiency). *If both u_1 and u_2 are continuous, and if $m_i^- < \infty$ for both $i = 1, 2$, then*

$$\left(\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \right) > \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}$$

implies that Part (ii) of Def.7 holds

Proof. If $\left(\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} \right) > \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-}$, then there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{[m_1^-(x_0) - m_1(x)]/m_1^-(x_0)}{[m_2^-(x_0) - m_2(x)]/m_2^-(x_0)} &\geq \frac{1 - m_1^+(x_0)/m_1^-(x_0)}{1 - m_2^+(x_0)/m_1^-(x_0)}, \text{ that is} \\ \frac{m_1^-(x_0) - m_1(x)}{m_2^-(x_0) - m_2(x)} &\geq \frac{m_1^-(x_0) - m_1^+(x_0)}{m_2^-(x_0) - m_2^+(x_0)} \end{aligned}$$

But since functions $\beta(\cdot)$, $\gamma(\cdot)$, $m_i(\cdot)$ and $E\hat{p}_1(\cdot)$ are all continuous in x' , for any such $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t., for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$,

$$\frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x)}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - \beta m_2(x)} > \frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x')}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_2(x')} + [1 - \beta(x, x')] \gamma(x, x'). \quad (30)$$

The result then follows from Lemma 15.

Lemmas 4, 16 and 17, together with Lemma 6 (noting that for $K_1 = K_2 = 0$, the expression in the lemma reduces to $\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}$, which by continuity holds if $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} > \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$, and only if $\frac{m_1^-}{m_1^+} \geq \frac{m_2^-}{m_2^+}$), prove the theorem.

Proof of Theorem 6.

Proof. Note that with differentiability, $Du_i^+ = m_i^+$, $Du_i^- = m_i^-$, and that $D^2u_i^- = \lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{m_i^- - m_i(x)}{x_0 - x}$ for $i = \{1, 2\}$. Parts 1 and 2 of the theorem therefore follow directly from parts 1 and 2, respectively, of Theorem 5. Part 3 follows from the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[m_1^- - m_1(x)]/m_1^-}{[m_2^- - m_2(x)]/m_2^-} &\geq \frac{1 - m_1^+/m_1^-}{1 - m_2^+/m_2^-} \\
&\iff \\
\lim_{x \rightarrow x_0^-} \frac{[\frac{m_1^- - m_1(x)}{x_0 - x}]/m_1^-}{[\frac{m_2^- - m_2(x)}{x_0 - x}]/m_2^-} &\geq \frac{(m_1^- - m_1^+)/m_1^-}{(m_2^- - m_2^+)/m_2^-} \\
&\iff \\
\frac{D^2 u_1^-}{D^2 u_1^+} &\geq \frac{D u_1^- - D u_1^+}{D u_2^- - D u_2^+} \\
&\iff \\
\frac{D^2 u_1^-}{D u_1^- - D u_1^+} &\geq \frac{D^2 u_2^-}{D u_2^- - D u_2^+}.
\end{aligned}$$

B.1 Interpersonal Comparisons: A Tight Characterization

The next result provides a tight characterization of the ranking of agents' failure avoidance (as per Def. 7), in terms of the key elements in the main representation theorem:

Theorem 10. *Let preferences \succsim_1 and \succsim_2 both satisfy the conditions in Def. 3 with respect to the same $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$. Then, \succsim_1 displays more failure avoidance than \succsim_2 if and only if there exists $\underline{x} < x_0$, such that $\forall x \in (\underline{x}, x_0)$, there exists $\bar{x} > x_0$, s.t., for all $x' \in (x_0, \bar{x})$, one of the following applies:*

1. $K_1 > 0$ and $\frac{K_1}{m_1(x')} - \frac{K_2}{m_2(x')} > \left[\frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')} - \frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} \right] (x_0 - x)$.
2. $K_1 = K_2 = 0$, $\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}$ and

$$\frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x)}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - \beta m_2(x)} > \frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_1(x')}{m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_2(x')} + [1 - \beta(x, x')] \gamma(x, x'), \quad (31)$$

where $\beta = \frac{x_0 - x}{x' - x}$, and $\gamma(x, x') = \frac{m_1(E\hat{p}_1(x, x'))m_1(x)m_2(x') - m_2(x)m_1(x'^2)}{m_1(x')(m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - m_2(x'))(m_2(E\hat{p}_1(x, x')) - \beta(x, x')m_2(x))}$.

Proof. Lemma 10 above proves part 1 of the theorem, while Lemma 4, together with Lemma 6 (concerning the \bar{p}_i ranking, noting that for $K_1 = K_2 = 0$, the expression in the lemma reduces to $\frac{m_1(x)}{m_1(x')} > \frac{m_2(x)}{m_2(x')}$) and Lemma 15 (concerning the \hat{p}_i ranking) prove part 2 of the theorem.

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